


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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

International Affairs

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Soviet Union

International Affairs

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CPSU Subsidies to Foreign Communist Parties Investigated

92UF0301A Moscow *NEW TIMES* in English
No 44, 5-11 Nov 91 pp 4-7

[Article: "NT Investigates; The Secret File of the Politburo"—first paragraph is *NEW TIMES* introduction]

[Text] The CPSU plundered the impoverished country. The money expropriated from Ryazan peasants and Vorkuta miners, received as Western countries' aid, was channelled to "fraternal" Communist Parties, hoarded in safes of European banks, spent to satisfy the Party elite's needs...

Nikolai Kruchina and Georgy Pavlov, two former executive managers of the CPSU Central Committee (Pavlov from 1965 to 1983, and Kruchina, from 1983 to 1991), will not answer any questions—they jumped to their deaths from the windows of their Moscow apartments. Dmitry Lisovolik, former Deputy Sector Head of the International Department of the CPSU, recently committed suicide, too.

Speaking at the 28th Congress of the CPSU in July 1990, Nikolai Kruchina swore that the Communist Party's only means of subsistence was dues coming from the Party members: "There are no bank accounts or property of the CPSU abroad. There is only one source of the Party's hard currency revenues: dues coming from Party members who work abroad. Hard currency revenues of the Party go to the state budget and are returned to the Party in the form of their equivalent in Soviet rubles calculated at the official exchange rates..."

"Hard currency for Party organizations was allocated to us according to the standard procedure for all ministries and departments. On our part we compensated for the hard currency thus received to the Ministry of Finance with sums in Soviet rubles calculated at the official exchange rates."

In November 1990, the Central Control Commission under the CPSU Central Committee which convened under the chairmanship of the late Boris Pugo analyzed the reasons for the worsening of the Party's financial situation and concluded that rank-and-file Communists were to blame: they forgot about Party discipline and did not pay the dues in time. The Control Commission stated that other financial affairs of the Party were in perfect shape. Nothing was said about the money draining abroad...
Pocket Money for Pocket P 219/7, September 20, 1985

Concerning the request of member of the ICP leadership Comrade Cossutta

1. The request of member of the ICP leadership Comrade Cossutta for the allocation in 1985 of \$200,000 for the publishing of the magazine *HORIZONS* has been satisfied.

2. The State Bank of the USSR (Comrade Alkhimov) is hereby instructed to allocate Comrade Boris Nikolayevich Ponomaryov \$200,000 for special purposes.

3. The KGB is instructed to carry out the transfer of the money.

Issued September 23, 1985 [excerpt]

12.	Danish CP	350,000	To Copenhagen	paid	100,000 - 17/I, 100,000 - 11/IV-85	494. 157/2389 of 28.X.85	Receipt of \$30,693.68
-			Comrade Jensen		40,000 - 12/VII-85, 180,000 - 18/VI	OP2892 of 29.X.85.	confirmed by B...(USA)
13.	Peruvian CP	350,000	To Lima	paid	100,000 - 8/I, 150,000 - 8/V		
14.	CP of El Salvador	400,000		paid	200,000 - 31/I, 200,000 - 29/V	495. 157/2390 of 28.X.85	Receipt of \$250,000
-						OP2893 of 29.X.85	confirmed by the CP USA
15.	CP of Argentina	400,000	Buenos Aires	paid	150,000 - 22/I, 100,000 - 24/IV	496. 161/2817 of 30.X.85	Receipt of \$200,000
-						OP2903 of 30.X.85	confirmed by Cappelloni for Cossutta
16.	CP of Brazil	300,000		paid	100,000 -10/I, 100,000 - 11/VI	497. 161/2783 of 29.X.85	Receipt of F2,196,550
-					100,000 - 6/III-87	OP2914 of 31.X.85	confirmed by R. Urbany
17.	AKEL	300,000		paid	100,000 - 4/II, 100,000 - 24/IV	498. 161/2818 of 30.X.85	Receipt of £69,445
-					100,000 - 3/X	OP2915 of 31.X.85	confirmed by Papaioannou
18.	Iraqi CP	300,000		paid	200,000 - 4/II, 100,000 - 1/VII	499. 165/2455 of 30.X.85	Receipt of \$30,000
-						OP2916 of 31.X.85	confirmed by F...

19.	CP (Spain)	300,000		paid	150,000 - 17/I, 150,000 - 10/VI	500. 163/1630 of 17.VI.85	Receipt of \$32,000
-						OP1617 of 17.VI.85	confirmed by M.M.'s letter
20.	Comrade Cossutta	300,000		paid	200,000 - 10/I (Zagladin)	501. 164/2038 of 31.X.85	Receipt of \$22,633
-					100,000 - 14/II	OP2939 of 01.II.85	confirmed by B. Boran...
21.	CP of Austria	250,000	To Vienna	paid	120,000 - 16/I, 130,000 - 25/II-87		
22.	Syrian CP	250,000		paid	100,000 - 4/II, 80,000 - 2/VI		
-					70,000 - 3/X		
23.	PLAS	250,000		paid	100,000 - 17/I, 80,000 - 3/VI		
-					70,000 - 18/II-87		
24.	Egyptian CP	230,000		paid	100,000 - 14/II, 130,000 - .../VI		

A page from a working diary of an International Department official. The rest of the text was illegible. Parties

We are not guilty of anything

NEW TIMES has gotten several pages from a secret working diary that must have belonged to a responsible official of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee (an assistant to or deputy of the Department Head). The authenticity of the pages is confirmed by the characteristic manner of binding and stamps on each page. The official who kept the diary must have been responsible for keeping the accounts of the CPSU's financial assistance to "fraternal" Communist Parties. The pages have been reproduced by LA STAMPA. Even these few pages with figures which must have seemed dull and tiresome to the keeper of the diary make it possible to imagine the scale of the Communist Party's transfer of money to foreign comrades-in-arms struggling for the triumph of the ideals of communism. One of the pages contains a list of Communist Parties' leaders or their emissaries confirming the receipt of CPSU donations in various hard currencies. The numbers beside each confirmation look impressive: from 494th to 501st (besides, seven out of the eight donations listed were issued in the course of one month of October 1985). One can only guess how many recipients of CPSU money there were and how many such diaries were kept by International Department officials throughout the years of the CPSU's cooperation with foreign Communist Parties. Another page (see facsimile at the top of page 6) [not reproduced] contains abstracts from Politburo (as is shown by the small letter "p" before each number) decisions on allocation of sums in hard currency "for special use." A few hastily written lines were enough to activate the huge mechanism of money transfer: Politburo - International Department - State Bank - KGB - foreign Communist Parties...

The facsimile on page 6 (bottom) reproduces the register of Politburo-ordered money transfers. The names of the recipients reveal the geography of the transfers: Europe, Latin America, the Middle East...

A NEW TIMES correspondent tried to interview the former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, head of the International Department Valentin Falin, about the transfer of money to foreign Communist Parties. Valentin Falin refused to be interviewed and made the following statement:

"When I served as Central Committee Secretary, there were no instances of the CPSU financing foreign Communist Parties. As for earlier such instances, I do not have any knowledge of them, so you should ask my predecessors. I will not be able to declare my position on the current discussion of the matter, as long as I do not have official documents."

Meanwhile the press has already published some documents: CPSU Central Committee Directive No. R-175/3 of December 11, 1989, to the Director of the State Bank of the USSR "to allocate a sum of \$22 million for 1990 for special use" to Head of the international Department of the CPSU Central Committee, former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin. Another directive, No. R-54/18, states how the money must be divided: for the CP of the United States, two million dollars; to the CP of France, two million dollars; to the CP of Portugal, one million dollars; to the CP of Greece, nine hundred thousand dollars; to the CP of Israel, five hundred thousand dollars; and to the CP of India, three hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

The commission investigating the CPSU involvement in the coup has discovered \$600,000 in the safe of the Head of the International Department Valentin Falin.

Vadim Zagladin, former Deputy Head of the International Department, has denied any involvement in the CPSU money scandal.

"I have never distributed dollars, but someone in the CPSU might have done it," he said in an interview for L'UNITA. "I have never dealt with money intended for other parties... The mention of my name is slanderous... I have never given a single dollar to anyone..."

The name of Zagladin is found in the money transfer register (see page 6).

London, Bonn Reaction to Minsk Agreement

92UF0335A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Dec 91 p 3

[Reaction from foreign capitals reported by correspondents V. Sisnev, S. Bunin, R. Urmantsev, R. Kolchanov, and A. Burmistenko: "Ambivalent Reaction: The World Assesses the Decision of the Leaders of the Three Slav States"]

[Text] BONN

Analyzing the situation which has emerged, the newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU distinguishes four factors which brought about the need for the decision on the Commonwealth of Independent States. First, the Novo-Ogarevo process was at an impasse. Second, the center which exists currently had on account of its short-sighted policy brought the country to the point of political and economic crisis. Third, social tension has grown and ethnic contradictions have become exacerbated in many regions of the country. Fourth, obstacles in the way of the implementation of vitally necessary reforms are piling up.

The prevailing opinion is that the new commonwealth will be more successful in tackling these tasks than the present authorities. The newspaper BILDZEITUNG, for example, writes: "The new Russian-Slav revolution has only just begun. If it succeeds, 290 million persons will switch from Marx via chaos to the market. If not, their path will be from Marx via chaos to civil war."

Foreign policy aspects attendant on the termination of the existence of the USSR are being discussed with anxiety and concern: Will the Commonwealth be the successor of the Soviet Union, will it assume fulfillment of the international agreements concluded earlier. The newspaper NEUE RUHR-ZEITUNG expresses these sentiments, "We would very much like to know precisely whose finger will be on the button of the nuclear missiles, will the disarmament treaties be observed and who will guarantee this, will the policy of detente continue...."

Much space is devoted to the fate of the president of the USSR. In this connection BILDZEITUNG publishes a mini-interview with Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev.

[BILDZEITUNG] What will happen to Gorbachev?

[Kozyrev] With the signing of the treaty all organs of the former Union should cease their activity immediately. This extends to the office of the president also. We will take almost all specialists. We will find work for Gorbachev also.

[BILDZEITUNG] And if he is unwilling?

[Kozyrev] It is a question merely of the way in which the remnants of his authority will be transferred to the Commonwealth of Independent States. There are two possibilities: with the aid of force or without it. We want a civilized transfer of authority to the new Commonwealth—authority over the army and nuclear weapons included. We rule out the forcible path.

[BILDZEITUNG] Will it remain only a triple commonwealth?

[Kozyrev] I believe that Armenia and certain other republics will join shortly. The Commonwealth is open to the East European states, to Bulgaria and Romania, for example, also.

[BILDZEITUNG] Why was so surprise an action necessary?

[Kozyrev] In place of the irresponsible Union, there should appear to the world community a civilized commonwealth of free states which guarantees peace and human rights.

LONDON

"The agreement reached on Sunday," THE TIMES writes, "has still to be filled with specific content—like almost everything else in the collapsing empire, even such a decisive step could be reduced to 'basis for negotiations' status. Much as yet remains unclear, from the budget of the commonwealth through the distribution of power among its potential members. But if the Minsk Declaration enjoys practical development, this will be the best news from Moscow since the failure of the August coup."

"There is, however, a tremendous distance between the political optimism evoked by the Minsk Declaration and the gathering storm of economic calamity," THE INDEPENDENT emphasizes. "No political agreement will work if people lose faith in its capacity for feeding them."

This is also noted by J. Steel, Moscow correspondent of THE GUARDIAN. "Ultimately the Minsk Commonwealth, like all the other draft treaties and other documents which have appeared in an abundance in the last 12 months, is as yet only a declaration," he writes. "The key problems of the former Soviet Union do not lie in the sphere of constitutional change. They amount to a manageable and flexible transition to a market economy and also to whether the fragile democracy which has sprung up in the past two years can survive and strengthen or whether it will be swept away by a fatal impatient nostalgia for a 'strong hand.' Commonwealth or Union—this is not now the main issue."

UN Secretary General Candidate Reviewed

92UF0268A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by A. Shal'nev and V. Lashkul: "Boutros Boutros Ghali"]

[Text] The Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt Butrus Butrus Ghali was nominated to the post of UN Secretary General for a five-year term. The resolution concerning this was adopted by the UN Security Council on Thursday evening. The final decision will be made by the General Assembly of the world organization, in all probability, by consensus, without a vote. Even now, however, there is little doubt that this Egyptian, who went through a rigid selection process in the Security Council, will become an occupant of the office on the 38th floor of the skyscraper on the East River. For the first time in the

history of the United Nations it will be headed by a representative of Africa who at the same time personifies the Arab world as well.

The Security Council conducted the first and only round of voting on the candidacy of the future secretary general at a closed session. The most "yes" votes—eleven votes, were received by the deputy prime minister of Egypt. In the opinion of diplomats France, USSR, and China were among those supporting the Egyptian, there were no "opposed" votes and four delegations abstained.

Ghali is a well-known political figure in the UAR and an outstanding jurist. He played a decisive role in the elaboration of the Camp David Accords. Ghali is a Christian Arab married to a Jewish woman. One of his minuses is considered to be his age—he is almost seventy. In responding to the question of whether he feels himself to be too old at his age, however, Ghali, who has worked in the international arena for over forty years, said to the journalists: "This question boils down to how you feel." According to him he has made various business trips twice a month just in the past fourteen years. We will add that the future head of the world organization will have to work from 1 January 1992 until 31 December 1996 at the post of UN Secretary General.

He will have to undertake further efforts toward the limitation and reduction of weapons, and regulation of such acute regional conflicts as the one in the Near East and others. The problems that will have to be resolved by the new secretary general include the ensurance of a more even economic development of all countries of the world, completion of the process involving renovation of the UN, as well as implementation of long overdue reforms in the activity of this organization.

The pressing need for a radical reorganization of the UN is ripe because even today it continues to exist according to rules formulated some fifty years ago which apply to another epoch. With consideration of the role which has now been acquired by the world organization a series of changes are all the more necessary. The "new view" of the UN will, among other things, also indicate the probability of fundamental financial reforms and curtailment of an unduly bloated personnel structure which is currently endowed with all possible financial and fiscal privileges.

Boutros Ghali has visited the Soviet Union a number of times. In an interview with *Izvestiya* on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Egypt he highly praised cooperation between our countries, stressing that it undoubtedly serves to consolidate stability in the world and in the region.

IZVESTIYA Ponders 'End of Era of Terrorism'

*PM1012163191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Dec 91 Union Edition p 10*

["Editorial Viewpoint" article: "End of Era of Terrorism"]

[Text] The release of U.S. journalist Terry Anderson in Lebanon may quite possibly mark the end of the era of terrorism.

The era of terrorism is an arbitrary period. It does not include the horrors of King Herod, the rivers of blood during the Jacobin dictatorship, or the "Red Terror" and the execution of the Russian royal family.

This period of history is considered to have started with the attack on the Israeli sportsmen during the 1972 Munich Olympics. The death of several dozen young men and women stunned everyone not only by its brutality but also by its obvious pointlessness.

The point was revealed later. It turned out that information written in blood wings its way around the world immeasurably faster than that in ink. The victims' innocence only fuels public interest. Parties and communities numbering hundreds of thousands or even millions of people remain in shadow, giving up their place on the front pages to groups whose scorn and contempt for the value of human life quite makes up for their smallness.

What do we know about the Norwegian Socialist Party? Less than about the Baader-Meinhoff group which has to its credit several daring attacks on prominent Germans. Ships being hijacked, aircraft being blown up, hostages and property being detained for years on end for belonging to a nation, state, or profession or for living on a particular street—these have changed traditional notions about the adequacy of security measures.

There is no doubt that the former Soviet Union, the former GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Iran (the list is incomplete) did all they could to back terrorism. Banditry backed by a state system was scientifically well-founded and financially unshakable. It enlisted not only inveterate scoundrels, but also passionate idealists into the ranks of the professionals. Without sparing themselves or others, these few people imparted an air of sacrifice to the tribe of hired killers.

But there are always fewer killers than the people they kill. It was not only people like Aldo Moro or corporations like PanAm, which simply never got over its Boeing being blown up over Ireland [as published], that have fallen victim to terror, but also hundreds of innocent people whose names will only be remembered by their inconsolable families.

The decline of terrorism did not coincide with the collapse of communism, since it had a powerful inertia. However, its time has come. Libya no longer takes pride, as it did before, in its special services' officers. It is quite likely that al-Qadhafi will hand over his assistants under pressure of personal liability.

But in all cases the world community's powerful defense against terrorists will survive the era of terror. For a long time to come people will pay large sums of money for protection against political insanity. So, the activity of the new Soviet Central Intelligence Service, the KGB's successor, designed to strengthen joint actions with foreign intelligence services in order to completely eradicate terrorism, will be needed for a long time to come.

Helsinki Accords, USSR Collapse Viewed
PM1012120991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "Trials for Helsinki Process"]

[Text] Last Sunday the most cherished dream of many of my fellow citizens came true. They acquired relations abroad, that is in Ukraine. As for me, I have been lucky twice over. An international commentator from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has finally acquired the opportunity to observe the life of a foreign power while on leave and not during brief work trips...

But let us leave irony aside. Of course, it is very possible to explain in the manner of Cassandra, as M. Gorbachev does, the extremely adverse economic, political, and international consequences of the collapse of the Union, which already seems inevitable. The truth of such constructs is obvious and is confirmed by foreign observers. "Any intelligent person," the British DAILY TELEGRAPH writes, "acknowledges that the republics which are leaving the Union would have far better chances of achieving economic and political success if they cooperated among themselves and did not waste time and money on creating new borders and new armed forces and elaborating complex new trade agreements."

But for all the justice of these opinions they have one substantial failing—they will no longer be able to change anything. Abraham Lincoln, a president who was prepared to fight the Southern states which had decided to secede, said at the same time: "If you are leading an elephant on a rope and the elephant wants to run, it is better to let him run." What is one to do if despite all the arguments of reason the elephant of sovereignization smashes all hopes of creating a new union?

Such is the reality. And our former opponents and present partners throughout the world have accepted it reluctantly. It is also hard for them to alter their guidelines and it was far more convenient for them to deal with known leaders according to a scheme of confrontation or cooperation worked out over years. They are alarmed by the prospect of the emergence of several states which are superpowerful in the military respect but at the same time highly unstable on the domestic political plane. But politicians deal with what exists and not with what they would like.

And the United States, followed by the West European states, Canada, and other countries, has hastened to determine its interests and essentially to set precise terms before the new state. Their fulfillment could ensure rapid recognition for Ukraine. It is a case of observing the treaties and commitments of the Soviet Union on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, on the reduction of both nuclear and conventional arms, on the retention of unified control of nuclear weapons. The question is being raised of responsibility for the USSR foreign debt and of the fulfillment of international human rights agreements. It is on these avenues that the U.S. secretary of state will soon hold talks in Kiev.

I have no doubt that the West will persuade Ukraine and those who decide to follow its example of the need to fulfill this minimum program. But one cannot fail to see that even if Ukraine and the others noisily confirm their adherence to the above-mentioned principles then in fact many very important international agreements may be buried under the rubble of the Union. Take the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, whichever way you turn with Ukraine's independence the nuclear club will be increased by one member. And the Ukrainian nuclear potential will exceed the French and British potentials combined. The Americans see a way out in the speediest destruction of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. And they are prepared to assist Ukraine in that. Actually, we shall wait and see. A serious uncertainty arises also in connection with the fulfillment of the paris agreements on conventional arms.

But in my view the main problem is connected with the conclusion 16 years ago of the Helsinki Act, which proclaimed the principles of the sovereign equality of states, the nonuse of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. It must be said that all these years the interpretation of individual clauses of this document has given rise to certain disputes. The new situation has given rise to new challenges which will evidently be the main topic at the conference of heads of the states taking part in the Helsinki process to be held in the spring of next year. Now centrifugal forces are gathering such strength in Europe that in the opinion of a JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY expert in a few years there will be nearly 30 new states on the political map of the old World. States which not only have not signed the Helsinki agreements but which also have territorial claims against each other and intend to resolve them by force.

I recall that it is the territorial problem which lies at the basis of the bloody tragedy in Yugoslavia. And now many European states are already prepared to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Consequently their conflict with the other republics is being projected into the future.

Territorial disputes are literally shaking the former Union. You only have to mention Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Checheno-Ingushetia, Gagauzia, and the Dnestr republic. Disagreement with existing borders (of which hardly one fifth is properly demarcated) is also being voiced by the Baltic neighbors. The problems of borders, White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater stressed at a press conference devoted to Ukraine, do actually exist.

But even that is far from all. Romania, which has signed the Helsinki agreements, is now talking of reviewing its borders with Ukraine. I have in mind the statement on the Romanian parliament's nonrecognition of the results of a referendum on what in its opinion are "non-Ukrainian" lands: North Bukovina, Khotin, and South Bessarabia. And it cannot be guaranteed that this example will not be infectious for those who regard as unjust the borders which have formed since World War II. And that they will not risk using force.

Yes, recent events have shown the imperfection of the existing system of European security constructed for a "bipolar Europe." But today, when the foundations of this system have been threatened, you understand that there is as yet no other legal base for safeguarding peace in Europe. Need one mention the consequences with which even a hint of the undermining of the Helsinki agreement is fraught under the conditions of the present instability.

Official on Inquiry Into 1979 Anthrax Event

92400030A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 45, 13 Nov 91 p 2

[Report by *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* correspondent for the Urals Natalya Zenova, under the rubric "Continuing a Topic": "Once Again on 'Military Secrets'"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—*LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* was first in the country to conduct an independent investigation on the causes of the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk. We maintained that this calamity took place not because of consumption of "infested meat," as the official version stated, but after an emergency discharge of substances related to biological warfare ("Military Secrets," *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, No. 34, 1990).

This topic was continued in one more article ("Military Secrets, Part II," *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, No. 39, 1991), which provided new arguments supporting the same conclusion.

On the basis of this newspaper's investigation, a deputy's inquiry was sent to the president of Russia. Boris Yeltsin assigned the handling of this problem, which produced serious international reverberations, to Aleksey Yablokov, state adviser on ecology and health care, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

This is what A. Yablokov told our correspondent:

"I will see to it that this matter is taken to its logical conclusion. The first step, which we have already taken, was to contact the KGB—let them dig into their archives and officially reply: "yes" or "no." If "yes," if the military admits fault, then the issue is resolved in principle, and one of the main tasks that remains is to get more precise figures on the number of families that perished, and to determine the amount of monetary compensation. If "no," then a government commission will be created on the basis of the argued conclusions reached by the press.

"However, I would like to state right now, before the investigation of the Sverdlovsk emergency comes to an end: Our parliament should adopt a law that will make the development, production, and storage of biological weapons a criminal offense. A law of this kind was adopted in the United States last year. Also, this crime should be put in the category of those without a statute of limitations—that is, a crime against humanity."

Bessmertnykh August Coup Role Examined

PM0512112091 Moscow *NEW TIMES* in English
No 45, 12-18 Nov 91 pp 4-7

[Galina Sidorova article: "The Mystery of Two Putsches"]

[Text] There is something that all participants in the August events prefer to keep silent about, even the most talkative ones, regardless of whether they work in the Kremlin or await trial at Moscow's Matrosskaya Tishina prison. Some of them may start talking at the trial. Others may wait until they have retired, and still others will never talk. Such are the laws of politics, the laws of half-truths which the rulers use in their relations with the ruled. In this country, these laws are observed more meticulously than anywhere. Will we ever live to know the truth about the August putsch? I do not think so. History has seen many an example that the whole truth rarely becomes known. Even today there appear new versions of the John F. Kennedy's assassination. At the same time, political secrets have one specific feature: sometimes they unexpectedly come to the surface. This is what happened to the secret that the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, is still trying to keep, the secret which I happened to involuntarily witness in its inception in June 1991, although at that time I did not really suspect anything.

Berlin, June 20

The former soviet embassy in Berlin, now the Berlin branch of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. I had just returned from the joint news conference of Bessmertnykh and Baker, at which the ministers announced that the START Treaty was almost ready for signing. My job done, I sat down to relax in a cosy old arm-chair near the main staircase of the Embassy. Was there anything I could expect from the Minister, one more briefing, for example? As I sat there thinking, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus stode past me to meet Bessmertnykh in the latter's office. I was almost ready to follow the example of other journalists and go, when suddenly Bessmertnykh appeared from a side corridor, his face a mask of anxiety. I do not think he noticed me at all. Several top diplomats from the Embassy staff trotted behind him. One of them asked me whether I had seen Bessmertnykh's deputy whom they were looking for. I knew where the deputy was, but I did not tell them. Actually, the deputy had allowed himself some time to go out, knowing that the bulk of the work had been done and the Minister did not need him. Not finding his deputy, the Minister took a senior expert in US affairs with him and went out to the Embassy inner yard through the back door. A second later I heard the screech of the opening gates and the rustling of the tyres of the ministerial limousine.

One floor up, the unsuspecting Cypriot Minister was chatting with Soviet diplomats waiting for Bessmertnykh to appear from the adjacent room. What happened? It took several months and the August putsch before I knew the answer.

Lake Naroch, August 18

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh was taking a stroll in the forest in a two-hour drive from Minsk, Belorussia, making plans for a grand fishing expedition, when his assistants found him and said he was to phone to Moscow. When he got to the phone, Bessmertnykh was told that KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov wanted to speak to him. Bessmertnykh asked to be connected with the KGB chairman. Kryuchkov said he was to come to Moscow "To discuss one serious matter" and that a special military plane reserved for the commander of the local military district was already on its way to collect the Minister and take him to Moscow.

Bessmertnykh says that very often it was Kryuchkov who phoned him to inform him of emergencies. The minister assured his wife that he would be back the next day to continue the vacation and, accompanied by a body-guard, flew to Moscow. An approaching thunderstorm nearly delayed their departure, but the plane managed to take off. Around 12 p.m. on August 18, Bessmertnykh appeared in the Kremlin, wearing a windjacket and a pair of jeans.

The Kremlin office

"I later wondered myself," Bessmertnykh said, "and at that time I just did not give it much thought. All big Kremlin offices look alike. It was a huge office of a big boss. There were portraits of Lenin and Marx on the walls. I saw a big green table and sitting around it were members of the state and CPSU leadership, including the Interior Minister, the minister of Defence, Boldin, Shenin, Yanayev, Pavlov and Lukyanov. The place of the chairman was vacant. I apologized for the way I looked and sat down at the end of the table, waiting for someone to inform me about some serious catastrophe. An uncomfortable silence set in..."

Vladimir Kryuchkov appeared as if from nowhere to talk with Bessmertnykh. The KGB chairman asked the Minister to come with him to the next room and said: "The situation in the country is critical and bordering on chaos. It has been decided to impose a state of emergency in the country. A special state committee is being set up to maintain the state of emergency, and it has been suggested that you join it." Bessmertnykh's first question to Kryuchkov was: "Has Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev so decided?" Kryuchkov answered: "Mikhail Sergeyevich is seriously ill and can barely move. The committee will be headed by Yanayev." Bessmertnykh said: "I will not join the committee," and Kryuchkov replied: "You must..." The KGB chairman produced a folder containing the list of committee members and Bessmertnykh immediately noticed his name on it. "I took a blue pen out of my pocket and crossed my name out," says Bessmertnykh. "After that we returned to the big office, and Kryuchkov announced: 'Bessmertnykh has refused.'"

Bessmertnykh heard Kryuchkov phoning someone and saying the same.

"Whom did he call?"

"I don't know."

"Didn't you suspect anything fishy that night?"

"I saw Gorbachev's closest entourage at the conference, including Boldin, Plekhanov and other state and party leaders. The question of a state of emergency had been repeatedly raised before at various sittings. Actually, the question was in the air..."

Was what Bessmertnykh heard on August 19 in the Kremlin entirely unexpected for him?

When his wife arrived from Minsk a day later, Bessmertnykh told her that he had refused to become a member of the emergency committee, that he could be fired at any time, and that other troubles might be coming. He told his wife not to go out with their little son Arseniy because he "did not know what those people might be up to." His family decided not to eat the dinners which are brought to Soviet leaders in sealed canisters.

On August 19, Bessmertnykh sent telegrams to Soviet embassies, saying that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was shaped by the constitutional bodies of power. The emergency committee was not listed among such bodies. Bessmertnykh insists the telegram said enough for a clever ambassador to understand what the situation was like. At approximately the same time most embassies received official documents from the emergency committee via TASS.

In the evening of the same day Bessmertnykh was ill with an onset of gall-stones, and on August 20 he followed the developments from his home. A document of the emergency committee was brought to him for signing. It was to be circulated by TASS after that. The document was "the Soviet leadership's response to the August 19 statement of President Bush: "The attempts by the U.S. President to portray the emergency measures of the Soviet leadership aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country as unconstitutional cannot fail to produce a great amount of concern. Obviously, the U.S. President, with his rich experience, must know that any sovereign state has certain procedures to independently determine the legality of various steps in domestic policy. Actually, this is not the first time the United States chooses to ignore this inseparable right of independent states. Suffice it to recall Grenada and Panama... Even greater indignation is caused by the support voiced by the U.S. President to direct instigation to unlawful actions by certain politicians in the Soviet Union. Only recently the U.S. Administration is virtually trying to undermine the appearing national concord..."

Bessmertnykh wrote on the statement:

"I cannot agree with the contents of this statement which can aggravate Soviet-American relations and the situation around this country." The document with Bessmertnykh's note was sent back to the emergency committee.

Strangely, at the press conference after the putsch Bessmertnykh chose not to mention that he had crossed his name off the list of emergency committee members: according to him, he wanted to report this to the President first.

The climax came on August 23. Says Bessmertnykh: "Gorbachev called me using the direct phone line. There were voices in his office. He said, 'I've been told that you were passive during these three days.' I replied: 'This is not so, but if you prefer to put it like that, I am to resign, aren't I?' 'Yes, Aleksandr, you have to resign in these circumstances.'"

During this short conversation, neither Gorbachev nor Bessmertnykh mentioned a certain event that happened two months before August 23. Both must have remembered it, though. Several days after his resignation, Bessmertnykh sent a letter to Gorbachev, in which, as he said himself, he "described in detail the events of the tragic days in order to restore the good name of the diplomatic service and himself." I suggested that this letter be published in *New Times*. After a moment's pause, Bessmertnykh said he could not publish the letter before he got an answer from Gorbachev. He has not heard from the President since then. Shortly after that, however, there was some talk about Bessmertnykh's possible return to the diplomatic service, but he decided that "the best option for him was to withdraw from the government and remain on the other side."

Berlin, June 20

Where did Bessmertnykh go that day? It did not take me long to discover that James Baker had called him. However, the Soviet Minister returned from the Secretary of State's residence only an hour before James Baker's call.

Soon Bessmertnykh returned to the Embassy the same way that he had left—through the back door. With a stony expression on his face, he proceeded to meet the Cypriot. My stroll about Berlin was frustrated and my staying at the Embassy a little longer did not produce any additional information. The Minister kept silent. As we flew to Moscow the next day, I bluntly asked him about the reason for his urgent meeting with James Baker. At first the Minister pretended not to understand, but when he realized that there was no use pretending, he referred to some unsettled details of the future START Treaty. It became evident that the Minister was not going to tell the truth.

Washington, October 17

The secret was blown up five months later at Washington's Watergate Hotel.

My American interlocutor, whom I have long known as a person belonging to the Washington corridors of power,

told me that on that day in Berlin, Baker wanted to meet Bessmertnykh to discuss something other than the latest achievements at the START talks or any outstanding problem of Soviet-American affairs. Baker spoke about what was to happen in Moscow. The Secretary of State warned Bessmertnykh about the planned coup and probably even mentioned the names of the plotters.

Moscow, October 31

Will Aleksandr Bessmertnykh answer my questions this time?

"Yes, that day in Berlin I really left the embassy through the back gates. All German guards were at the front gates and did not see me leaving. I took one person with me, but Baker and I talked confidentially, not even the interpreters were present. When he called me, Baker asked me to come as soon as possible. He apologized for being unable to come himself: the secret service people wouldn't allow him to come without guards and there were too many people around. I heard something unusual in his voice."

"What was it?"

"He sounded too anxious, although the reason for the meeting was absolutely impossible to guess from the conversation. He asked me to come incognito, if I could. Later we thought up a plausible explanation in case someone learned that we met."

"Did Baker really warn you?"

"Yes, he did so, referring to intelligence sources."

"When did you inform Gorbachev? When you returned to Moscow?"

"There was no time to lose. When I was still in Berlin, I took the necessary measures to convey this information to the President."

"By phone?"

"Not exactly. The direct phone line is protected from foreign intelligence, but not from Soviet intelligence."

"What means of communication did you use, then?"

"I can't answer this. Later, when I returned from Berlin, I discussed this with the President."

"How did Gorbachev react?"

"He was obviously alarmed, but he did not look like a man in panic."

"Did you ever return to the June warning later?"

"No."

"What about the Americans? For instance, when Bush was in Moscow?"

"No."

It seemed to me that Bessmertnykh wanted to stay loyal to Gorbachev and to be tactful to Baker who had not yet spoken up officially on the matter. Bessmertnykh told me that in the history of Soviet-American relations, Moscow had shared similar information with Washington, demonstrating the highest level of confidence.

Moscow informed the United States about possible troubles for the U.S. President...

In the summer of 1989, the former KGB chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, also spoke about cooperation with the U.S. intelligence in such spheres as efforts against terrorism, drug trafficking and nuclear proliferation. Said Kryuchkov: "If we receive information that somebody's life is in danger, we try to immediately convey this information to the other party. The other party also informs us in such situations. After all, human life is of the greatest value..."

The fact that the U.S. President did not come to any trouble suggests that the Americans used our information better than we used their warnings. On the other hand, no one can be sure what would have happened if the threat to George Bush had come from the CIA director.

Versions

The American warning was meant to inform Gorbachev in advance about Prime Minister Pavlov's demarche in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when the latter demanded himself extraordinary presidential powers. The Pavlov demarche was supported by the old threesome: Pugo, Yazov and Kryuchkov, who explained why a state of emergency was necessary. There was really no time to lose and the Americans were very concerned. I think the Pavlov demarche was the beginning of the putsch the Americans warned Bessmertnykh about. It was Putsch Number One. This putsch had been planned to happen smoothly and with no victims—in the form of a constitutional coup. At that time the conservative faction Soyuz dominated the Soviet parliament, and Chairman Lukyanov was firmly in control of the Supreme Soviet. Something went wrong, though. Perhaps Pavlov's energetic demand scared some vacillating deputies. Perhaps deputies were alarmed by seeing the trio act as one. Plus, Gorbachev's art of political

manoeuvre also helped save the situation. Gorbachev could have been spurred by a sense of reality, the realization that the Americans knew everything and if he did not check the "Pavlovites," the US would give no credits, and normal relations with America would be finished.

What happened next does not fit the pattern: especially the strange behaviour of two people on the Soviet side who knew about the American warning.

The anxiety and fear which Bessmertnykh sensed, although he must have been prepared for what he heard in the Kremlin on August 18, can have only one explanation, I think. He might have been uncertain about Gorbachev's role in the events and wondered what side the President was on. Gorbachev knew about the plot, but he did not fire any of the plotters. He did not even react to the demarche of the KGB chairman who, when speaking at the Supreme Soviet, accused him of having surrounded himself with CIA "agents of influence." It must be recalled that after Kryuchkov's speech, *New Times* demanded that he resign on grounds of disloyalty to the President.

Was the President too sure that the situation was under his control? On receiving the American warning, he might have summoned the plotters and talked to them in the language which Soviet apparatchiks understand so well: "I know everything about you, so watch out..." Then came the period of success: the Bush visit, the London summit of the Group of Seven, the finalizing of the Union treaty...Gorbachev relaxed and left for vacation at Foros...

In any case, the Berlin episode with the US warning confirms that the August putsch in Moscow could not have been a plot Gorbachev's aides thought up over a cup of tea. It was at least the second thoroughly planned attempt to bring the nation back to the totalitarian impasse. This attempt left too many questions.

And now one more question has been added to them: who informed the Americans about the coming coup?

Asia-Africa Committee Plenum Meets, Views Solidarity Movement

92UF0277A Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 10, Oct 91 (signed to press 19 Sep 91) pp 11-12

[Report on extended plenum of Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries: "Solidarity Movement: In the Name of the Future"]

[Text] "The Current Stage in the Development of Asian and African Countries and the Solidarity Movement"—this is how the agenda of the recent extended plenum of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries (SCSAAC) was formulated. It was attended by representatives of all of the republic solidarity committees, the SCSAAC branches in Leningrad and Nakhodka, and the Belorussian and Ukrainian peace committees, movement activists, academics, the personnel of foreign policy and foreign economic agencies, and journalists.

More than 20 people joined the lively discussion of reports by renowned academics M.S. Kapitsa, V.G. Solodovnikov, and V.A. Yashkin, demonstrating a broad range of views and analytical discernment. It is true that some of the words from yesterday's lexicon were also heard, but they were few in number and certainly did not influence the overall level and nature of the discussion. A debate took place, and it was serious and productive.

The apprehension of politicians and the public in the developing countries with regard to current processes in our country was one of the main topics at the plenum. The report by SCSAAC Chairman M.S. Kapitsa, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the subsequent debate underscored the concern of our friends in the Asian and African countries about some of the "excesses" of perestroika in the USSR and the changes in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is being accused of taking an "isolationist" stance, refusing to support the desire of developing countries for stronger independence, and subordinating the goals of these countries to the interests of international detente and common human values. Many in the Third World even interpret the thesis of the interdependence of today's states as a validation of the neocolonial exploitation of the developing countries by transnational corporations.

Of course, these are extremist attitudes, but they do exist. According to speakers, these feelings stem primarily from a misunderstanding of the purpose and nature of the domestic and foreign policy activity of the Soviet State, which does not intend to ignore the interests of the emerging nations or sever relations with its old friends. The Soviet foreign policy line excludes the use of force from the practice of international relations, upholds the freedom of each nationality to choose its own pattern of development, and proclaims the irreplaceability of dialogue and negotiation in the resolution of conflicts. This policy line has already ended the cold war and is now essentially paving the way for the establishment of a new world order, in which common human values and national interests will merge in harmonious unity.

M.S. Kapitsa reminded those who doubt the sincerity and the principled nature of the Soviet stance on the developing countries of M.S. Gorbachev's words: "The policy of the new thinking certainly does not mean the decline of our interest in the developing countries. Our solidarity with those who are fighting for equal rights, for social progress, for democracy, and for a dignified life for the individual is immutable."

It has been some time since this declaration was made, but the worries about Soviet international policy in the Third World have not diminished, and they may have even grown stronger. People in the developing countries are particularly disturbed by the USSR's efforts to establish broader economic ties with the West. This concern stems from the fear that our state might refuse to continue supporting the Asian and African countries' efforts to eliminate or lessen their economic dependence on the capitalist world. Even people in our own country, especially academics, journalists, and some officials, are suggesting that economic ties with the Third World are unprofitable, unfavorable, and unnecessary for the Soviet society. People certainly have a right to express these opinions, but this does not mean that they are indisputable. The scientific, economic, and political groundlessness of this stance was cogently exposed at the plenum.

If we weigh all of the pros and cons, we have to admit that cooperation with the Third World is not only necessary to the USSR, but is also our only alternative in many cases. Although this group of countries has only a relatively modest share of our foreign trade (11-12 percent), they account for four-fifths of our exports of machines and equipment, including around half of our exports of complete sets of equipment, and—what is equally important—a high percentage of our imports of foods and industrial raw materials. We must not underestimate the significance of data such as the following: We get almost half of all the fruits and berries we consume, more than one-fourth of our tea, and one-fifth of our vegetable oils from the Third World countries. The effectiveness of imports from developing countries is almost twice as high as the effectiveness of our imports as a whole. As for nonrefundable and preferential aid (which is, after all, an elementary rule of civilized international relations), it represents, according to Western estimates, only 0.3-0.5 percent of our gross national product (GNP), and its reduction certainly could not seriously improve the state of our budget or balance of payments.

As Doctor of Economic Sciences A.Ya. Elyanov correctly pointed out, a skewed policy aimed at developing economic ties with industrially developed countries at the expense of our relations with the Afro-Asian states could reduce the overall potential for our development considerably. The severance of ties with the Third World could reduce our export-import possibilities instead of producing a savings in resources.

What kind of outlook, what kind of narrow mind, does it take to completely forget the immutable fact that our national interests are closely related to regional and worldwide interests! Who does not know that the USSR's

diverse relations with the developing countries—economic, political, cultural, commercial, technological, military, and just plain human—took decades, and sometimes even centuries, to develop? Destroying these relations and severing ties at one blow are certain to be less difficult than restoring them later. We must not carelessly give up the positions that were so difficult to win; we must consider our country's present and future—this was the unanimous opinion of the speakers at the plenum of the SCSAAC Presidium.

"Solidarity, both the idea and the practice, is one of the signs of the humanistic essence of the individual and mankind. It will never disappear." This statement, which was made at the plenum by Chairman G.P. Pallayev of the Tajik Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, agrees with the message the plenum received from Doctor M. Haleb, the president of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Our organization has a role to play in the non-confrontational world and can make an important contribution to the search for harmony and a balance of international interests, he said.

Of course, there have been mistakes and difficulties in the activities of the Solidarity Movement and the SCSAAC. These were also discussed in a frank, thorough, and discerning manner at the plenum. Speakers recalled that for many years the SCSAAC was essentially the "driving belt" of state foreign policy and an unofficial promoter of CPSU foreign policy doctrines. The committee's activities were highly ideologized. It preached the need for stronger "class solidarity against world imperialism" and artificially cultivated not only "enemy stereotypes," but also "friend stereotypes".... It did not oppose the offer of economic aid and political support to regimes which pursued undemocratic and repressive policies while verbally proclaiming "socialist" slogans and principles.

All of this did occur, but it was not these mistakes and omissions that constituted the essence of the activities of the Solidarity Movement. "The movement for solidarity with the people of Asian and African countries," said Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V.G. Solodovnikov, "came into being at a time when these people were fighting against colonialism and imperialism. The Soviet public was present at the birth of this movement. We have every reason to be proud of our contribution to the historic struggle of the colonial peoples for their independence."

Speakers underscored the increased role and significance of the Solidarity Movement in the present sociopolitical atmosphere in Asia and Africa and the need for more vigorous concerted action for the attainment of a strategic

goal—the elimination of the gap between the wealth of the developed states and the poverty of the developing countries.

Speakers expressed the belief that the Solidarity Movement, which is experienced in struggle for economic decolonization and for the freedom of peoples, could take action to promote the world's progression toward the new economic order and the elimination of dangerous situations in the Afro-Asian states.

The criticism of shortcomings and omissions was accompanied by constructive proposals and comments on ways of correcting mistakes, improving work, and attaining the goals stipulated in SCSAAC policy papers.

Problems in inter-ethnic relations and the establishment of political, economic, cultural, and other contacts between the nationalities of the USSR on a new and democratic basis are now recognized as some of the SCSAAC's main concerns. The SCSAAC and activists of the Solidarity Movement, some speakers said, should do everything within their power to promote the establishment of a climate of stable civic peace in our multinational country and use every means available to encourage the fair and peaceful settlement of ethnic and other conflicts. The mere realization of the need for this is not enough; it is time to take action.

According to Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Kutsenkov, the concepts by which the Committee for Solidarity is guided, and on which it bases its work, must be reviewed. Such terms as "imperialism," "national liberation movement," and "non-equivalent exchange" no longer correspond to the realities of the present day. According to A.Ya. Elyanov, the ideas of the exploitation and plundering of the developing countries and non-equivalent exchange are false and defy reasonable explanations. "What is most disturbing is not the distortion of the facts," he stressed, "but the effect the continued support of these false ideas could have on the prestige of the SCSAAC and AAPSO."

The statements by A.A. Kutsenkov and A.Ya. Elyanov aroused the interest of many, but not all, of the people present at the plenum. Regrettably, they were not followed by thorough and serious discussion.

Nevertheless, the results of the extended plenum of the SCSAAC are certain to provide the momentum for increased activity by the Solidarity Movement.

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Armenian Minister on Status of Joint Ventures *92P50058A*

[Editorial Report] Beirut AZTAG in Armenian on 10 October p 3 carries a 400-word interview with A. Alavertyan, head of the joint ventures department of the Armenian ministry of external economic relations. In the interview, Alavertyan explains the rules for establishing a joint venture in Armenia and says that most of the foreign partners are Diaspora Armenians from the United States and Europe. He says that 111 joint ventures were registered in 1991 alone and that the investments are mostly in radio and electrical technology, building materials, and foodstuff production. He adds that Armenia wishes to promote joint ventures in machine building, semiconductor technology, and microchemistry.

Armenia Asks Black Sea Port Expansion To Help Trade *92P50060A*

[Editorial Report] Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian on 9 October p 1 carries a 300-word report that Ishak Alaton, president of Alarko Corporation, which is one of the largest industrial concerns in Turkey, has gone to Armenia to hold talks on economic cooperation. According to the report, during his talks Alaton was asked whether Turkey is interested in enlarging the Black Sea port of Trabzon and was told that Armenia believes that the Yerevan-Trabzon road may be the best way for Armenia to open up to the outside world. Armenia offered to procure financing for the expansion of the port and hinted that the port may also serve as an outlet for the exports of Turkic republics in Central Asia.

Western Oil Companies Pull Out of Irkutsk Development

92UF0284A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by V. Sbitnev, personal correspondent (Irkutsk):
"The Attempt To 'Sell Off' Siberia Has Failed"]

[Text] **A consortium made up of world-renowned giants of the oil industry, British Petroleum and Norway's Stat Oil, was formed to carry out major projects in the USSR, but has refused, after a year of cooperation, to invest in the exploitation of oil and gas deposits in Irkutsk Oblast.**

When the interaction with these giants began, the people in Irkutsk quickly formed their own consortium, Baykalekogaz, consisting of the oblast's 20 largest enterprises in the chemical and timber industries, power engineering, machine building, and geological prospecting. This was done a year ago, and all of it was done enthusiastically. One of the initiators of Siberia's "connection" with the West, Sergey Perov, then the manager of the Vostsibneftegazgeologiya Association, spoke enthusiastically with journalists about the future plans.

They entailed the exploitation of rich deposits of condensed gas and oil in the north of the oblast. The Kovyktinskoye deposit alone, which has already taken geologists decades and hundreds of millions of rubles to explore,

contains up to 400 million cubic meters of superb condensed gas. It could be used as a substitute for coal and oil in oblast power engineering and completely clear up the atmosphere over the Baykal region. It could be turned into textiles and plastics, which foreign buyers to eager to purchase from us and which could be used for settlements with investors. More than 20 different areas of work were planned. The main objective was to sell finished products instead of the semimanufactured goods the chemical and wood chemical industries in Bratsk, Angarsk, and Sayansk are selling. This, we were told, would provide momentum for the development of all industry in the oblast.

At that time, a year ago, the initiators of this project felt that the main obstacle was the sluggishness of parliaments, which were in no hurry to grant the territory the right to manage and allot its own land resources. Of course, even then our Western partners were underscoring such essential conditions as rapid transition to the market and strong legal and economic support for the market environment. Even they, however, believed at that time that this would not be the main difficulty.

Leading experts from British Petroleum investigated the situation in east Siberia and surrounding areas for 8 months with their Soviet colleagues and prepared a lengthy report. Finally, on 26 November in the Irkutsk Hall of Soviets, they reported their findings, derived by their own Western procedures, to the members of the Baykalekogaz consortium. Different people reported on different fields: the gas market, the oil market, the exploitation of deposits, and the regional and commercial aspects of the project. Everything was spelled out in detail, clearly and eloquently, and illustrated with graphs and diagrams in dollars, tons, and cubic meters. There was a fleeting reference to the traditional error of Soviet experts, who assess projects according to production capacities instead of market capacity.

The first thing the English pointed out to the Siberians was the inadvisability of exporting oil and gas from the oblast—rail transport would be too expensive. This excludes the possibility of earning hard currency. It is a bit too early to transport the raw material from the north to the closest refinery in Angarsk and sell it at world prices: The USSR does not have a local market, and Angarsk is incapable of paying 120 dollars a ton.

The conclusion was that the exploitation of the northern deposits would be profitable only in a free market. I must say that the English had already issued this warning a year ago. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the political and economic situation in our country, as Director E. Whitehead of the Project Development Department of BP Exploration said, "does not encourage investment." The giant oil companies were also deterred by the uncertainty of tax rates and the absence of a law on the joint exploitation of resources, a local market, highways, communications, housing, and other shortcomings that do not bother us too much but increase the level of risk dramatically for foreign firms. Whitehead feels that tax privileges and a special status would attract Western investors to Irkutsk Oblast, but is this feasible?

The British businessmen tried to comfort the Siberians by promising to rewrite their voluminous report in the form of an advertising prospectus, which the people from Irkutsk could use in a worldwide search for other investors. The beauty of the market, they said, lies in the variety of possibilities it offers.

My journalist colleagues and I recalled how much commotion this project stirred up a year ago: We were selling Siberia, people said; we were letting the exploiters into our country, and we would lose Russia's pride. Now, however, it appears that we can keep all of this: our Siberia, our pride, and our complete freedom. The foreigners are in no hurry to "buy up" our merchandise. They may have been discouraged by their calculations, or by something they neglected to mention—for example, a more profitable contract with Sakhalin Oblast. In any case, the Siberians suddenly arrived at the depressing realization that the drowning man will have to save himself.

Of course, I think that a great deal of work lies ahead for all of the many parliaments and governments within the territory of the Union of Sovereign States. It is obvious that the Siberians alone cannot secure political stability or economic and legal stability, just as they cannot establish strong market relations on their own. If there is no flow of foreign capital into Siberia, however, no one will get any raw materials.

Fishermen Call for Closing Okhotsk Sea to Foreign Ships

92UF0312C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 91 Union Edition p 7

[Article by Yu. Balakirev: "It's Time to Close the Sea of Okhotsk"]

[Text] VLADIVOSTOK. The leaders of the Dalryba [Far East Fishery] Association have thought up an unprecedented measure for protecting the resources of the Sea of Okhotsk. They have proposed that the government close the open part of the Sea of Okhotsk under the pretext of conducting military training.

One must assume that the originators of the idea did not themselves believe in its reality. More likely, this is an act of despair, a demonstration of the extreme stage of anxiety of the Far Eastern fisherman, connected with the unprecedented incursion of foreigners. All appeals to curb the legitimized plunder of the fish resources have turned out to be in vain. In October about 60 catchers were observed from Poland, the Republic of Korea, and China (IZVESTIYA No 279). With the arrival of the Panamanians and the Japanese the intensiveness of the free fishing trade has sharply increased.

Unlike our catchers, the new arrivals were not bound by limits and take the fish without controls, as many as they can. It is already tight for them within the limited neutral space, which stretches from north to south for 300 miles and from west to east a little over 30 miles. The other day a patrol boat from the fishery inspectorate detained two foreign violators in our economic zone.

In response to the demand for extraordinary measures, a polite reply arrived, as one might expect, from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which stated that closing of the "grey area" under pretext of military training is not possible, since that does not correspond with the principle of free open seas and is fraught with negative reaction of the world community. All that is so. In those places where state interests clash, international legal norms must regulate them. Having that path in mind, the internal affairs ministry informs that the embassies of the interested countries have been sent proposals to urgently hold multilateral talks about a special convention for preserving the living resources of the Sea of Okhotsk. In the near future it is planned to hold a conference of the agencies of the Ministry of the Ecology and Natural Resources of Russia; however, the alarm in the Far East will not decrease, because of the precedent of the Bering Sea.

At the very northern reaches of the Pacific Ocean Basin our economic space coincides with the American, framing a free zone. There the press of massive catches began to snuff out the productivity of the Bering Sea earlier. There the catch of mintai [Alaska pollock, *Theragra chalcogramma*] the main objective of the Far Easterners, has today declined by over a million tons in comparison with preceding years. This loss of a million tons of valuable protein products is even more alarming against the background of kilometer-long lines of petitioners from various regions of the country at Dalrybsbyt [Far East Fisheries Sales Office].

An international conference of six Pacific Ocean countries, ours included, has met three times already in order to work out the legal status of the open part of the Bering Sea—most recently, in early November of this year. And only at the third stage, according to Dalryba Deputy Chief Nikolay Moskvitin, returning from the USA, did mutual understanding reveal itself. The conferees supposedly agreed on the necessity to regulate fishing, to place observers on the vessels, and to employ an inspection staff [apparat]. But no decisions were taken and the agreement was not signed. Scientists are to meet once again in Seattle, and the results of this meeting will determine the place and time of assembly of delegations for signing the agreement. If talks on the Sea of Okhotsk follow a similar rut, we will have lost it as a base of biological resources.

One can understand that our fishermen, who are prepared to the limit, are losing the vital basis of their existence. In view of our dynamic situation, multi-stage talks are unacceptable. But it is possible to make a non-standard decision. The peculiarity of the Sea of Okhotsk is obvious with the first glance at a map: the status of an open sea is not applicable to it. This is, in essence, a closed, internal sea of our country and Japan. Undoubtedly one may count on the understanding of the Japanese with their assiduous approach to natural resources. Establishing order in the basin would be to their advantage as well. And the trip of the President of Russia to Japan is not far off. Here they could come to an amicable agreement...

Sakhalin Oblast Advice to Foreign Firms on Oil Bids Described*92UF0312B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Article by I. Zhagel: "An Island of Dependence" or: "Can the West Build Us a Bright Future?"]

[Text] While discussion is going on at the Union and republic level on how to attract Western capital in order to improve the nations's economy and what sort of incentives are required to do so, at the regional and oblast level quite often the opposite concerns are expressed: how to wring the last cent out of the firms wishing to do business on their territories? To do that they are trotting out the most absurd demands.

For example, about a year ago IZVESTIYA wrote about the situation surrounding construction of the second phase of the International Trade Center in Moscow. Regional authorities made permission for this contingent upon a great many conditions which took up nearly three pages. Among these, they demanded supplying uniforms for the municipal police, equipping computer classes for elementary schools, and many many others.

A paradoxical situation results: instead of promoting the rapid growth of industry on their own territories and on that basis increasing the receipts to the rayon, oblast and kray coffers, we are going for the jugular of the first company that shows up and are trying to achieve everything right away at its expense. A recent decision of the Sakhalin administration may serve as confirmation.

As is well-known, right now an international competition is taking place for the right to develop the gas and oil deposits on the shelf of Sakhalin Oblast. It has attracted the attention of many well-known foreign companies. A highly competent commission, which at the last stage includes representatives of the regional administration, is analyzing the projects.

This solution was undoubtedly the correct one. But it seems that the representatives of the region somehow incorrectly interpreted their task. They sent a letter to all the firms taking part in the competition—a copy of which the editors of IZVESTIYA obtained—in which they state that the final selection of a foreign partner will be made on the basis of his readiness to fulfill additional conditions. And what sort of conditions?

Well, for example: "At the very beginning of the realization of the project and even at the moment of signing the right for a technical-economic base the oblast must receive a significant increase in products and goods..." Does that mean that a certain petrochemical company, instead of developing the deposits, will have to first of all engage in satisfying all the needs of the citizens of the island? It would be interesting to see what the oblast administration does next!

The letter goes on with great interest. The Western firms are given the task of "Concurrently with the beginning of

the project, to carry out reconstruction of the Okha-Yuzhno Sakhalinsk highway for a distance of 800 kilometers; construction of a railroad from Nogliki to Okha, and to the seaports and settlements of Ilinskiy and Prigorodnyy; expansion of the Okha TETs [heat and power station] with the installation of two 80 Mwt units; construction of a 220 Mwt electric power line from Okha to Dagi for a distance of 180 kilometers; reconstruction of airports in the city of Okha and the settlements of Negliki and Zonalnyy; creation of a communication system for the oblast with access to international channels, and a water-supply system for Yuzhno Sakhalinsk."

One gets the impression that the leaders of Sakhalin Oblast have decided to include their entire program for social-economic development of the region. Moreover, in the middle of the letter, they switch entirely to the imperative mood, and one section even reads: "Provide for the execution and the financing of the following programs."

This section also includes construction of a cement plant, and plants for roofing materials, crushed rock, and production of bricks. The demand for developing the coal industry and even construction of a "power plant at the Solntsevskiy Coal Field" are especially curious: One wonders what oil companies have to do with that?

Well, of course, in order to win the competition, it will also be necessary to build greenhouses and hothouses "for year-round and complete supply of vegetables to the oblast," medical facilities in Okha and Noglike, a 300-bed maternity home in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and a 500-bed children's hospital. Special stipulation is made for the erection of...customs control posts and establishing training sites on Sakhalin for skills enhancement; naturally, with a period of work abroad at foreign firms.

I understand that I might inundate the readers with such extensive quotations, but these are all only a part of the demands placed on those taking part in the competition. It seemed interesting to me to find out the opinion of the latter, and I contacted a representative of "Idemitsu," one of the major Japanese companies engaged in production of petroleum products and energy transport, which has also prepared its own project for the development of the Sakhalin Shelf.

Mr. Shigeru Kawakami, manager of projects with the USSR, was extremely cautious in his evaluations, but admitted that after receiving the conditions from the administration of Sakhalin, Idemitsu sent its own letter to the vice-governor of the island, which states that both in the past and at present, the company has devoted principal attention to creating the kind of project which would permit carrying out export of articles with a high degree of added value, and not simply raw material. This is the primary condition for the influx of foreign currency, which might be invested in the infrastructure of Sakhalin, and in stimulating other branches of industry.

Moreover, the company is thinking very carefully about how to take advantage of the capacities of Soviet enterprises which are freed up in the course of conversion—for example, the dock in Nakhodka—and how to make their

production absolutely pure from the viewpoint of the ecology. However, as concerns conditions not having direct bearing on the project, they can be realistically examined only after determining the membership of the consortium, and preliminary estimates of its possible income and expenditures for developing the oilfield.

At the end of our conversation, Mr. Kawakami added that he cannot give any kind of advice, but nevertheless he believes that if the winner of the competition is to be decided on the basis of certain secondary considerations and additional conditions, the Soviet side might lose badly.

It is hard not to agree with such a point of view. For example, as far as I know, projects were entered into the competition which envision transporting Sakhalin gas to Japan via pipelines, and processing it there. It would be a shame if such a project wins if only because someone promises to build two or three hospitals on the island and set up a business school, owing to which two-thirds of the people move abroad.

Clearly, the present policy of local authorities with respect to Western firms is largely motivated not by economic but political considerations. It is necessary to carry out promises made at pre-election meetings. And nevertheless, it must be thoroughly understood that one must not place an entire island or some other type of region into dependency. This is not a market where one person works and the rest sit with a spoon. This is something from our recent past.

UN Report on USSR, East Europe Industrial Output Cited

92UF0312A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 91 Union edition p 6

[IZVESTIYA Press Service Report: "Crisis in the East, Signs of Depression in the West"]

[Text] Industrial production in the countries of Eastern Europe will decline by 19.5 percent in 1991: that is the conclusion of the authors of a recurring report of the UN European Economic Commission, published in Geneva.

Against this background, the predicted 9.0 percent decline in 1991 production output in the republics of the former Soviet Union does not look quite so depressing. However, the authors of the report warn that the state of the Soviet economy will decline rapidly, and it is not excluded that the actual figures may turn out to be much less favorable.

Judging by the initial report of the information agency, the severe economic crisis in the former USSR and in the East European states is an extremely significant feature, which other experts point out in their surveys (the authors of the government's "White Book on the World Economy," published in Japan; the compilers of a report from the "Conference Board of Canada" research organization and others). However, not even the leading industrial nations of the world can boast flawless indicators. Economic forecasts published in authoritative foreign publications are sprinkled with figures with "minus" signs in addition

to data on unemployment, the highest level of which (15.5 percent of the able-bodied population) is registered in Spain.

Even in those countries where in recent months growth in industrial output has been noted (Great Britain, Canada, France and others) the corresponding data does not reach the level of the comparable period last year. "Most of the countries of Europe," summarizes the American WALL STREET JOURNAL, "have suddenly found it necessary to struggle in order to remain on the path of economic growth."

In the United States the economy remains in a state of some stagnation, where, in the words of the Associated Press Agency, neither healthy nor negative trends are preponderant. At the same time analysis of the Index of Leading Economic Indicators, the AP believes, gives rise to fears that the American economy is headed toward another slump.

Thus far Japan remains the exception, where as before one observes growth in industrial production, gross national product and sales volume. However, analysts are forecasting for Japan a noticeable slow-down in economic rates from 4.5 percent growth in GNP this year, to 3.3 percent in the coming year.

Worsening economic conditions, apart from everything else, reduce the capability of the West to render the broad-scale financial assistance which the Soviet Union and the former Eastern Bloc countries need so badly. However, both the authors of the report of the UN European Economic Commission and the compilers of Japan's White Book stress the need for drawing up a new "Marshall Plan" for the purpose of coordinating efforts to restore the health of the economy in the region embracing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Further deepening of the slump and an increase in unemployment in these countries, the UN experts believe, might lead to disorder on the social scene, which will force the government to abandon the implementing of radical economic reform.

Economic Cooperation Council To Be Created To Replace CEMA

AU1012153591 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 45 (53), 13-19 Nov 91 p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Zabelin, head of the working group dealing with the creation of the Economic Cooperation Council: "The Holy Place Is Never Empty"]

[Text] A working group is presently active at the USSR Academy of Sciences International Economic and Political Studies Institute. Its task is to create an Economic Cooperation Council—an international forum representing the interests of the business circles of those countries that were formerly CEMA members. There is no talk of the return to any artificial schemes. The purpose of the forum is to accelerate the process of adaptation of our uncivilized market to forms of international trade that have been tested in real life.

Provisionally, the tasks of the new organization will include the collection and analysis of legal and commercial

information, training of specialists in the spheres of external trade, banking business, and information science, the elaboration and implementation of mechanisms facilitating mutual settlements in commercial transactions, and the inauguration of international banks, stock exchanges, trading agencies, and insurance companies. It goes without saying that all these projects will be accomplished by interested partners on their own. The council will mainly fulfill a coordinating function.

It is clear that, under present conditions, considering that the political situation in our country remains unstable and the former partners of CEMA still remember vividly their

distressing past experience, it is, to put it mildly, premature to speak about a new interstate union. However, there is a hope that cooperation in trade and industrial spheres will only promote a dialogue at an interstate level.

We are planning to hold our first conference at the end of this year in order to tentatively coordinate the positions of interested parties and to discuss the statutes and the programs for the activity of the council. The Russian Commodities and Raw Materials Stock Exchange has sponsored the project for the creation of the Economic Cooperation Council.

Aleksandr Zabelin, head of the working group for the creation of the Economic Cooperation Council.

U.S. Said Buying Up Soviet Space Technology

92UF0306A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Irina Akimushkina: "Soviet Space Secrets for Export: The Americans Are Buying Up Nuclear Reactors Made in the USSR at Military-Industrial Complex Enterprises"]

[Text] The Soviet Union, finding itself in a difficult economic situation, is hastily selling its main export goods on the foreign market: oil, natural gas, furs, and gold, in order to obtain hard currency. Now, judging by everything, it seems that our technological achievements have been "put up for sale" to foreign buyers, including output of the Soviet military-industrial complex [VPK] that has long been considered secret.

According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the Soviet Union has already "dumped" on the world market a considerable number of various "classified goods," including modern space equipment. The greatest interest in this kind of goods is being shown by the United States and a number of West European countries.

What specifically is the Soviet Union offering for sale to Western countries? According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, nuclear reactors, satellites, rocket engines, space stations, plutonium for compact power installations, and scientific data on experiments conducted in space. As a rule, all these "goods" are of the highest quality and their parameters exceed those of Western counterparts.

The Americans and representatives of the Soviet Union have already signed several deals; a number of projects are still being resisted by representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. U.S. experts have lately started to frequent Moscow for the purpose of buying up advanced technologies and know-how wholesale. According to Pentagon representative Professor Roberto Verga, responsible for the technical supply side of the "Star Wars" program, the Americans see making these deals with the USSR as a promising and worthwhile undertaking.

In his turn, Harvard University Professor Richard Sates believes that all Soviet offers regarding the sale of space and other previously classified technology need to be carefully "sifted through," and only most profitable ones selected. This is because the Soviet Union is currently experiencing an acute need for hard currency, and therefore during the last few months has sharply increased the number of "goods" produced at VPK enterprises that are for sale.

In the opinion of American experts, by buying the Soviet Union's military and space secrets the United States will thereby help stabilize the economic situation in the USSR. The Soviet VPK has on exceptional occasions been selling its output on the world market since 1987. However, at that time practically none of these deals were made with American companies, because the U.S. Administration wanted first and foremost to protect its own producers

rather than contribute to the development of the respective industrial branches in the USSR.

Now the "secrets business" between interested parties in the Soviet Union and the United States is developing swiftly. At the beginning of the year the Pentagon officially announced that it was allocating \$12 million for the purchase of the modern Soviet nuclear reactor that provides a power supply to space objects—of the kind, according to the American press, that Soviet spy satellites are equipped with. Professor Roberto Verga was in Moscow in July this year and discussed with Soviet representatives the possibility of buying both the reactor as a whole and its individual components.

THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that the USSR is now lagging behind world standards in many areas, in particular, in microelectronics and computer manufacturing. However, it is far ahead of the West in the manufacture of high-temperature alloys. Therefore, it is not accidental that the U.S. Air Force has for a long time wanted to purchase the RD-170—the world's most powerful liquid fuel rocket engine—from the USSR. Right now the negotiations are stalled because of bureaucratic snags, but the American side is not losing hope.

A delegation headed by Larry Cavaney, an official in charge of the "Star Wars" program, has just returned to the United States from the Soviet Union. The delegation visited the Thermal Processes Institute and a military research center near Moscow, where the visitors were shown a new Soviet superminiature space engine in operation. The USSR also named the price tag of the "goody"—\$1 million. "This is a very affordable price for us," said Larry Cavaney. According to experts, the mini-engine fits into the palm of a hand, and its price includes all attachments.

Besides this, the Americans want to purchase the secret data obtained by Soviet scientists in the area of the atmospheric effects of nuclear testing. This summer alone, experts from the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy, as well as from NASA, visited Moscow to shop for this kind of "goods." It was NASA that acquired in the USSR the 27 grams of Plutonium-238 that later ended up in the Los Alamos Laboratory (New Mexico).

So far, all the attempts by various American private and government organizations, firms, and companies to buy up Soviet space and military-industrial secrets have encountered rather serious resistance on the part of America's own powerful and influential space industry as well as the national VPK. They demand that the government place the priority on helping its own industry rather than buying the corresponding systems cheaply abroad.

As to the representatives of our VPK, so mysterious in the past and now undergoing serious economic difficulties, they have not yet spoken of the possibility of commercializing the Soviet military and space industry. Perhaps the revelations of their American colleagues in THE NEW YORK TIMES will bring them to the point of being just as open with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA readers?

Soviet, E. European Approaches to EC Differ*PM1112100191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Dec 91 p 3*

[IAN correspondent V. Katin report: "Time To Roll Up Our Sleeves: Our Relations With the Common Market"]

[Text] Brussels—Recently N.N. Solntsev, counselor at the USSR Embassy to Luxembourg, suggested in a friendly way that I look into the following topic: Why is the EC long on talk about aid, credit, and good intentions toward our country, but short on action? Since I have long been interested in this, I decided to begin finding out the reason straightaway. I managed in general to visit various levels of the EEC administrative pyramid, to converse with appropriate officials, and to obtain the required information.

In actual fact the EEC did promise pretty generously to the Soviet Union back at the start of the year the sizable sum of \$500 million for humanitarian aid and technical assistance. However, to date only around \$12 million has been spent. From the sidelines it might appear that the bureaucratic machine, whose wheels turn exceedingly slowly, is to blame. I confess that I myself thought this was the case, as probably did our diplomat who advised me to investigate, concerned at the sluggishness of European officials. However, the bottleneck is not to be found in Brussels, but in Moscow, Kiev, Tallinn, and other capitals of the former Soviet Union. The EC is somewhat perplexed: Whom is it to help, who is the addressee? Previously everything was dispatched to the "center," which allocated and was responsible for what happened to the credits—which do, incidentally, have to be repaid. Now that the "single powerful Union" does not exist, though the check has actually been made out to it, a legitimate question arises: Whom are we dealing with?

This has been the main hitch in implementing aid—both in kind and in the form of currency. The problem regarding the addressees does now seem to have begun to clear up. EEC envoys intend to travel to the republics to ascertain needs at local level. It has been decided to channel assistance by the shortest, direct route—from Common Market warehouses and safes to the capitals of the former union but now sovereign republics. But all this is still theory, while in practice... It turns out that in the republics, except for the Baltic, there is virtually no one with whom to hold a serious dialogue—there they are to be found holding more and more rallies, settling scores, and fighting. Moreover, some local authorities intend to introduce their own currency, backed up with nothing more than the air above their sovereign territory. Such plans, as EC Commission President Jacques Delors acknowledges, simply frighten him.

So even in little Luxembourg people are wary about granting aid to a great power, and I think you can understand the Europeans. Here they are aware of quite a few specific instances where money, foodstuffs, and medicine went to the victims of the earthquake in Armenia and the victims of Chernobyl in Ukraine and Belarus failed to reach their intended recipients.

As President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Germany showed, even the Germans, who are more disposed than others to participate in developing the Russian economy, are now adopting a posture of restraint and are biding their time. Who actually wants to bet on a horse lame in all four legs, as a Brussels banker visiting Moscow and St. Petersburg told me. Wolff von Amerongen, chairman of the German Ost Committee (businessmen in favor of cooperation with Russia), told the Russian president in Cologne: "Before showing an interest in foreign investments, the sovereign republics of the former Union should roll up their sleeves and become part of the world economic system through their own labor." A thought which is, I think, absolutely clear and which reflects business people's opinion of our country and the whole mosaic of republics.

I would like to describe in this context how our former CEMA partners—the countries of East Europe—intend to tackle their economic problems. The other day saw the conclusion in Brussels of agreements with the EC that are very advantageous to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The negotiations were tough, lasting almost a year. "That does not mean that the three countries have obtained entry tickets to our Community," M. Benavides, who has been in charge of the negotiations, warned us journalists. "As yet only the preparatory process has begun." I learned that the transitional period for full EEC membership will take the candidates a full 10 years. However, time is on the side of the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechoslovaks. Having rolled up their sleeves, they will be purposefully seeking to bring the standards of their own output up to the West European level and become equals in the Common Market in the prescribed period.

I enquired whether the heads of delegation of the three countries were content with the results of their arduous marathon. "Yes, completely so," was the unanimous response. The main thing is that they have succeeded in opening the Community door a little to their goods and agricultural produce with a minimal, sometimes token, tax and have achieved free access for citizens to those countries. As far as credits and investment are concerned, these certainly have to be attracted, but our former allies are not focusing their attention on this, but are setting the winning of extensive West European markets as their objective.

Such are the two approaches to obtaining EEC assistance—ours and the East Europeans'. The paradox is that for them, who do not possess such vast natural wealth and resources, the problem is to sell their food and commodities, while for us, it is find people charitable enough to feed us.

EC Recognition of Croatia, Slovenia Viewed*92UF0310A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Dec 91
Union Edition p 5*

[Article by M. Yusin: "Europe Is Leaning Toward Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia"]

[Text] International observers place the bulk of the blame for the continuing bloodshed on the Serbian side.

The Yugoslav crisis is taking a new turn. The military successes of the last few weeks not only did not strengthen the position of Serbia in the international arena but, on the contrary, have increased this republic's isolation.

The foreign ministers of the European Community have decided to provide economic and financial aid to four Yugoslav republics: Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia. This is the first time the EC has taken a differentiated approach: strict sanctions formerly applied to Yugoslavia now are in effect in regard to only two republics: Serbia and its loyal ally Montenegro.

EC members are increasingly inclined to officially recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The only question is whether this will be done by all 12 EC countries simultaneously (as in the case of the Baltics) or individually. Germany declared that in any case it will recognize the independence of the two republics before Christmas. "Yugoslavia does not exist any more," stated Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher.

Italy, Belgium, and Denmark also advocate a speedy recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Only Greece took a special position in the EC. Among other European countries Austria is the most active, with its promise to recognize Zagreb and Ljubljana before the end of the year. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are preparing to undertake similar steps.

One more unpleasant piece of news for Belgrade was the leak to the media of a confidential report of EC observers stationed in the combat zone in Croatia. According to their conclusions, the main blame for the torpedoing of the cease-fire agreements and the escalation of combat actions should be placed on the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian militia.

"Federal Army units regularly strike civilian objects and destroy entire villages in Croatia. Only international containment forces can stop the large-scale offensive inside Croatian territory," the report states. In its authors' opinion, the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement is the Yugoslav Army. Neither the Serbian nor Croatian leadership is capable of controlling the extremist nationalistic units; among them, "the Serbian militia, whom the Army basically gave a free hand, is notable for its exceptional cruelty."

According to REUTER, this report was delivered to Cyrus Vance, special representative of the UN secretary general, who is now in Yugoslavia. On 3 December he paid a several hour visit to Osijek—a large Croatian city 35 km from the Serbian border; after Vukovar fell, Army forces are being concentrated in the vicinity of this city.

"In visiting this city I learned many facts that are fundamentally different from what I had been told by representatives of the Federal Army," FRANCE PRESSE quoted Vance as saying. "This will undoubtedly influence my upcoming negotiations with them." Upon Vance's return to Belgrade he is expected to have another meeting with Federal Secretary for National Defense Veljko Kadijevic.

Credit Suisse Opens Moscow Branch

92UF0311A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91
p 2

[Article by M. Berger: "Banking Operations Are Grinding to a Halt, and Western Bankers Are Coming to Us"]

[Text] One of the largest Swiss banks, Credit Suisse, was the first of its country's banks to open its own office [predstavitelstvo] in Moscow.

It is not so easy to understand why a bank with a worldwide reputation, which successfully operates in all the financial centers of five continents on the Earth, suddenly decides to open its own office in Moscow, when its own banking operations with our country have practically ceased. Not long ago—in 1989 and 1990—goods turnover between the USSR and Switzerland amounted to more than 12 billion dollars, and Credit Suisse had a considerable amount of work within our borders. But right now, when trade has been frozen because of our insolvency and it is not even known what to call that which used to be the USSR, and which finds itself on the verge of bankruptcy—banks have one very definite trait, if they have business here at all: to wait until it becomes clear who will pay the debts and when these debts will be paid.

And instead of fleeing from this risky zone, a very wealthy bank, with a balance which could pay all our foreign debts twice over (115 billion dollars), is becoming increasingly active in strengthening its position here. And Robert Ecker, president of the general directors of Credit Suisse, arriving in Moscow, says that the opening of the office here realizes their long-held hopes. How can these hopes be explained?

Robert Ecker himself cited four basic reasons. First of all, the events which are taking place here are a part of world history, and will have a stable influence on the formation of the coming century; therefore first-hand knowledge about this country is an absolute necessity. Secondly, the bank nevertheless hopes that trade relations will not only be restored, but that they will surpass the previous level, and that the demand for financial contracts will increase accordingly—and that means the demand for banking services as well. Thirdly, Credit Suisse is testing the soil and is establishing contacts in the new sector of commercial banks; thus they simply cannot get along without an office here. And fourthly, the desire to put Swiss banking experience to practical use here. Credit Suisse, incidentally, recently received 100 representatives of commercial banks from our country in Zurich.

Of course, to receive first-hand information is all very well and good; but to maintain an office for this purpose in one of the most expensive cities in the world today—is really too disadvantageous. The hopes for a rapid growth of export-import operations are for now of a rather hypothetical nature.

Among all the motives cited, one of the most convincing appears to be the desire to establish direct contacts with the new generation of bankers and influence the formation of the banking system which is coming to life here, and to

transfer their "know-how" to us under the very best conditions. The more the Swiss features our system has, the more chances there are for Swiss banks.

And well, of course, to strengthen their position in the country (or countries) with perhaps the very greatest potential in the world for privatization, and to be there on the spot, as they say, when genuine capital receives the opportunity to assimilate this market, that is a more than worthwhile matter—one which is worth any expense.

Soviet-Greek Discussions Held

More Effective Forms of Cooperation Sought

92UF0303A Moscow VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA
INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR in Russian No 15,
15 Aug 91 p 19

[Unattributed report: "Soviet-Greek Talks"]

[Text] On 23 July in the Kremlin talks were held between USSR President M. S. Gorbachev and C. Mitsotakis, prime minister of Greece, accompanied by other representatives of the two sides.

The Soviet and Greek foreign ministers reported on the results of the discussions they had held on the previous day. They had touched on a wide range of problems, particularly those pertaining to the prospects for providing security and cooperation in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean as a whole. The result: on the main issues they noted either the complete coincidence or great proximity of their positions, and they agreed to continue and intensify their dialogue.

The two countries' ministers who had discussed economic problems reported on the results of their discussions. They are significant. A search is under way for new and more effective forms of cooperation. The idea has come up of establishing a Soviet-Greek Chamber of Commerce and of jointly promoting the creation in the USSR of industrial-development zones and the carrying out of large projects, in the area of power engineering, among others (in connection with plans for European-wide cooperation in power engineering).

In summing up the results, M. S. Gorbachev and C. Mitsotakis noted that the present meeting is laying a firm foundation for the further development of relations between the countries, bringing them to a fundamentally new level. The meeting, the Soviet leader noted, assumed a broad scope. The pooling of the two states' efforts may provide substantial results in both politics and economics. It is important only not to delay beginning the implementation of everything that was agreed on.

C. Mitsotakis reaffirmed the invitation extended previously by the president of Greece to M. S. Gorbachev to visit his country. The USSR president accepted the invitation with pleasure.

Upon conclusion of the Soviet-Greek talks, a package of bilateral documents was signed. The main one, a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, was signed by M. S. Gorbachev and the head of the Greek government. This

document lays a new legal and political basis for the development of relations in all areas.

Also signed in the Kremlin were three intergovernmental agreements—on the prevention of dangerous military activity; on cooperation in combating illegal trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances and the abuse of them; and on cooperation in customs matters. These documents open new prospects for cooperation between the two countries in specific areas.

Terms of Treaty

92UF0303B Moscow VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA
INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR in Russian No 15,
15 Aug 91 p 19

["Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic"]

[Text] The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic,

relying on the centuries-old traditions of friendship and cooperation between their peoples;

fully resolved to actively develop their relations in political, commercial and economic, cultural, scientific and other areas, and to deepen mutual understanding and trust between them;

endeavoring to contribute to the building of democracy, peace and unity in Europe based on the principles of the priority of universal human values, respect for human rights, freedom of choice and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, stability and security for all states, and also the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of international law;

guided by the goals and principles of the UN Charter and reaffirming fidelity to the commitments undertaken within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

and considering that improving the quality of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic is in keeping with the fundamental interests of their peoples, and likewise of the enhancement of peace and cooperation in Europe,

have agreed to the following:

Article 1

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic regard each other as friendly states. They reaffirm their resolve and desire to actively and consistently develop relations of trust and cooperation in all areas on the basis of respect for political independence, sovereign development and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Greek Republic regard each other's boundaries, like the boundaries of all states in Europe, as inviolable.

Article 3

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic pledge to resolve disputes that may arise between them exclusively through peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security.

They will also use all their existing potential to see to it that disputed international problems are settled on the basis of the norms of international law through peaceful means with the utilization both of the appropriate mechanisms provided in the UN Charter and of new structures of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe].

Article 4

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will never under any circumstance use their armed forces first against each other, and they reaffirm that the principle of nonaggression is the foundation of relations between them and all other states.

In the event that one of the sides becomes the object of unprovoked aggression, the other side, without infringing on its commitments stemming from its participation in existing alliance treaties and the relations that follow from them, will not render the aggressor any military aid or other assistance.

Article 5

In the event that situations arise that, in the opinion of one of the sides, create a threat to peace or a disturbance of the peace, or that give rise to dangerous international complications, the sides will promptly enter into consultation between themselves for the purpose of agreeing on necessary measures to prevent the threat of force or use of force. This also pertains to the eventuality that a threat of armed attack arises or armed attack is carried out against one of the sides or against both together.

Article 6

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will make efforts to prevent any armed conflict, whether it be a nuclear conflict or one employing conventional arms, and in order to preserve and strengthen the general peace, they will actively promote the process of both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

They believe that the reduction of armed forces and arms to levels sufficient for defense will result in a strengthening of the security and stability of all countries. The sides will continue to cooperate in the cause of creating a system of all-European security and the development and enhancement of confidence-building measures and cooperation.

Article 7

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will undertake joint efforts for the purpose of further enhancing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations, among other ways, by promoting the implementation of its decisions.

The sides will cooperate closely within the framework of other international organizations of which they are members, as well as at multilateral conferences and forums, in order to make the positive changes in Europe and in relations among states as a whole irreversible, and to stimulate international cooperation in all areas.

Article 8

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic attach primary importance to the further development, strengthening and institutionalization of the all-European process. They declare their readiness to make a specific contribution to the formation of common European spaces—economic, cultural, technological, ecological, transportation, legal, humanitarian and others, and to thereby foster the drawing together of the European peoples, relying on such common values as peace, the supremacy of law, respect for human rights, political pluralism, social justice, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief.

Article 9

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic believe that multilateral cooperation in the Balkans is in keeping with the interests of strengthening mutual understanding, confidence and security in that region of Europe, and is a weighty factor in the further development and deepening of the CSCE process and a contribution to the strengthening of peace and stability on the European Continent.

The sides favor cooperation among states of the Black Sea basin and the Balkan states, keeping in mind their common history, cultural traditions and commercial, economic and other interests, and the unity of the ecological and water systems of the Black and Mediterranean seas.

Article 10

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will make efforts aimed at the strengthening of peace, stability, security, mutual understanding and cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea, and also at the peaceful settlement of disputed issues, and at the promotion within the limits of their capabilities of solution of the most acute socioeconomic and environmental problems.

Article 11

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will assist each other in the development of cooperation with European organizations, institutions and associations of which one side is a member in the event that the other side shows an interest. They agree that the improvement of relations between the USSR and the European Communities also serves the strengthening of relations between the USSR and Greece. Greece will make every possible effort to promote the further strengthening and deepening of relations between the USSR and the European Communities.

Article 12

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic, in accordance with the 12 February 1985 bilateral Protocol on Consultations, have agreed to regular consultations between their leaders and responsible representatives of bodies of state authority and administration.

The subject of such consultations will be key problems of the present day; the strengthening of security and cooperation in the world and Europe, including the Mediterranean, the Black Sea region and the Balkans; the further development of bilateral relations; and also any other issues of mutual interest.

Political consultations at the highest level will be held as needed. Meetings between ministers of foreign affairs will be held at least once a year.

The sides will promote the creation of necessary conditions for the broad exchange of experience and information between representatives of their governments and of the appropriate ministries and departments, as well as between nongovernmental organizations.

Article 13

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will develop and expand mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technological cooperation for the purpose of creating the most favorable conditions for stable economic growth, the satisfaction of their people's vital needs, and the effective utilization of material and financial resources.

They will provide the necessary economic, financial and commercial conditions for close business cooperation between and the entrepreneurial and other economic activities of the two sides' direct producers and state and nonstate organizations.

The sides will provide for the protection of mutual investments and encourage projects of bilateral and multilateral joint capital investments, including those involving third countries, making efforts to ensure sources of financing for these projects on maximally advantageous terms, from the standpoint of their legislation.

Special attention will be devoted to the development of cooperation in the training and advanced training of specialists in the area of economics. If necessary, individual agreements will be concluded on this matter.

The practical issues of cooperation in these areas will be regularly considered by the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Industrial Cooperation and the Mixed Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, as well as by special working groups established by them as necessary.

Article 14

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic, in accordance with bilateral and international agreements, will strive to expand cooperation with the use

of advanced technologies in the sphere of transportation, and will also cooperate in the development of up-to-date communications equipment.

Article 15

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic, for the purpose of expanding and improving cooperation in the area of science and technology, will encourage the establishment of scientific and technological associations, and the carrying out of joint projects and research and development. They have agreed to promote the more active involvement of competent Soviet and Greek organizations in multilateral programs of scientific and technological cooperation.

The sides will promote the development of scientific exchanges, including exchanges by young researchers and highly qualified scientists.

Article 16

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic favor stepping up joint efforts in the area of environmental protection and the combating of natural disasters on international, regional and subregional levels.

They will devote special attention to multilateral cooperation in the area of environmental protection in the Mediterranean and Black seas and the maintenance of environmental equilibrium in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.

Article 17

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic reaffirm the desire to develop and deepen contacts and ties in the area of culture, art and information. They will do their utmost to promote the expansion of cultural exchanges, the in-depth familiarization of the two countries' peoples with their cultural and historical legacies and the accomplishments of present-day culture, and cooperation in the preservation of historical, artistic and cultural monuments; and to encourage the opening on a mutual basis of cultural information centers and their activities.

The sides express the readiness to facilitate, including through the exchange of interns, students and schoolchildren, access to the other side's language and culture, and to encourage direct cooperation between higher and secondary educational institutions and cultural and artistic institutions, as well as between organizations operating in this sphere.

They will take steps to create favorable conditions for the teaching of the other side's language in schools and higher and other educational institutions. To this end, the sides will provide each other with capabilities for the training and advanced training of instructors, and they are also exchanging modern textbooks.

Persons of Greek nationality moving from the USSR to Greece for permanent residence and acquiring Greek

citizenship will be provided with the opportunity to preserve their culture. Soviet citizens of Greek nationality living in the USSR and desiring to preserve their language, culture and traditions will be provided with the opportunity to develop their national, linguistic and cultural distinctiveness within the framework of existing legislation.

Article 18

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will support and develop broad ties and dialogue between the Soviet and Greek peoples in the spirit of mutual understanding and friendship, and respect for the two peoples' customs and specific religious and other features and distinctiveness.

The sides will promote the expansion of contacts between their countries' citizens and the development of cooperation between political parties, trade unions, foundations, educational institutions, religious organizations and social institutions, friendship societies, and women's, young people's, sports, environmental and other public organizations, as well as media.

Special attention will be devoted to deepening contacts and communication between the two countries' parliaments and other elective bodies of authority. The sides will provide assistance to mutual cooperation at the general state level, the level of USSR union republics, and the oblast and communal levels, and also along the lines of kindred cities.

Article 19

Competent bodies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis in combating organized crime, terrorism, unlawful acts of interference in the activities of civil aviation and maritime transport, and illegal narcotics trafficking and smuggling, including the illegal movement of items of cultural value across borders.

Article 20

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will, as possible, take steps to reciprocally simplify visa formalities and improve the provision of consular services to the two countries' citizens. They will provide conditions for the normal operation of and render, on the basis of reciprocity, the utmost assistance to the activities of diplomatic, consular, commercial and other official missions of the other side accredited on their territories, and will provide the necessary possibilities for the work and residence of businessmen and journalists, as well as specialists taking part in the carrying out of joint projects.

Article 21

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic will develop regular contacts between representatives of their armed forces, and will also hold meetings to

discuss questions of mutual interest, for the purposes of developing mutual understanding and strengthening mutual trust.

Article 22

This treaty does not affect rights and obligations under existing treaties and agreements concluded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic with other states.

Article 23

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Greek Republic declare that this treaty is not directed against anyone whatsoever. Both sides regard their cooperation as a constituent and dynamic element of the further development of the CSCE process.

Article 24

This treaty is subject to ratification and will take effect on the day that ratification documents are exchanged.

This treaty is concluded for a 20-year period. It will thereafter automatically be extended for subsequent five-year periods if neither side declares its desire to denounce it through written notification a year before the expiration of the current period.

Concluded in Moscow 23 July 1991 in two copies, each in Russian and Greek; both texts have equal force.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, M. Gorbachev.

For the Greek Republic, C. Mitsotakis.

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Peace Committee Meets With Norwegian Defense, Security

92UF0328A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Lev Strzhizhovskiy, special correspondent: "What Will Replace David's Sling?"]

[Text] Have you ever had anything to do with top-secret documents? The procedure is a well-known one—receipt upon signing for them, storage in a safe, constant worry over whether they are in the proper place. How do you feel, then, when you are holding in your hands an elegant booklet entitled "The Kola Peninsula Photographed from Satellites: Prospects for Arms Control and Environmental Problems." To this very day I cannot forget the feeling which seized me when I opened this atlas for the first time. Fear, doubts, and a certain state of feverishness—could all this really be true? And if it were true, then how did it become known in NATO? Because, after all, the words "Norwegian Atlantic Committee" were right there on the cover.

In short, like the poet, "How could I help being burned when I held them in my hands...?" "They" were these detailed maps of the Kola Peninsula, known and unknown towns, bases, harbors, missile-launching installations, photographs of large and small ships, airplanes, and many

other things. All these Grems, Severomorsks, Titovkas, nameless gulfs, fjords, and islands, of which dozens of photographs had been taken in sequence. They were neatly placed in squares and "diamonds" with conventional signs and supplemented with new figures. Inasmuch as the "eye" of a satellite can see a ball on a tennis court, the silhouettes of MIGs and Sukhoy aircraft on the concrete strips of the Kola airfields were shown just as clearly!

We not only knew about the armadas of tanks and flocks of missiles, but even took pride in them. We were confident that no one but us knew about such great military secrets. Suddenly it turns out that other people have known about them. And not just anybody, but indeed our potential foe—NATO and, of course, our northernmost neighbor—Norway, with whom we share a common border only 196 kilometers long. It was specifically here that NATO's northern flank met one-on-one with that of the former Warsaw Pact.

I recall catching the gaze of Elman Ellingsen, chairman of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, who had written the foreword to the booklet mentioned above. We had already been working together for several hours in the conference-car of the train which was taking us to Stavanger. By "us" I mean the delegation from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the leaders of the organization entitled "The People and Defense," which had invited us. It was as if Ellingsen were asking the following question: Do you yourself know what has been created on your own land? If up to then our discussion had retained a calm and moderate tone, this Atlas of the Kola Peninsula was capable of stirring up many arguments. But even that is not the main point. It explained and—to a large extent—justified Norway's military policy, about which we know so little. It is a small country (in the kindest sense of that term, with a population of only 4,200,000). And throughout all the postwar years it has felt itself quite uneasy side-by-side with its great neighbor. The common border—this "dominant factor," as the Norwegians kept repeating—hypnotized politicians, military men, and the entire nation. Interest in it was also heated up by NATO.

There is another important detail without which we cannot understand the entire course of Norwegian history. Having traveled through several NATO countries during the past year, I venture to assert that, most likely, nowhere in Europe do people preserve such a profound memory of World War II as they do in Norway.

In certain respects it is similar to the tradition of our people. But whereas in Russia people speak and write about our victories and their price, in Norway they emphasize that war (whether it happens or not) must not catch the country by surprise; the nation must be prepared to fight. This idea was expressed with particular clarity in the Museum of the Norwegian Resistance. In listening to General Reiner Thorp talk about the Norwegians' five years of fighting for freedom, you sense certain painful points of Norwegian history. One such point (and the first of them) was the suddenness of the attack and the forced emigration of King Haakon VII. The main lesson to be learned by the nation from that war is not to yield to

political illusions of neutrality, but rather to be prepared for any turn of fate. They gave me a valuable souvenir—a badge with the initials of King Haakon VII on it; all the proceeds from the sale of these badges have gone to aid those persons who took part in the Resistance. It must be pointed out that for Norway, with its forests and dales, its enormously long maritime border, and other features, a great deal of time is required to assemble an adequate defense effort. And this is one of the components which make up the Norwegian mentality.

Such an explanation is necessary in order to understand the role played by the public organization known as "The People and Defense" in the life of Norwegian society. And although I see nothing similar to this in our country, I will, nevertheless, attempt to make some comparisons. "The People and Defense" comprises—at one and the same time—something like the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], a peacekeeping union, the SOD [Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries], and many other organizations. Norwegians were able to introduce such a structure into their society—a structure which is capable of undertaking any political action. And the principal goal of "The People and Defense" is to prepare and bring to each and every citizen a precise estimate of the military situation in the world, region, and country. It would serve no good purpose to hang out the labels of propaganda or manipulation of public opinion which are customary for us in such cases. The stance taken by "The People and Defense" is natural and firmly entrenched in Norwegian society. Its strength and unwavering quality rest on good organization and information. Both of these factors merit deciphering, i.e., interpretation, here.

This particular Society was born in 1951, at the height of the "Cold War," and—no less importantly—the propaganda war. The West needed to secure its rear-line area. Such a campaign came to be termed "value propaganda," for it rested on a defense of Western, or—as we say nowadays—common-human values. In this regard, Norway was a richly endowed country, and its border with the Soviet Union made it particularly important in the NATO plans. In the wave of postwar patriotism and the unanimous striving for peace, success was achieved in founding a nationwide organization which was not tied to any political party. On the contrary, parties, entrepreneurs, military structures, and clerics in the form of 78 collective members joined "The People and Defense." Have you ever happened to see a marshy hummock on which a northern cranberry plant is growing? The large berries are hidden among the moss and the dense tendrils binding them. These berries are almost invisible, but the entire hummock is tightly covered by the cranberry plant. This figure precisely fits the Norwegian model. During the years since 1951 "The People and Defense" has become a firmly implemented component of the country's political landscape. Its activity is noticeable and not noticeable. If one part is touched, the entire system starts to vibrate without delay.

"The People and Defense" has been constructed on the principle of horizontal representation. It is not necessary to think up special actions or to "raise" public opinion. The organizations themselves do this. For example, military discussions in the schools, the place of women in the army, conferences with draftees or persons subject to being called up, teaching civil defense, get-acquainted trips to neighboring countries, propaganda campaigns in the press—these are just a few of the things that "The People and Defense" are engaged in. But its goal is to disseminate information, and every action is performed by the appropriate groups, trade unions, or parties. This is also suitable and convenient for the following reason. Although "The People and Defense" has its own budget (contributions come in from the government, the Storting [Norwegian Parliament], and parties), any action is paid for by the organizers of that particular action. The connections, fine-tuned by time, operate smoothly and without a hitch. Let me cite merely those whom we met: generals and admirals, deputies to the Storting, trade-union leaders, members of the employers alliance, heads of companies, and influential journalists. These persons' interest in their great neighbor is understandable. But, after all, they are leaders within their own groups. Just try to assemble such a team here in our country!

"The People and Defense" is a lobby-type organization (I am not afraid of this term, for it is only in our lexicon that it has a negative connotation)—one of 1400 such organizations in Norway. It is important to note that it is a component of NATO's finely tuned structure and is united by a platform of "common defense." In other words, "common" for all of them, but each country has its own defense. But that's not all. Norway also has an Atlantic Committee, which includes well-known persons. Their circle of interests is wider and more intellectual; their exchange of ideas is less fettered; and they work out their own opinions, which are also taken into consideration when policy is being determined. Such a system might seem cumbersome or awkward. But it's a real pleasure to see it in action. NATO created not only an excellent military machine, but also a splendid informational mechanism. It has been efficiently targeted and adapted for each country and each social group existing under all the governments involved. The result is that 90 percent of Norwegians, as we were told, support NATO and are convinced of the need for it. Are there grounds to justify this?

Nowadays, when the entire world has begun to move, it is difficult to answer that question unambiguously or categorically. The Norwegian military people spoke to us politely but firmly about the threat from the North; deputies and industrialists complained about economic pressure and mentioned disputes about the maritime shelf, as well as the problems of Svalbard (Spitsbergen); and scientists were concerned about the continent's ecological condition. This mosaic came together most fully in a conversation held in the Ministry of Defense. In a reasonable, well-argued manner Major Rede spoke to us as follows:

"When the Germans landed in Norway in April 1940, the myth of political neutrality collapsed; it had not provided us with any protection. Therefore, after the war we continued to cooperate with our former allies. The small countries could have become bridges between the great powers. However, the "Cold War" led Norway into NATO. The goals proclaimed by this alliance were understandable: preventing war, ensuring freedom and sovereignty, and facilitating detente throughout the world. But we had our own task—preserving security in our own, northern region. We decided not to "disturb" the Soviet Union nor to undertake any actions of a military nature, but rather to conduct a 'policy of limitation or restriction.' We proclaimed that Norway would not allow any foreign bases, would not permit either the deployment of nuclear weapons or the holding of maneuvers on its own territory. Our military budget amounts to 3 percent of the GNP.

"With the passing years the situation in the North became worse and worse for us. Here there is neither a lobby nor a corridor, as is the case in Central Europe, but rather a direct confrontation. We know about the development of Soviet bases in the Kola Peninsula, the new types of ships, the modernization of the fleet, and the increase in its mobility. In other words, the unequal balance of forces is being maintained, although—under the present-day conditions—the Norwegian side acknowledges the following: There is no military threat to our country in the immediate future...."

We were shown maps and diagrams, photographs, comparative features, and survey slides made from satellites. Captain 2nd Rank Sistein Hohl, who commands the South Norway Coast Guard, made a report on defense, whereas General Egil Omdahl, who commands the South Norway Air Force, told us about aviation. In short, there was no shortage of information. How valuable would it be to have satellite photographs made at the Nansen Institute in Bergen? I think that we have no more military secrets left from NATO and or the Norwegians. They have grounds for misgivings or apprehensions. It is not by chance that the plan for Norwegian national defense has been designated as "total defense." This information, which was brought to the attention of the average citizens, also determined their choice in favor of NATO. Hence those misgivings which are caused by any of our new airplanes or new ships on the Northern flank. However, the present-day military situation, as we were shown, is treated by the Norwegians in a one-sided way, and here's the reason why.

The escalation of disarmament has lasted for more than a year now. There is no more Warsaw Pact, and NATO is being reformed. If we are to turn away from global concepts, would Norway's position in a changing world be changed? We put this question to the politicians and military men. Bjorn Gudahl, chairman of the Storting's Committee on Foreign Policy, was both optimistic and cautious in his reply:

"We welcome the Soviet initiatives. But everything is happening in a very headlong and precipitous manner. We in NATO are really not quite ready for new processes in Europe. Everything that I see leads me to the following

idea. The task of reforming the world opposition or confrontation should not be undertaken by NATO, but rather by the UN. Military matters are gradually being handled more and more by the world community, and the proof of this is the war in the Persian Gulf. After all, approval to engage in this fighting was virtually granted by the UN. Such supervision is, obviously, required for the European continent as well. Although serious wars could hardly flare up here, interethnic conflicts—like those in Yugoslavia—are possible. Norway's position will not be a brake on turning matters over to the UN."

An original idea. If it is being set forth by the head of the Committee on Foreign Policy, that means that it has been discussed in the Storting. It's important for politicians to keep in step with the times—something which cannot be said about other professionals.

One can agree with the military assessment of the present-day situation as provided in the Ministry of Defense (an "unequal balance of forces"). Is there a way out of this situation for small Norway? Our question remains suspended in midair. Of course, military doctrine is not to be changed within a period of a few weeks, and Major Rede is correct in this. Only NATO as a whole is capable of doing this. Still, what kinds of thoughts are being engendered by the European peace prospect? It seems that there are no such thoughts. The prolonged alliance has, evidently, engendered the habit of relying on the decisions to be made by the "older brother" in Brussels. The presently contemplated freedoms of actions has not made military thinking free. In general, therefore, there has been little opposition to the justifiable thoughts about the "threat from the North." The time of gunboats has passed, but so far nobody has brought anything to the negotiating table—and this is understandable. How can we fail to mention here the insulting term (which we heard for the first time in Norway itself)—an "European colony." It is used with regard to a country which it would be ridiculous to include among the economically developed countries. But, you know, what we are talking about is not a matter of economics....

The attentive and kind Poul Engstad, general secretary of "The People and Defense," who touchingly looked after the delegation from the SKZM [Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace], understands this. The nature of the information with which the Norwegians were supplied for several decades is becoming utterly different. The changes must be explained, and new ideas are needed for this purpose. Because, of course, the concept of "the people" remains, whereas that of "defense" is changing its nature. If we may use another figure of speech—one which the Norwegians are fond of employing—it is a matter of the two Biblical heroes, David and Goliath. Then the present-day problem of the opposition or confrontation on the Northern flank looks like this. Goliath has changed. And as to the question of what David will replace his sling with—that's something which David himself must decide. Because his sling is no longer needed. The opposition or confrontation is fading into the past. What we must come to agreement on now is good-neighborliness.

German, Austrian Interests in Yugoslav Crisis Analyzed

92UF0294A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Fadeyev: "The Lord Is Against, But the Chancellor, For"]

[Text] Vienna-Belgrade—*After Belgrade, the Austrian capital—although it is only 640 km away—is the North Pole. A biting wind and an icy rain continually turning into stinging snow. And only the city center, which is festooned with many-colored lights—it is the Christmas period in Vienna—lighten one's mood somewhat.*

It is at this inclement time in Austria that an offensive of forces of the right, whose purpose is urgent recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which have "rebelled" against Yugoslavia, has begun. There is nothing surprising here, in fact: there has long been talk of this in Vienna, but the speeches of Vice Chancellor E. Busek, leader of the People's Party, and, particularly, M. Gras, speaker of this party, who has called for military intervention against Serbia, have in the opinions of a number of Austrian politicians dotted the "i's" as regards the Yugoslav crisis.

Chancellor F. Vranitzky also spoke on Austrian radio's first channel about recognition of Croatia. Following a traditional meeting with the Croatian foreign minister, he said that this act would take place immediately before or after Christmas.

So it was that at this very time German Chancellor H. Kohl was speaking unequivocally about recognition of the two northern Yugoslav republics also. "Germany will not wait," he observed, "for all the members of the European Community to display a readiness to recognize Slovenia and Croatia."

...It is no secret that Yugoslavia is at the center of German and Austrian interests. These two countries have from the start of the crisis in the SFRY not only kept a close watch on but also participated in the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, doggedly attempting to realize their own ends. This policy has not been overly publicized, but nor is it any secret. It "has afforded scope for a breakthrough of German and Austrian interests into Slovenia and Croatia," the Belgrade journal NARODNA ARMIJA observed recently. "Germany's aspiration to restore its old influence in Southeast Europe and to reach the Mediterranean via the Adriatic has been manifested distinctly. Were all the goals to be achieved, the conditions for the creation of the Fourth Reich would have been created," the journal sums up.

The secret operations of Germany and Austria aimed at splitting Yugoslavia and the support for the Slovenian and Croatian separatists are today becoming manifest. Representatives of the French Foreign Legion and British Falklands veterans are fighting on the side of the Croatian National Guard. The competent Yugoslav authorities have only just learned that throughout July 20 German military instructors were training the Croatians in rocket subtleties

at the firing range in Novi Cakovci. They were to have returned to Germany on 29 July, but.... A note of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to the German Embassy in Yugoslavia gives the first names and last names of the German instructors and says that the competent authorities do not have any further information on them and that it should, therefore, apply to those who recruited them....

The Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES published an article which says that the Croatian leadership is endeavoring to acquire its own air force and arm it with the MiG-29 fighter. Germany is prepared to hand over to it free of charge the Soviet aircraft with which the army of the former GDR was equipped. Several Croatian airmen, the newspaper observes, have already started training on the fighters.

Nor is Austria lagging behind: It recently presented Croatia with 12 155-mm howitzers. The supplier was the Norikum company, which has repeatedly been involved in speculative ventures involving illegal arms sales. Austria is also serving as a channel for the transfer to Slovenia and Croatia of, for example, Spanish handguns and revolvers: More of them have been purchased here in a year than in all the EC countries put together.

A number of leaders of the new democracy of Slovenia today have stylish villas in Austria, and some carry Austrian passports also. In the last six months alone Slovenian capital has opened almost 2,000 mixed firms in the bordering country.

...Vienna is spoiled by visits of politicians from its southern neighbors. At the time I was in the Austrian capital it was visited, for example, by the presidents of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina K. Gligorov and A. Izetbegovic. The first requested recognition of Macedonia as a sovereign republic. The second declared during a meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister A. Mock that the disintegration of Yugoslavia into six separate states would be a national calamity and that Bosnia-Herzegovina was interested in preservation of the Yugoslav commonwealth. The opinions were heard, and Foreign Minister A. Mock instructed the Austrian ambassador to the United Nations to decisively support the proposal for the dispatch of an international force to Yugoslavia, which should take up positions along the administrative borders of the republics in conflict. Such is Croatia's proposal. Serbia, I would recall, is of a different opinion: The "blue berets" should be stationed along the present line of contact of the belligerents.

"The prehistory of the war in Yugoslavia is identical to Austrian history," Austrian writer Josef Haslinger says. "In the areas where a pitiless struggle is now under way, Austria pursued for centuries an imperialist policy against Serbia. The first war it waged together with Hungary, the second, on the side of the Third Reich. We all need to speak about this today in Austria. Not only about Serbia and Croatia but also about our own role in the war going on in Yugoslavia."

...Returning to Belgrade, I read about the opinion of Lord Carrington, chairman of the Hague Peace Conference, which he had just expressed. "I do not believe," the highly experienced diplomat declared, "that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would hasten a solution of the Yugoslav crisis."

The Austrian capital is of a different opinion on this score.

Changes in FRG Intelligence Services Viewed

92UF0329A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by PRAVDA Correspondent A. Stepanov, Berlin, 3 December, 1991: "They Do Not Want to Lag Behind Bakatin: Changes in the German Secret Departments"]

[Text] Two to three years ago you would have thought it impossible that the time would come for serious reductions in such preserves of the German state as intelligence and counterintelligence. Yes, obviously, other times have actually arrived.

Let us take the Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution—this is how they have slightly concealed what they call the organization that carries out primarily counterintelligence tasks in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. Right now, according to local press reports, it has 2,435 agents on its staff and budget appropriations for its activities total 219 million marks per year. Recently the issue of reducing department personnel by four hundred people was discussed at closed hearings of the Bundestag budget commission subcommittee. Naturally, everything occurred in an "atmosphere of secrecy" but, as it is always done, that information which must be reported to society was "especially trustingly" shared with newspaper reporters. Counterintelligence also faces some sort of structural transformations. The subunits that are involved with leftist radicals and terrorists will be merged and the departments of counterintelligence and protection of state secrets will be united. And the structure that is involved with combating rightist radicals will be reinforced—we need to assume the growth of the "Brown threat" is being quite precisely felt by the professionals.

Bundesnachrichtendienst [transliterated] [BND]—intelligence also "received its turn" at the closed hearings. It will lose thousands of personnel, that is, one of every seven agents, in the next few years. The budget will also be reduced from 600 million to 500 million marks. They propose conducting the personnel rearrangements in accordance with changed operating conditions. For example, the subunit that conducted intelligence against the currently no longer existing GDR [German Democratic Republic] is being left "overboard"—it totaled nearly 10 percent of all BND personnel.

It would be interesting to know if the old guard that made a career in the era of intelligence confrontation "along all azimuths" will be put out to pasture? Of course, competition among the intelligence services is inevitable while they themselves exist, but maybe we have already lived to

see the time when they will be conducted using civilized methods, as they are attempting to convince us from all sides?

As before, the BND will continue active operations in the world's crisis regions which currently includes first of all the Soviet Union that is going to pieces. International terrorism, drug trafficking, laundering of criminally amassed capital [money laundering], and illegal transfer of technologies also remain in the sphere of interests of German intelligence.

Changes are also anticipated in the Federal Border Guard [FPO] which recently celebrated its 40th Anniversary. Since the threat of disorder in the 30-kilometer border zone was significantly reduced after the reunification of Germany, one of the guard's most important functions has also changed accordingly. These elite units are increasingly being transformed into an additional "potential security"—essentially an emergency reserve of the territorial police. This is obviously why they propose decentralizing control of the guard, having created four regional centers instead of the one in Bonn. Furthermore, the FPO retains the functions of guarding the government, embassies, the most important state facilities, airports, and even Lufthansa Airline's foreign affiliates.

Soviet-German Oil Prospecting Firm To Start Up in Spring

92UF0319A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Dec 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by V. Kornev, personal correspondent (Volgograd): "Germans Will Seek Oil Along the Volga"]

[Text] The Nizhnevolzhskneft Production Association and the German Deminex firm have signed a contract forming the Volgodeminoil joint venture. The new joint venture will begin exploratory work shortly, in spring of the coming year, and will then move on to the extraction of oil and gas.

The exploratory work will be conducted on an area of almost 23,000 square kilometers, taking in several rayons in Volgograd Oblast.

It is probable that some will respond to this news with the warning that our resources are being sold off to foreigners. For this reason, I must immediately stipulate that this is not a concession in any sense. The operations will not affect existing oil and gas production in the oblast. In fact, Volgodeminoil will be the first enterprise in the country to assume responsibility for the whole cycle—from prospecting to drilling and equipping working wells. The contract stipulates that this is a venture. What does this mean?

"This means," General Director A. Novikov of the Nizhnevolzhskneft Production Association explained, "that we calculated projected profits on the basis of undiscovered deposits. What will happen if the search turns up nothing? Or if the deposits discovered are barely productive and would cost too much to work? Then the funds will have been spent in vain. The partners risk the loss of the capital they have invested. The contract stipulates that no one will owe anyone else anything in case of failure. We are in a better position, incidentally, because we will have the

results of the exploratory work no matter what happens, and this will cover some of our expenses and keep us from making unnecessary expenditures in the future. The joint venture's total expenditures on the prospecting, development, and exploitation of deposits will amount to 22 billion rubles, or around 44 billion adjusted for inflation."

At the Nizhnevolzhskneft association I was told that the search for a partner in a joint venture began here last year. After recovering 25 percent of what specialists term projected resources of oil and gas, the association could not proceed on its own. The rest was "hidden" at considerable depths—of 5 kilometers or more. Reaching these strata would require sizable expenditures and special equipment.

Why did the people in Volgograd choose Deminex? I was told the following reasons: The firm is supported by the FRG Government, has experience working in various regions—in the United States, Egypt, Canada, and other countries—and, what is most important, has the expertise and modern equipment that will have to be used in the work of the joint venture. Another consideration was the fact that part of the territory of the rayons making up Volgodeminoil's sphere of operations was once part of the autonomous republic of the Volga Germans, which existed until 1941. Besides this, many Germans work for the association.

The articles of incorporation still have to be "ratified" by the Russian Government. General Director A. Novikov said he did not foresee any problems. In conclusion, I would like to cite several intriguing figures. "Net state income, including local budget revenue, should amount to almost 13 billion rubles, or over 22 billion adjusted for inflation, and 10 percent of the total expenditures will be invested in conservation measures. Within 5 years after the start of the exploratory work, the annual output of oil should reach 1.2 million tons and then gradually rise to 10 million."

STERN Cited on FRG Government's Motives for Honecker Extradition

92UF0293A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by S. Maslov: "Red Carpet—To a Prison Bed?"]

[Text] What are the motives of the FRG Government in seeking the extradition of E. Honecker? STERN, the top German illustrated weekly, gives its answer to this question.

So the federal government wants to put Honecker on trial at all costs. With monstrous tiresomeness it is trying to have the fugitive returned from Moscow and committed to trial. The people in the East are calling for vengeance and want blood, symbolically, at least. And people are in this way doing the nation a favor in order to divert the anger from themselves. "Revenge justice" is not that good an expression but it suggests itself.

Of course, Erich Honecker is guilty in that he headed a regime which represented a mockery of the UN Charter and which made the GDR a vast, but, for that matter, very comfortable prison. But this is not subject to examination from the viewpoint of criminal law.

A pretext was employed as the grounds for issuance of the order for his arrest—the so-called order to use firearms. Whether this is sufficient for setting a trap is doubtful. After all, the principle: “There can be no punishment outside of the law,” still operates in this country. And what law of the GDR—it is only in accordance with it that he could be convicted, after all—prohibited the chairman of the GDR State Council giving the shameful order? Such an opponent of the regime (the sincerity of whose position no one can doubt) as Manfred Stolpe, now prime minister of the land of Brandenburg, considers the charges against Honecker “not pertaining to the realm of justice.”

A trial would not only be dubious from the legal viewpoint—it would be a political stupidity. Does anyone seriously believe that Erich Honecker, who by no means appears decrepit, would let slip an opportunity to so turn about the trial that it would turn into a forum for the good of his cause? It is naive to think that a trial could be conducted surreptitiously. It would be an event of international significance for the media: the first head of a state of the former Warsaw Pact on trial—in Germany, of course, where else?

Here the main question arises: What in fact was going on between us—a war? Or was it not that same Erich Honecker—while he was in power—who was in the good graces of all leading politicians in Bonn? Or was he not received with us even with the highest honors as an official guest? Did we not praise him for the ever increasing detente in German-German relations from year to year? Had there been no wall or order to use firearms when Helmut Kohl shook hands with him?

Ultimately whoever accuses Honecker should also accuse the Socialist Unity Party Central Committee Politburo, where decisions were adopted collectively. And whoever accuses the Politburo cannot make an exception for the Council of Ministers and Central Committee. Are we in for an era of purges or what? One is almost afraid so when one sees how the “Central Office for Registering Crimes on the Part of the Government and the Associations” with hundreds of officers of the criminal investigation police and dozens of prosecuting attorneys is expanding in Berlin. We cannot, apparently, live without “registration offices” in this country.

It stands to reason that investigations should be conducted into manifest crimes—such as they exist according to the laws of the GDR. But the fact that a trial is currently being arranged for leaders of the eastern special services in connection with “treason” (which state did they in fact betray?) appears a satire almost. Only the state based on the rule of law does not come out of this looking very good. Unification with the GDR—if this is to be anything more than pure annexation—meant unification also with German communists and with the millions of people who contributed to the regime and (or) profited at its expense. It means assumption of a specific burden and the acceptance of history. If now shame is being awakened in the East in connection with the past and means are being sought there to restore a lost self-respect, the appeal to justice is entirely accurate—but misaddressed.

Legal proceedings cannot substitute for the difficult but necessary process of inner cleansing, which the Deutsche mark has so rapidly and thoroughly suppressed. Wolfgang Tirse, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party from East Berlin, recently proposed an end to the political disputes in this connection and the organization of a public tribunal “as a form of public comprehension of our past by ourselves.” He was not, understandably, interrupted by applause. Soul-searching is not what is wanted—what are needed are scapegoats.

The history of the GDR cannot be written in a black-and-white format—there is good and bad here. This history represented an extraordinarily complex path, on which there was constant Soviet pressure. Of the division of Germany, to which the GDR was obliged for its existence, the West was guilty to at least an equal extent. There is, in any event, no arriving at a comprehension of the past 40 years with moral maxims in the spirit of sentences of a field court martial.

Honecker Should ‘Live Out His Days in Peace’

PM0912162891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 91 p 1

[Lev Strzhizhevskiy report under the rubric “PRAVDA Exclusive,” accompanying a photograph of Erich Honecker with his wife, seated at a desk reading letters: “Let Him Live Out His Days in Peace”]

[Text] I have never met this man. But I know him, and so do millions of people throughout the world. Erich Honecker, head of the former GDR, hero of the antifascist Resistance, a man who devoted his entire life to an idea which until recently was “our” idea. Today, with our help, he is back in Russia. He has no home and no homeland. The Federal Republic of Germany is demanding his extradition.

We remember postwar history well and know that the cold war was invented jointly by them in the West and us in the East. Therefore we prefer cordially to forget many aspects that are unpleasant for everyone. Especially certain German events. But today they want to drag Erich Honecker out of the past for political purposes. Some people would very much like also to play the part of champions of justice. Although there is plenty of scope for pursuing this principle in both the West and the East, where today there is an active ban on professions—“Berufsverbot,” which, incidentally, was invented in Germany.

This policy has for a long time had nothing in common with morality. Let us remember what happened once before: The Comintern people whom, more than 50 years ago, for the same aims of “peace-making” and “justice,” we handed over to the “legitimate German government” were Germans too. Everyone knows what became of them. This did not improve matters for my “Land of the Soviets,” or improve the rule of law there.

...An old man is reading letters from Soviet people. When you see him you cannot help remembering the calls for justice, love of our fellow men, and help for one another

which are so fashionable nowadays. I wonder, what attitude do the strong men of this world adopt toward these calls? Or has everything merged, in their perception, into a single chorus in which you cannot distinguish "charity" from "aid," and short-term advantage justifies everything? Apparently our current political jargon can again be divided into the internal kind and the kind that is for external consumption—and incidentally this is also true of the politics itself—and the two have less and less in common.

Those are my thoughts as I look at this photograph of Erich Honecker and his wife. He lives in Russia, and he is not simply our guest. He is a part of our history, and indeed of all mankind's 20th-century history, with all its horrors. And before seeing him as a kind of pass giving us the right of collective entry to the other side of the western barrier, to where the store windows shine so enticingly in the distance, we should pause for thought. At least about our common human values.

There is much in our history that was tragic and unjust. Must we add to it? Let us call a halt, and allow our former friend to live out his days in peace.

Honecker Extradition Would Be 'Degrading'

*PM1012110991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Dec 91 p 5*

[Stanislav Oganyan article under "Viewpoint" rubric: "Honecker, the Kurils, and Self-Respect"]

[Text] This is the first time that the words—Honecker and the Kurils—are been written together. I am not a specialist in internationalist affairs and have never written on these topics. And I have never expatiated on my self-respect: I have preferred to keep silent, assuming that you cannot enhance your own self-respect by discussing it at length. Either you have it, or you do not have it at all. And if I venture to talk about this, it is only because I and many people close to me, about whose impeccable credentials I have no doubt, are going to be deeply insulted.

The possibility of extraditing former General Secretary E. Honecker is being discussed seriously in this country. Purists we never dreamed would appear have begun to make a legal case for the German side's demands to get Honecker back, with an unexpected zeal bordering on servility. And you can see the Germans' point of view: With that nation's customary punctiliousness, they wish to sort everything out. They fought for unification—they became unified; they insisted on the forces of occupation being withdrawn—the troops have turned back eastward; now they are setting about carrying out the program's next point—to bring back Honecker, who was smuggled out of Germany, and there bring him before a German court, the world's most impartial. He may not even be seriously punished; he may just be put in the dock and then released: Get going, they will say, you have already gotten your just deserts...

But by that time Germany itself will already have gotten its just deserts in full measure—in the form of our total humiliation. Having been placed by fate in the pit, we have

now become the subject of almost facetious demands from those who only yesterday strove to forestall our every wish. I have our foreign partners in mind. The only one to conduct itself in an honorable manner in this situation is America, which we tirelessly cursed and prepared to fight.

Let us allow that Germany is legally right. All the more so as quite a few supporters in Russia are ready to oblige the Germans or to curry favor with them. Let us consider something else. Honecker is accused of having ordered the shooting of those Germans who, in an attempt to escape from the communist paradise, climbed the Berlin Wall and fell, struck down by East German snipers' bullets. This is a very serious accusation. But is Honecker the only one guilty of this? Does it not seem to you that all of us are guilty of this, the whole country whose might supported and coerced the regime of the "first worker-peasant state on German soil"?

I personally bear the responsibility for those Germans who were shot at the Berlin Wall. There are almost 300 million such as myself. There are those among them who today are inciting Germany to toughen its demands still further with regard to Honecker's extradition. Those who today time after time show on our color television screens the newsreel in which Gorbachev and Honecker kiss each other. Those who state that they personally did not invite Honecker to visit. Those who... In short those who in their time prudently distanced themselves from Afghanistan and its terrifying consequences.

But all of us bear responsibility for this. As well as for Honecker. He was our plenipotentiary representative over there. I would go further—he was one of us. Honecker is so much "one of us" that he lacks, as NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes, the dignity to go back to Germany on his own, "on foot and without his minders' assistance." He states, on the contrary: They'll never take me alive. And it was we who drove that person to make such dramatic statements. We could have said simply and firmly: This person is in our home, and will leave it only of his own volition.

Strictly speaking, Honecker is not the problem. The problem is us ourselves. How are we going to be able to live after this degrading extradition? You see, there is a hot meal shamelessly lurking behind it, even though it may not be directly tied to this concession. But the chance of receiving it will become much greater after the extradition. That is the way people behave only with the most hopeless scroungers, who have lost their shame and dignity and are ready to do anything for some hot broth.

And it is not difficult to detect the deeply hurtful internal link here with a second problem which is tearing us apart—that of the southern Kurils. It is possible and necessary to respect the Japanese's attachment to the "northern territories," and their aspiration to resolve this chronic problem. It casts a shadow over our mutual relations. But recently an ever bigger shadow has been cast over them by the new tone, one of ultimatum, which has appeared in Japanese statements: If you do not give the islands back, you will not receive Japanese aid. Here even the most

complacent person cannot help but be stunned, to say the least. It means: If you behave yourselves, we will put water into the pool, and if you do not, well don't blame us; go on, leap from the springboard just the same, and maybe you won't smash yourselves up.

And here also it is, of course, not the Kurils which are the problem. The problem lies in attitudes toward us. Or, to put it better, the problem lies in our attitude toward ourselves. We see that the country is collapsing. In their

attempts to save the it, people have begun to talk about creating some kind of economic space—something amorphous, which has lost the right to call itself a country. And the country itself no longer has a name. All in all this can be put right. It is something else which we will not be able to put right. If we lose the respect of the peoples surrounding us, we will lose our self-respect and the concept of what is decent and what is not.

And all this could start with Honecker's extradition.

Bulgarian Spy Chief Said Leaving Moscow*92UF0304A Mosco KURANTY in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 5*

[Article by M.A.: "Moscow Does Not Believe in Spies..."]

[Text] According to available information, following in the footsteps of East German superspy M. Wolf, his Bulgarian colleague Todorov is leaving Moscow. The general from Sofia arrived in the Soviet Union back in the happy pre-putsch times to enjoy his mother-in-law's blinis—and stayed, apparently assuming, just like Honecker, that the Moscow climate is good for functionaries of communist regimes. The sudden love the state security general developed for his mother-in-law dealt a blow to the investigation of "Georgiy Markov Affair"—that of the Bulgarian dissident writer liquidated in London by Bulgarian special services. By settling in the Soviet Union the general naturally was able to avoid interrogation by the Bulgarian procuracy, which had started an investigation "into the fact of G. Markov's death." The file on the writer, kept in the bowels of the Bulgarian secret service, had been destroyed.

It is hard to tell now whether the general would have settled in Moscow with his nearest relatives for good had it not been for the fact that the defeat of the putsch led to the fall of his obvious benefactor, Army General V. Kryuchkov, who, according to Oleg Kalugin, in 1978 warm-heartedly responded to the Bulgarian colleagues' request to provide technical support for the liquidation of the disagreeable writer—to supply the poison and other means of persuading the apostate. Now it appears that Todorov will have a lot to tell his homeland about his "literary past."

By the way, the investigative organs of the Bulgarian procuracy recently received some smart advice: to check the lists of those presented for awards on the occasion of 9 September 1978. The Bulgarian intelligence's task was to remove the dissident in time for the national holiday.

Ukrainian Referendum Viewed as Parallel to Yugoslav Situation*92UF0296A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Dec 91 p 3*

[Correspondent V. Gorlov report: "Gloomy Parallels Being Drawn in Yugoslavia, Observing Moscow and Kiev"]

[Text] Belgrade—Belgrade and Zagreb have their eyes on Moscow and Kiev. There is in this gaze curiosity, hope, and fear. Ukraine has taken one further step in the wake of Croatia, and the Soviet Union is now tackling the same problems that previously, prior to the armed conflict, were being tackled by Yugoslavia.

What next? Commentators and politicians in Yugoslavia are guarded in their conclusions, but are drawing parallels in the development of events. Croatia also experienced a great day of entry into independent life. Unwilling to part with Yugoslavia, the national minority in Croatia—the Serbs—held their own referendum. Its outcome was the autonomous province of Krajina, which, naturally, Zagreb

did not recognize. There was no ensuing political dialogue. In the spring the first casualties fell in an armed clash at the Plitvic Lakes. And then, war.

The parallels are horrifying. And we can take comfort in just one hope. There is between Ukrainians and Russians no war of forty-one, which divided the Serbs and Croats. Russians and Ukrainians have shared all their troubles and all their woe half and half. And, I would like to believe, will share the present problems also.

Is this possible? Having opted for independence, Ukraine, as the local papers write, was unable and, perhaps, unwilling to discuss questions of economic relations with its neighbor and, most importantly, the division of the armed forces. It has now been placed within a strict framework, which largely rules out compromise.

Great attention is being paid in the Yugoslav press to the statement of U.S. President Bush made on the eve of the referendum in Ukraine. In this way, many observers believe, the President, speaking about recognition of Ukraine as an independent state, has wittingly or unwittingly prompted the choice of many undecided voters. By all accounts, U.S. policy in respect of the USSR has tilted sharply. And no longer believing in the power of Gorbachev, people there are attempting to establish in advance relations with Ukraine, which has nuclear weapons on its territory. Others believe that Bush has made a mistake. In supporting Ukraine he runs the risk of losing Russia and exacerbating the situation not only in the USSR but in Europe also.

German Moves on Yugoslavia, U.S. Moves on Ukraine Analyzed*92UF0327A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 91 p 3*

[Article by B. Gorlov, correspondent: "Conquerers and Conquered: Can the World Expect a Division Into New Spheres of Influence?"]

[Text] Europe has been beating about the bush quite a bit. Thus, it has wanted the wolves to be full but—at the same time—the sheep to be healthy in this Yugoslav conflict. However, as soon as the next solution in the sequence was reached, the following turned out to be the case: Someone was insulted or injured again. Either Serbia was opposed, or Croatia showed its true character. Understandings have not helped the situation, nor have threats achieved their intended goals; like obedient schoolboys, the presidents of these two republics have sat down 14 times to sign agreements providing for a truce.

Having grown tired of alternately reconciling and threatening, Europe went onto the offensive. At the beginning of the week the following news flew in from Brussels: Serbia and Montenegro were to be punished by economic sanctions. The relevant document also stated that Montenegro might possibly be forgiven soon. When and after what? No explanations were forthcoming. But, of course, Montenegro understood the hint: If it quits Serbia, it will be dropped from the "fined team." In order to understand what kind of step Europe has demanded from Montenegro,

one must know the history of its neighborly relations with Serbia. No matter how deeply an analyst might look, he would not see these two peoples or nations acting separately. During the postwar years—which were, perhaps, the happiest in their lives—and during the years which preceded the war, as well as throughout all their previous history—contending with the Turks, Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians.... In all wars, on all fronts, as if it were ordained by fate, Montenegrans and Serbs have stood together. Even the recent, generally timid or mild attempt by Montenegro's President Bulatovic to state his own point of view—which was scarcely different from Milosevic's opinion—virtually cost him his job. Belgrade was not involved in this. It was Bulatovic's native Titograd which censured him. In teasing Montenegro with the prospect of a "pardon," and, essentially, "buying" its loyalty, Europe, perhaps, had no thought of insulting this nation or people. But, as the saying goes, that's the way it turned out.... However, that is not what we are talking about here and now. What was it that prevented or hindered the ministers from the EC [European Community] from taking one side or another in this painful war considerably earlier? After declaring their own neutrality in the conflict, why did they specify only Serbia as a kind of hostage? And what suddenly happened in the last few days which compelled them to shelve their initial plan of punishing all of Yugoslavia with economic sanctions?

It would be best to understand why Europe took a long time to "harness up," i.e., to settle down to its task, but then started to feverishly try to catch up to the latest events connected—not only with Yugoslavia—but also with our country.

In mid-November Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher held diplomatic consultations with Paris, Rome, and London. Almost immediately the following announcement came from Bonn: Germany intended to break off all ties with Yugoslavia, including both land and air connections. Very soon afterward another declaration was issued from the German capital to the effect that they were prepared to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia prior to the decision by the EC. On 29 November the American President George Bush stated that in case the Ukraine were to declare its independence, it would be recognized by the United States as a power. When people in Kiev were celebrating the triumphant birth of the Ukrainian state, the United States and Canada came out in support of it. And on the following day in Brussels the European Community pronounced its "sentence" on the obstinate Serbia....

What kind of link or connection could there be between Slovenia, Croatia, and Germany—on the one hand—and between the Ukraine and the United States—on the other hand? But the fact of the matter is, as commentators have cautiously pointed out, that these events are interconnected, and they have turned about in tandem. The grounds or causes may be disputed. But let's attempt to follow the logic of their ideas.

It's no secret that the United States has always attempted and still is striving to achieve a strong position at any point

in the world—and particularly in Europe. After the war, utilizing and taking advantage of its status as a conqueror, the United States indeed put down strong roots in European soil. Perhaps the first threat to America's future here was the emergence of the idea of a unified, i.e., integrated Europe—with a common currency, economy, and army, that is to say, under a common roof. No place was provided for the United States here.

But events swung along even more rapidly with the unification of Germany, which—according to the estimates of many specialists—could become within a few years not merely the foremost country in Europe, but also its basic connecting-rod or binding element. The conflict in the Balkans, which broke out during this past summer, has undermined the idea of European unity. That's why the United States has had such a restrained attitude toward the war in Yugoslavia, politely declining the respected and honorable mission of a judge and guarantor of peace—something like the mission which it engaged in during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Biding one's time is not the worst factor in diplomacy.

Meanwhile, thanks—for the most part—to Germany, the situation in Europe has changed. The following has become clear: Serbia is suffering a defeat, whereas Croatia and Slovenia are becoming independent powers. Does this mean success for Europe? It means rather a victory for Germany. The latter has strengthened its own positions by returning both Croatia and Slovenia to its sphere of influence and—through these countries—gaining egress to the Mediterranean Sea. This is a dream which was nurtured and ripened; it is a dream for which more than one generation of Germans has fought. And this has been accomplished without a single shot being fired, without any hint of resistance. Brilliant!

Sooner or later, the United States will have to remove its chess pieces from the European political "board." It may be that Europe has forgotten who opened the Second Front during World War II, but Germany remembers. It also remembers who had the idea of dividing Berlin into zones after the victory and who was able to expropriate the most important thing—Germany's minds—who raised America high in space.

German diplomacy has always played in a cold-blooded and calculated style. But, perhaps, in this game, having been drawn into the struggle for Slovenia and Croatia, it has evoked an answering move. And who could have foreseen it? For our president this move has led virtually to a checkmate type of situation, whereas for Europe's politicians, who have become accustomed to listening to America and believing it, the impact is no less. U.S. President Bush, who in all his numerous meetings with Gorbachev has emphasized that he would do business with him alone, that he would support only the USSR, and did not wish to operate on the level where the real power was during that period—the level occupied by Yeltsin, has suddenly extended his hand to the Ukraine. At the time when the world—taken aback by the headlong, avalanche-like course of events in the Soviet Union—was still looking on thoughtfully, hesitating, and trying to make up its mind

whose side it should be one, the President of the United States knew what he was doing, and the main thing was that he did it in time.

The Ukraine has become a power, and it is clear that it is a fully independent one. But certainly not without the help of the United States. Specialists—politicians and scholars—will continue to analyse the diplomatic game in which two pieces—Slovenia and Croatia—were exchanged for one—the Ukraine. But are these two pieces really comparable in their power and importance to the one which was removed from the Soviet Union's "board"?

With its powerful human, economic, and natural resources, the Ukraine could become one of Europe's strongest countries within a short time, provided, of course, that it obtains aid and support. There is no doubt that, having said "yes" in words, the United States will also support the Ukraine in deeds. And the enormous colonies of Ukrainians residing in the United States and Canada will, undoubtedly, have their own say in this matter. With regard to the Ukraine and Germany, it is already a different story and, of course, one which everyone remembers. All one has to do is open a history book to the year 1941. It is specifically the Ukraine which could become in the opinion of politicians—a serious counterweight to Germany in Europe. Until quite recently that was the role played by the Soviet Union, which has voluntarily given up its own powers.

KGB, GRU Still Active in Czechoslovakia

92UF0337A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Dec 91 p 4

[Interview with Jan Ruml, first deputy minister of the interior of the CSFR, by NOVOSTI correspondent Aleksandr Kuranov specially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; place and date not given: "The KGB and GRU Against Czechoslovakia. 1991"]

[Text] The 40-year-old Jan Ruml was for many years an active participant in the dissident movement in the CSFR. He became associated with it under the influence of his father—a leading employee of reform publications of the "Prague Spring" and then an excavator operator and chief of the underground newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY, who repeatedly spent time in a prison cell. Jan also illegally published the "Charter 77" news sheet and wrote for the Western press. And in order to feed himself he worked as a male nurse in a hospital.

The "velvet revolution" came as a surprise to him, as to almost everyone in the CSFR. But in its very first hours even Ruml, Jr. succeeded in organizing an independent press center which supplied Czechoslovakia and the foreign media with current information. As a member of the coordinating council of the Civic Forum movement headed by Vaclav Havel, he made a considerable contribution to the removal of the communist regime from the CSFR's political scene.

Following the revolution, he considered it his duty to struggle for the destruction of the sinister state security system, which permeated the pores of Czechoslovak

society to no less an extent than the KGB did Soviet society. Many people in the country ascribe to Jan Ruml the main credit for the fact that the local state security service was quickly and very reliably neutralized. But he himself is very far from being complacent, believing that "the teeth of the dragon" could grow, given an opportunity. And not only of the local "dragon."

[Kuranov] The Prague newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY recently published the material "Operation X," which places responsibility for the destabilization of the situation in the CSFR in the past two years, primarily on the nationality issue, on the Soviet KGB to a considerable extent. How far, according to your data, does this information correspond to the truth?

[Ruml] Approximately 40 percent, the rest having been thought up by the journalist, most likely.

We would appear very naive were we to think that the KGB laid down its arms here after 1989. It is undoubtedly a very strong organization, which is now undergoing a serious transformation, but which will hardly alter its essence. We have information concerning the KGB's assertive activity in Czechoslovakia, using the agent network among the local population which had been created earlier.

But an even greater danger to us is posed by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry. After all, the Czechoslovak encryption system operates on Soviet equipment, and the GRU has the technical possibility of monitoring our territory.

In addition, the KGB, in my opinion, is participating in the proliferation across the territory of the CSFR of various components of weapons of mass destruction and individual chemical materials. This is causing serious concern both with us and in Western countries for there are fears that these components are destined for states of the Third World.

Those employees of the KGB who have already been dismissed from this organization are involved in this activity, perhaps. In any event, it may be assumed that they are in this way seeking financial resources for continued existence—either their own or of the structures of the reforming KGB.

[Kuranov] The recent operation of your special services involving a total inspection of the airport in Ostrava, which agitated, by its aggressiveness, the Czechoslovak community (I am referring to the search for some "foreign radioactive materials"), was aimed against just such activity?

[Ruml] Yes, it was connected with this problem.

[Kuranov] In September you were in Moscow and you had talks with V. Bakatin and V. Ivanenko. Were you satisfied with these meetings?

[Ruml] I did not at that time, to be honest, believe that Mr. Bakatin would succeed in really transforming the KGB. I do not know exactly how things stand now. It is being conjectured that the all-Union KGB apparatus will simply partially merge with the Russian apparatus.

Mr. Ivanenko tried to assure me that his organization would not operate against the CSFR but would be engaged primarily in the counterintelligence protection of Russia. I am skeptical. I now know how the KGB operated and continues to operate.

[Kuranov] Are there any of the former personnel of the Czechoslovak state security authorities in your new structures?

[Ruml] No, except for a few employees of the technical services.

[Kuranov] How many persons in the CSFR worked with state security?

[Ruml] Approximately 100,000, but some of them had one-time, almost incidental contacts. Among the most active state security agents there were 15,000.

[Kuranov] Do you personally know of some politician or, let us assume, journalist who is active currently having in the past assisted the state security authorities?

[Ruml] Of course I do, but I would under no circumstances name them unnecessarily.

[Kuranov] CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier recently declared that all spy diplomats had already quit his department. The same was said earlier about intelligence officers who while overseas availed themselves of a journalist cover. Can you answer the question of whether Czechoslovak intelligence operates at all now in other countries?

[Ruml] No, I cannot answer this question for you.

[Kuranov] It may be assumed, consequently, that it does unless you disavow this, as Mr. Dienstbier did the spy diplomats. And could you say anything about the activity of Western intelligence services in the CSFR?

[Ruml] We are cooperating with the intelligence services of Western countries in the fight against terrorism and narcotics and also the proliferation of components of weapons of mass destruction which I have mentioned.

But, as a sovereign state, we cannot permit the activity of anyone's intelligence services on our territory.

[Kuranov] Could I interview the head of your intelligence service?

[Ruml] No, our laws do not permit this.

'Higher-Level' Talks Needed on Cuba Pullout*PM0512114791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 4 Dec 91 p 3*

[A. Golubov report: "F. Castro Staking His All. First Round of Talks on Withdrawal of Soviet Training Brigade From Cuba Ends Fruitlessly"]

[Text] On a warm November evening, a Soviet delegation flew out from Havana to Moscow on an ordinary Aeroflot flight; its main aim had been to agree with the Cuban leadership all the details of the withdrawal of the Soviet training brigade from the island. The delegation left in silence. Without the usual briefing, press conference, or, at the very least, a few words to journalists at the airport. An ultra-laconic communique on the results of the talks published unobtrusively in the local press pointed out that "a wide range of issues was broached."

The reason for the delegation members' silence is obvious nonetheless. World news agencies did not delay in reporting that "the fruitless conclusion of talks is exacerbating to the limit relations between Havana and Moscow which have been complex enough in recent months."

As is known, M.S. Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw the training brigade, which numbers over 3,000 men, from Cuba back on 11 September. Official Havana responded extremely sharply to this statement, calling it a "betrayal," an "intolerable, unilateral decision," and a "go-ahead for aggressive U.S. plans with respect to the island."

Valeriy Nikolayenko, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, who was sent to Cuba at the end of September on a "pacifying" mission, calmed the Cuban leadership down somewhat, although right after the end of the consultations Cuban leader Fidel Castro stated that "Cuba will never accept the USSR's unilateral decision."

This time the Soviet mission was headed by special envoy Vyacheslav Ustinov, whose wide range of powers enabled him to discuss a genuinely "wide range of issues" with the Cuban side, represented by Alcibiades Hidalgo, Cuban deputy minister of foreign affairs. However, the sides did not reach agreement on the main issue among these—the dates and conditions of the withdrawal of our brigade from Cuba. Why?

From the start, F. Castro and other Cuban leadership representatives stipulated that Cuba can only agree to the withdrawal on condition that Moscow puts pressure on Washington and the United States withdraws its naval base from Guantanamo. It is noteworthy that literally in a matter of days, this proviso turned into an indispensable demand and one of the binding conditions for the "successful continuation of the talks."

However, the United States have repeatedly made clear that there can be no question of withdrawing the base or changing its status. Indeed, Moscow was evidently aware of the pointlessness of these attempts.

But, as became clear following the ignominious end of the first round of talks, it did not prove possible to convince

the Cuban side of this. At the last press conference, F. Castro stressed especially: "We will resolutely oppose the withdrawal of the Soviet brigade while, against the will of the Cuban people, there continues to be a U.S. naval base on our territory. Both countries' troops should leave simultaneously. Any other solution would mean that any of action by the White House administration could go unpunished."

According to many experts, Havana's obstinacy in continuing to stubbornly repeat what it knows to be an unrealizable demand is connected with the fact that the Cuban leadership, in the person of F. Castro, evidently understands that it will never again be able to rely on the Soviet Union as the "milch cow" it used to be, and has decided to stake everything on trying to dictate terms to Moscow and even trying to exert direct pressure on it. Indeed, the fact of holding the talks on its own territory is evidently helping it and inspiring self-confidence. A similar viewpoint could be heard in the past few days among certain Cuban acquaintances in Moscow.

The talks were held behind closed doors in total secrecy. According to a Foreign Ministry [as published] Latin America Department staff member, they were "complex and tense, but did not lead to the desired result." Direct evidence of this is that special envoy Vyacheslav Ustinov sent the members of the delegation home but remained in Havana himself to continue with contacts and consultations in an attempt to find a way out of the Havana impasse.

Stop Press

Special envoy Vyacheslav Ustinov, head of the Soviet delegation, has returned to Moscow without making any headway in the talks on the withdrawal of the brigade. It was reported in Havana on the eve of V. Ustinov's departure that higher-level delegations are required on both the Soviet and the Cuban sides in order to reach concrete agreements.

Oil Exports to Cuba Reduced*OW0312041991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1930 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[From the "Soviet Business Report"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the first ten months of 1991, the Soviet Union exported 8.1 mn tons of oil to Cuba. This amount included 6.2 mn tons of raw oil. Before year end, the Soviet Union will ship Cuba an additional 1.1 mn tons. Compared to 1990's total oil exports to Cuba, these 1991 figures mark a 800,000 ton reduction. Ministry of Foreign Relations experts say that plans for 1992 exports are still not clear.

An international agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union stipulated that Cuba would receive 13 mn tons of oil and oil products annually from 1986 to 1989. Of this amount, Cuba consumed 11 mn tons domestically and reexported the rest for hard-currency

In 1990 oil exports to Cuba were cut to 10 mn tons. This act led the Cuban government to implement emergency measures in an attempt to conserve energy. Indeed, these measures helped Cuba to reduce consumption of oil and oil products by 10

. Cuba no longer re-exports oil.

Cuban Organization Asks Soviet Assist on Human Rights

92P50061A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 91
Union Edition p 3

["Cuban Union Statement"]

[Text] The Cuban people are again feeling the cruel hand of violence and injustice. Once again those who dare to speak the truth are being thrown into prison torture chambers.

Recently we became aware of the arrest of the son of the Cuban dissident general, Rafael del Pino. The political police actually made him, a Communist party member, a hostage of the regime, attempting to force del Pino himself to stop his radio addresses to the Cuban people. This week new information arrived concerning the tyranny of the Cuban authorities: the human rights activist, Maria Elena Cruz Varela, a well-known poetess in Cuba, was convicted.

The Cuban Union, one of whose main tasks is defense of the freedom and dignity of Cubans, is exposing the new and extremely crude violation of fundamental human rights in Cuba to Soviet and international public opinion.

We demand the quick release of all prisoners of conscience in Cuba and call upon all Soviet humanitarian organizations, as well as the political and public figures of your country, to assist in the creation of a truly democratic and free Cuba.

Russians Faulted for Continued Support to Cuba

92UF0307A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Leonid Velekhov: "Who Has Their Foot in the Door? Soviet Support of the Castro Regime Continues"]

[Text] Fidel Castro is looking for a way out of the deadend in which he has been left by the collapse of the fraternal communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In the foreseeable future the matter, in the optimistic forecasts of Castro's enemies, threatens to turn into an economic blockade of one of the world's last communist enclaves. But we will find out if that is true, or whether we are just seeing what we want to see.

Yes, Castro is casting about wildly in his search for a way out. He is trying to transfer his gaze from the transoceanic distance to his immediate continental neighbors. He wants to play the "Latin American community" card, hoping that his brothers by history and language will respond to his hand extended in friendship with more than a handshake. For now, however, that is as far as it has gone.

Castro recently made a surprise appearance on the stunningly beautiful Mexican island of Cozumel, where the

participants in the "Group of Three," the presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, had gathered. His appearance was unexpected to everyone except his host, Mexican President Salinas, who invited Castro to this meeting at the very last minute for a reason known to him alone. We will point out in passing that Castro readily accepted such an impromptu, last-minute invitation; in former times he would not have done this.

But the main thing is that Castro did not and could not have anything to do with the "G-3" meeting. Those who gathered were old economic allies preparing to sign a free trade agreement in 1992. It is a kind of little brother to the grandiose agreement of the same name that Mexico is planning to sign with the United States and Canada and which will result in the creation of an unprecedented unified economic space for free commerce, covering a territory where 350 million people live. Of course, the agreement among Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia is also to some degree a clever political maneuver by Salinas. He wants to use it to deflect accusations that have long smoldered in the Latin American community over Mexico's alleged exclusive economic and political orientation to the "Gringos"; hostility toward them continues to be a typical feature of Latin politics and social psychology (and note that Castro has been successfully playing on these feelings for 30 years now). But the political maneuver, as is always the case with Salinas, does not diverge from the economic advantage. He has associated with countries whose economic interests and specific features potentially complement and combine with Mexico's interests: Venezuela is rich in petroleum and hydro resources, Colombia has coal, and Mexico is extremely well situated to develop power engineering and has a well-developed petrochemical industry.

The concerns of Castro and the Cuban economy he has devastated have nothing in common, of course, with the concerns of the three upward-bound Latin American countries. The only thing that can bind them together is the relationship of creditors and debtor, which is exactly what Castro is looking for. As always, Salinas is playing a cunning game: he invited him, but didn't give him anything. Indeed this was also the posture of the other presidents, give moral support and nothing more. This is dictated by common sense. If Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela, gives material support to Castro, who does not want to make the concessions in domestic policy which the world community is demanding from him, then he dooms himself to bitter attacks from the opposition in parliament and will not, of course, be able to count on election to a second term. The results of the most recent congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which was reported in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, demonstrated more clearly than ever to the entire world, including Latin America, that Castro will not retreat on any principles, having learned from the experience of Eastern Europe and the USSR that a half-step backward from the positions he has occupied for decades will inevitably and quickly lead to a hurried and full retreat from the political arena. This has strengthened those Latin American presidents who are still on a handshake basis with Castro in their tactic of

moderate political friendship and absolute economic indifference toward El Comandante.

No, it is perfectly obvious that there is no attraction for him here. And indeed, even the most promising Latin American countries are not rich enough to take on the role of Santa Claus.

But where then is Castro to look for salvation? Strange as it seems, the events of the last few months show that the door to the storehouses of the Soviet economy has by no means been closed to him. And someone is very stubbornly holding it open with their foot, preventing it from being slammed shut. Here are a few facts.

In September the leaders of the Cuban emigration in the United States, headed by multimillionaire Jorge Mas Canosa and U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Armando Valladares, visited the Soviet Union for the first time. The busy Russian politicians with whom they sought meetings did not find the time to receive them. Nonetheless, our guests found an opportunity to speak publicly about the purpose of their visit. In an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Mas Canosa stated that if the Soviet subsidies that are keeping the Castro regime afloat were halted and the Soviet troops stationed there were withdrawn, the Cuban emigration (the wealthiest emigre group in the United States, incidentally) would undertake to fully compensate for any sugar not delivered by Cuba and would carry out other economic obligations not performed by Castro, and in addition would completely pay for the withdrawal of troops, going so far as to build housing in the USSR for the returning military personnel. Furthermore, Mas Canosa proposed a broad program of economic cooperation, including credit, sale of contemporary technology, and so on. In the future this all opened the way for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the future Cuba, whose president many insisted would be Mas Canosa. It would seem that any sensible politician, especially in a country in such desperate condition as ours, would find this interesting, to put it mildly. But that is not what happened. Mas Canosa simply up and left, and his proposals, extremely advantageous for the USSR, permitting us to be rid of the huge burden of subsidies which cost our economy billions in hard currency each year, and at the same time avoid any losses whatsoever, were left hanging in the air.

What is going on? Okay, let's get away from the idea that some kind of dark reactionary forces were operating in this episode, preventing Mas Canosa from making connection with the Russian leadership and preventing the latter from taking advantage of his proposals. But then the impression forms that the old, rusted-out ideological springs continue to operate in the actions of the new politicians. How else can we explain the fact that when, after Mas Canosa, Carlos Alberto Montaner, a Cuban dissident of a more moderate, social-democratic orientation, arrived in Moscow from Madrid he was received by the highest Russian authorities? Montaner is certainly a very intelligent and worthy man, but his political weight, capabilities, and prospects are not comparable with those of Mas Canosa. But "on the other hand," he is a social democrat,

and members of the same party in the Russian Supreme Soviet tried to give high official status to what was basically a simple courtesy visit. So that is how it goes: powerful, concrete proposals for present and future economic cooperation remain unnoticed by those to whom they are addressed, but on the other hand stormy activity develops over signing protests against the Castro regime, the formation of a committee to fight for human rights in Cuba, and so on. But Castro, needless to say, could not care less about these appeals: the subsidies are continuing.

But then on 28 October Yeltsin announced firmly that Russia would simply put an end to all subsidies to foreign regimes. Three days later Agence France-Presse reported that Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Ties Filshin announced the possible halting of Soviet participation in construction of the AES in Cuba, which was assessed as the first step toward a complete stoppage of subsidies. It was a very significant step: according to information from American and independent Cuban sources, in addition to the billion dollars already invested another 1.5 billion is still to be invested. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA published the information from Agence France-Presse, but on the same day officials from the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry called the newspaper: nothing of the sort, they said, the Soviet side is continuing to build the AES in Cuba, the contract was signed and is in effect. Does this mean that Yeltsin's intentions and his minister's statement were nothing but words? It is true that they are assuring us that this construction project is extremely necessary and advantageous for the USSR: in exchange we are receiving sugar from Cuba. For one, where is it, this sugar? For two, wouldn't the Mas Canosa proposal be more advantageous? He would deliver sugar without demanding construction of billion-dollar AES's in return. For three, so what, is Castro really going to refuse to sell us sugar without the AES? What is he going to do with his sugar? If he goes into the world market with this quantity of sugar, it will hit prices so hard that he will find trading there far less profitable than in the USSR.

So to the accompaniment of reformist talk, promises, and incantations the old policy continues to be successfully and openly followed. In the case of Castro it is obvious that a powerful lobby has been preserved in different levels of the power structures and continues to protect the interests of the odious Comandante. And there are reports, which of course still need to be verified, that a large share of the economic transactions aimed at maintaining and supporting the Castro regime are secret and are carried out in USSR territory by agents of the Cuban state security services.

So perhaps Castro does not have to hustle so much in the search for new creditors? Perhaps he should wait calmly (as they say Yanayev advised him in a confidential message back in July) until everything here is harvested, ground up, and made into flour which the Soviet Union, engulfed in bread lines, will very properly deliver to Cuba?

Broader Trade Relations Sought With Brazil

92SM0133V *Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL*
in Portuguese 19 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Livia Ferrari]

[Text] Rio—Nikoliy Drosdov, acting chief of the Soviet Department for Economic Relations with Latin American Countries, announced yesterday that his country would like to broaden its commercial relations with Brazil, although he admitted that, in the present phase of transition to a market economy, the Soviet Union is having difficulty paying hard currency for its imports.

Speaking at a seminar in the ACRJ (Rio de Janeiro Commercial Association), Drosdov said: "We are experiencing a huge need to acquire food products and the foreign currency at the disposal of the country will be used primarily for foreign purchases of foodstuffs, medicines, and equipment that will enable us to increase domestic production in our agroindustry." He noted that his country is promoting a reduction of its import aliquots.

According to Drosdov, the USSR is seeking lines of credit in the international market to pay off its debts to its

trading partners, including Brazil. In this regard, he reported that last month his country had paid off a part of the outstanding bills for purchases of Brazilian instant coffee.

Drosdov noted that before his country opened up its economy, only the state companies could conduct foreign trade. Now this activity is also being conducted by private companies and companies with mixed capital. However, because of the problems inherent to the political and economic transition in the USSR, the country's world trade, which traditionally came to as much as \$160 billion per year, has declined considerably in the last few years, partly as a result of the decline in domestic production.

Although they recognize the commercial potential of a country like the USSR, with some 300 million inhabitants, the 50 or so Brazilian businessmen who took part in the ACRJ seminar expressed a reluctance to do business. Claudio Martins, executive secretary of the Brazilian Association of Poultry Exporters (ABEF), noted that Brazil had not renewed its sales contracts with that market this year because of the delays in payment.

Results, Goals of CPC CC Plenum Reported*92UF0292A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Dec 91
Union Edition p 6*

[Yu. Savenkov report: "How To Preserve in the 21st Century Socialism With Specific Chinese Features"]

[Text] Beijing—Economic reform. Political control. Revival of the role of the party. Social stability. The participants in the CPC Central Committee Plenum which has just concluded in Beijing see these as the ways to preserve socialism with a Chinese coloration.

The 50 million-strong party, which does not intend sharing political power in society with anyone, is at a critical stage of development. The collapse of socialism in East Europe and the departure from the political arena of the CPSU are confronting the Chinese Communists also with the problem of survival even more sharply. The 80- and 90-year-old veterans, the first generation of Chinese revolutionaries, are departing. There is a changing of the guard. What kind of captains will lead the Chinese caravan on the tempestuous seas where the force-9 gales of democracy are roaring?

The 14th CPC Congress will be held in the final quarter of next year, the plenum decided. It obviously devoted the lion's share of its five days of business to discussion of the principle of the formation of a new Central Committee, which is to be considerably renewed at the coming congress. The communique does not disclose the details of this debate but, obviously, the participants in the plenum achieved a consensus, as a whole. The new leaders must be "true Marxists."

The architect of the Chinese reform, Deng Xiaoping, once said: "They call me a reformer. They call other comrades conservatives. But if a conservative is one who defends the socialist path, the leadership of the Communist Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong, consider me a conservative." It was such an atmosphere which reigned at the plenum. There were differences only in the methods of the improvement of socialism, which, as the documents proclaim, "is to save China."

The communique speaks of the need for an improvement in the organizational structure and the actual style of party work. It is a question of enhancing the political level of the Communists and their cohesion and capacity for defending the party line. The emphasis on ideology, observers believe, testifies that the CPC is aware of its vulnerability in connection with the changed situation, particularly following the failure of the August putsch in Moscow.

The plenum supported the continuity of the policy of the December 1978 plenum. And, consequently, the policy of the 87-year-old Deng Xiaoping. As is known, that plenum adopted the decision to shift the center of gravity from class struggle to the country's socialist modernization. The emphasis on economic building was significant. But since the Tiananmen Square tragedy it has been heard increasingly often that class struggle is not over. Former General

Secretary Zhao Ziyang was accused of having underestimated its role. The supporters of a class approach are still quite strong in the party. At the time of the plenum the newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO carried an interview with Deng Liqun, former leader of the Central Committee Propaganda Department, in which he extols the revival in society of interest in Mao Zedong. The veteran considers this phenomenon, which he called "Mao fever," healthy inasmuch as it indicates young people's devotion to communist ideals.

As was to have been expected, the plenum adopted a document on the development of agriculture and work in the countryside. The plenum acknowledged that there could be no progress or harmony in society without tangible successes and stability in the countryside. There was confirmation of the need for an increase in investments in agriculture, primarily in the construction of irrigation systems and introduction of the achievements of science and technology and a statement of support for the rapidly growing rural industry. The plenum confirmed that the family contract will be preserved for a long time to come as the basis of the rural economy. For it was here that the Chinese reform, which required of the peasants initiative, inventiveness, and enterprise, began. The party intends to strengthen ideological education in the countryside and to revive the party cells, which, it seemed, had died away following the introduction of the family contract (it was acknowledged in the 1980's that the party cells should not interfere in economic affairs). The party intends to raise a "new generation of peasants" with noble ideals, educated and disciplined.

So, economic reform. Political control. Revival of the role of the party. Social stability. the multicolored palette of the life of Chinese society.

Ambassador on Soviet-Japanese Relations, Far East Issues*Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Nov 91 Single
Edition p 4*

[Speech by Sumio Edamura, ambassador of Japan in the USSR, at the opening of the "Japanese Evenings" series organized in the Moscow Soviet-Japanese Friendship and Culture Center: "Japan and the 21st Century"]

[Excerpts] I sometimes say jokingly that the Soviet Union does not hold the patent for perestroika. Every country is at times faced with the need to make strenuous efforts for the sake of major changes. Like other states also, Japan arrived at its present prosperity by no means without work by the sweat of its brow.

I am not talking about the postwar difficulties, when the whole country had been turned into a pile of ruins. Even in recent years Japan has had to overcome several serious problems through the efforts of the whole people. The doubling of the oil price at the time of the 1979-1980 oil crisis created a critical situation for our country, which imports a large amount of its energy resources from overseas. The sharp rise in the value of the yen in the

mid-1980's doubled the price of Japanese products overseas, which created a threat of a loss of their competitiveness. All these difficulties demanded of enterprises intensive efforts to improve technology and streamline production. And a cardinal structural change in the direction of science-intensive production was needed at the national level. From an economy concentrated around heavy and chemical industry to a society of information supply requiring high technology.[passage omitted]

Energy and environmental problems. Whereas in the latter half of the 1980's the price of oil remained low, it is anticipated that in the latter half of the 1990's the price of energy will increase. For such an oil-producing giant as the USSR this is possibly good news. But this could hamper the economic growth of such consuming countries as Japan.[passage omitted]

The world's prosperity has up to now been achieved under the conditions of the free exchange of commodities and services globally. And it is necessary henceforward to maintain and strengthen the system of multifaceted free trade based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and check the temptation to protectionism and the formation of exclusive economic blocs and regional egotism. On the threshold of the 21st century also our country will continue its numerous diplomatic efforts to preserve the system of free trade on a world scale as a priority task of diplomacy.

In this speech I have spoken mainly about the domestic and international tasks which confront Japan on the threshold of the 21st century and focused attention on the economy and scientific and technological sphere. At the same time, however, I have to express hopes that our country, occupying an important position in the modern world, will play a more important political part in the interests of the whole international community.

An example of this are the many diplomatic efforts made by Japan in cooperation with interested parties, the USSR included, for the purpose of the achievement of peace in Cambodia. We aspire, as the next step, to the creation of a system in which we could actively participate in peace-keeping activity under the aegis of the United Nations.

In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly also on Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-Russian relations. New hope is being engendered today for a solution of the question of the affiliation of the four northern islands—the biggest unsolved question between our countries. I am convinced that this question will be solved on the basis of the principles of legality and justice before the onset of the 21st century at the latest. The solution of this problem will remove a major obstacle for the conversion of the USSR into an influential, respected member of the international community and equal partner of the states of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is at the present time the most dynamic region of the world. It is characterized not simply by a high growth rate. The development of the dynamic relationships of interdependence and the horizontal division of labor observed here is truly astonishing. This is

leading to a widening of the circle of economic growth, from the foremost countries such as Japan through the new industrial countries (the Republic of Korea, Singapore), and embracing developing countries even (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia). This could be a model for a future solution of the North-South problem.

As a result, taking the United States as an example, the amount of American Transpacific trade has exceeded Transatlantic trade. The United States' Pacific coast has become, partially under the influence of this factor also, a significant driving force supporting the growth of the entire American economy. Were something similar to happen with you in the Far East and Siberia, it would come as no surprise. I say this as an example of the fact that positive changes in Japanese-Soviet relations will afford many opportunities for cooperation between the two peoples.

The 21st century will confront us with a multitude of tasks. At the same time, on the other hand, it affords us many shining hopes. Cooperating, we must exert efforts for the active accomplishment of these tasks and the realization of the shining hopes. I am convinced that the establishment of Japanese-Soviet relations on a basis of justice and legality would facilitate these joint efforts of ours.

Moscow Radio Commentary Discusses Attack on Pearl Harbor

*OW0712125191 Moscow Radio Moscow in Japanese
1100 GMT 6 Dec 91*

[Text] Listeners! Fifty years ago on 8 December 1941, the Japanese Air Force waged a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection, Moscow Radio military commentator Kalin comments as follows:

The sneak attack by the Japanese left 2,903 Americans dead and about 1,000 others wounded. In the attack, the Japanese sank 21 warships and wrecked 328 planes, incapacitating the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Thus was the outbreak of the Pacific War. It is still remembered that the United States and Japan were enemies. For example, according to American newspapers, one out of five Americans living in the Pacific coastal state of California still does not forgive Japan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile a large number of Japanese are still haunted by the bitter memories of various occurrences from that time. During the war, 120,000 Japanese residing in the United States were held in custody. During the closing days of the war, Americans dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to the results of a recent opinion poll, 61 percent of Americans and 34 percent of Japanese surveyed do not view the United States and Japan as allied nations. This view among the Americans and Japanese appears to have resulted from the negative effect of economic friction between the two countries, but I believe that the two countries' past has a profound effect on their views.

It is quite unreasonable to confine the attack on Pearl Harbor to the relations of Japan and the United States. The attack must be assessed from a broader historical viewpoint. The Nazis launched their attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, and these two attacks triggered World

War II, which brought about horrible consequences. The war left at least 50 million people dead. Did the war give any lesson to mankind? I believe it failed to do so. After the war, mankind experienced the cold war, as well as a series of regional conflicts and wars in which approximately 10 million people lost their lives. However, positive progress has recently been made in the international situation, and the dream of peace is becoming something real. For example, the disarmament process has gained impetus and has affected not only conventional war capabilities but nuclear war capabilities as well. Current global issues cannot be resolved by the use of force, and those issues should be resolved with perseverance by respecting the interests of all nations and treasuring civilization, mankind's highest value. Therefore, in order to prevent a recurrence of our blood-tainted history, it is important for the world to keep in mind the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This has been a commentary in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Moscow on Damage Caused by Attack on Khieu Samphan

BK0812095991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1230 GMT 7 Dec 91

[Commentary by station observer Viktor Valentinov: "A Costly Mistake"—read by announcer]

[Text] The issue is the aftermath of the incident which took place in the Cambodian capital on 27 November. First of all, the author of the commentary writes.

I would like to give a brief account of what happened. On that day, Khieu Samphan, leader of the Khmer Rouge, arrived in Phnom Penh to take part in the work of the Cambodian Supreme National Council [SNC]. The man was not cordially received by the Cambodian capital. Hundreds of demonstrators raised placards with such slogans as: Khieu Samphan, Murderer, Dog, Get Out of Phnom Penh. The government was late in taking security measures. It was fortunate that leaders of the Pol Pot group escaped lynching. Accompanied by guards, Khieu Samphan arrived back at Pochentong Airport and left Phnom Penh for Thailand on the same day, 27 November.

Listeners may well have realized why I use the word mistake in the title of my commentary. There was indeed a mistake. The Phnom Penh Government did not think in advance of what could happen. It ought to be said that the agreement signed in Paris indeed charges the Phnom Penh Government with the task of ensuring personal security for all SNC members, including those of the Khmer Rouge, who are full participants to a solution.

His Excellency [H.E.] Hun Sen, head of the Phnom Penh administration, sincerely admitted his mistake and promised that in the future, all SNC members do not have to worry about their security. However, the Khmer Rouge have already managed to use the mistake made by the Phnom Penh authorities. This is why one is forced to talk about the great loss resulting from this mistake. What did Khieu Samphan manage to achieve?

First, this man seized the opportunity to set his own conditions. In fact, in the period before 27 November, the Khmer Rouge were isolated. Now the anger of the Cambodian people with those guilty of genocide seems to have slid into becoming a secondary matter.

Second, and this is more certain, it has cast doubt on the ability of H.E. Hun Sen's Government to control the situation in Phnom Penh. The United Nations even threatened to pull out its staff from Phnom Penh if there is no order there.

Thirdly, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, head of state, seems to have been under pressure from Khieu Samphan. He has canceled his planned visit to Vietnam. The visit to Phnom Penh planned by the Chinese Foreign Minister to put a final touch on normalizing Sino-Cambodian relations will also not take place.

Finally, Samdech Sihanouk has renounced the alliance with the party of H.E. Hun Sen, although this has already taken shape. However, this issue should be dealt with separately.

Now more than ever the balance of forces in the Cambodian political arena is easy to understand. All four political forces in the country have the possibility of staying separate. The tripartite opposition, which existed earlier, has been split following the signing of the Paris agreement. The rapprochement of the party of Samdech Sihanouk and that of H.E. Hun Sen has only recently emerged; in the future, this could lead to the formation of a government which can fully function with the nation's trust. However, the 27 November incident has blown away this alliance which has just taken shape.

Now the Khmer Rouge side, taking advantage of the situation, is striving to win over the Son Sann group, and if possible that of Samdech Sihanouk as well. This is the price Cambodia has been forced to pay for the 27 November incident, an incident which I firmly believe was accidental and unintentional.

However, it has clearly shown how much damage can be done by a mistake or the slightest miscalculation, concludes our observer Viktor Valentinov.

Former Kurils Inhabitants Favor Joint Residence With Soviets

92UF0390A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by S. Bunin, under the rubric "Pulse of the Planet": "Too Much Time Has Passed—What the Former Japanese Inhabitants Think about the 'Northern Territories'"]

[Text] While the politicians carry on debates about the "territorial problem," people on both sides of the present border are observing the development of events with alarm. And it is interesting in this connection to find out what the Japanese who formerly lived on the Southern Kurils and after moving settled mainly on neighboring Hokkaido (there are about 11,00 such people at the present time) think about the "northern territories." The NHK Company conducted a survey, the first one incidentally,

among people who moved from Chishima, as the Japanese call the Kurils. The results showed the following opinions.

To the traditional question, "Do you want the territory to be returned?" a large majority, 90 percent, answered yes. The next question was, "Would you like to visit the place you used to live?" Fifty-eight percent expressed an intention to visit their former home if these islands are in fact turned over to Japan, and 26 percent are ready to travel there right now, taking advantage of the recently introduced no-visa system for visiting Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai.

The answers to the third question on the questionnaire draw attention. Only 39 percent of the former inhabitants of the Kurils think that they could return to their former place of residence to live permanently. Sixty percent said that they would remain where they are now living, even if the islands are turned over to Japan. Among persons of the second and third generations of former inhabitants even fewer would return to the land of their ancestors—28 percent. The majority (71 percent), referring to family, everyday, and financial difficulties, would prefer not to go anywhere.

But the most noteworthy results came from questions about the future of the "northern territories." Among former inhabitants of the first generation 36 percent were in favor of these lands being settled exclusively by Japanese after the conflict is resolved. Forty-one percent of those surveyed favored joint residence with the Soviet people who now populate the islands, and 15 percent just prefer for the South Kurils to be a zone of free movement and residence regardless of citizenship.

Commenting on this survey the information program "21" noted that a marked majority of the former Japanese inhabitants, of both the older and younger generations, today favor joint residence with Soviet people.

As for the reasons that most of the former population of the South Kurils do not want to return to their former places of residence if they are turned over to Japan, the primary factor here is age; nearly a half-century has passed since those times. Here is what Inako Ichimohe, a 69-year-old former inhabitant of Iturup, said about this: "Of course, I will certainly go there if it becomes possible, even if only for a day or two. I will find the place where my father's house stood, pitch a tent, and spend the night, so that afterward I can say—this is the place where my parents were born. And then it will be possible to die in peace. It is hardly likely that anything has been preserved from those days. As far as I know, others also want to make one visit to their native place before they die, out of respect for the memory of our ancestors. I do not think, though, that anyone is seriously intending to move to the islands to live permanently—the time has passed."

Food Processing Joint Venture Between Sanyo, Energiya Association

92UF0313A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Dec 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by B. Konovalov: "Food Processors in Orbit of Conversion"]

[Text] By the new year the Energiya Scientific-Production Association [NPO], as the prestigious firm is now called, where the first satellites were created—Gagarin's spacecraft and the MIR Orbital Station—will be producing 30,000 food processors [kukhonnyy kombayn], manufactured under license to the famous Japanese firm, Sanyo. Next year it is planned to produce 250,000, and by 1993—a half-million. In essence, high-capacity "civilian" production was set up at Energiya in just one year. If conversion were to take place at such a pace at all enterprises, the goods famine in our country would be significantly alleviated as early as next year, and in a couple of years would be only a bitter memory.

Creating high-capacity civilian production here proceeded from the premise not to "reinvent the wheel," but to purchase equipment by means of currency [valyuta] earned. We chose Japan because she proposed paying off the contract much more cheaply than her competitors. With the help of an intermediary—the Nisho Iwai [Niskho Ivai] Co., we established contact with the Sanyo firm, which agreed not only to sell the license, but also to completely furnish the equipment for the entire manufacturing chain, taking upon itself the responsibility of bringing together ten firms.

This summer under the leadership of I. Khazanov, chief engineer of the Experimental Machine-Building Plant of the Energiya NPO, a group of specialists "descended" on Japan, bringing Soviet materials from which the USSR proposed manufacturing food processors. I then saw with my own eyes that at last we had learned from our well-known bitter experience, in which imported equipment operates splendidly with Western raw materials, but will not accept Soviet materials. But this time the Japanese themselves chose from among our numerous variants the materials which, although not meeting Japanese standards, would not decrease the quality of the end product.

This fall, a group of Japanese specialists made a landing in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad. After training Soviet workers, they started up all the equipment purchased. The plant managers at first wanted to build completely new buildings for the new production, but had their doubts as to the capability of the builders, and decided to deploy the equipment basically in the spaces of the old foundry. You would not recognize it now: the cleanliness is like that of a Japanese firm.

By November practically all the Japanese specialists had gone home.

"The Japanese have turned out to be very reliable partners," says Experimental Machine-Building Plant Director A. Borisenko. "Right now our main difficulty is acquiring materials—both in quality and quantity. But we hope to resolve this problem and to reach our planned capacity. We plan to introduce production of other household appliances in our existing spaces."

Now let's talk a bit about the economy. The cost of the contract completed is a little larger, but comparable with the cost of sending the Japanese journalist up to Space Station Mir. And so manned space flight turns out to be

very profitable, if one can directly convert its as yet modest returns into civilian production. And after all, we have practically only begun.

The "Japanese Miracle" is in essence simple—after all, Japan, while not yet a wealthy country, purchased licenses throughout the world, and organized advanced production. Right now we are following the same path. But you see, we must not at the same time throw overboard that in which we have already achieved perfection, in which we may trade. Conversion for such firms as the Energiya NPO, is fine as a "life saver" which permits retaining the cadres and the high technology by means of profits from the sale of civilian production. But one must not put the question in terms of either-or. For the country needs both food processors, and cosmonautics.

DPRK KGB Reportedly Runs Siberian Labor Camps

LD0612054991

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1200 GMT on 5 December carries a 5-minute report by correspondent Vlasta Demyanenko on a North Korean worker who reportedly recently escaped from a Siberian labor camp controlled by the DPRK KGB.

Demyanenko introduces the report by noting that "the camp at which our hero arrived was not far from the village of Tynda, in Amur Oblast. It is surrounded by the taiga. Somewhere in the vicinity there are another five such camps, which, either to soothe the conscience or for the sake of decency, the Korean Political Protection Administration dignifies with the name of timber holdings [lespromkhoz]. Such timber holdings—where Korean citizens work cutting timber 20 hours a day, receive 5-10 rubles a month, live in huts, and eat seaweed in the summer and minty fish in the winter—also exist in Khabarovsk Kray."

Demyanenko continues: "According to the fugitive, whose name I deliberately will not give because he is being sought, there are 10 such timber holdings in Khabarovsk Kray. Having worked without a day off for three years, employees from the timber holdings receive 40 days of holiday. They are sent home under strict escort. Escape from the timber holding, just as an attempt to correspond or, for example, to take an interest in anything Russian, is considered high treason. Each year, five or six people run away from timber holdings. Each one contains around 1,000 Koreans. The North Korean Political Protection Administration immediately puts out a call and the Soviet KGB then sets off in search of the fugitive. The captured man is sent back without delay, not home but to a concentration camp."

Demyanenko summarizes reports about individuals who have run away from timber holdings. She notes the involvement of the Soviet KGB in this system: "The hopeless situation is aggravated by the fact that the treaties concluded between North Korea and Union departments in the 1960s still have not been annulled."

She adds: "It is known that, in accordance with a treaty between North Korean and Soviet sides, including with the Timber Industry Ministry, 61 percent of the output produced in the timber holdings remains in the Soviet Union."

Demyanenko closes with an appeal on behalf of the escaped Korean.

South Korean Fishing Boat Detained

92UF0332A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Dec 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by G. Chardeyev: "Poachers Flying Foreign Flags"]

[Text] A couple of days ago in our country's economic zone near the port of Nakhodka, Soviet fish preservation organs detained a South Korean fishing ship belonging to the firm Gak Yang Kheung San, Ltd. which was illegally trawling for pollock.

It was established that before the ship was detained it had been fishing in the open part of the Okhotsk Sea. After a careful inspection, 50 tons of valuable fish were discovered on board. The Korean captain refused to follow to the Soviet port and only agreed to sign a protocol for their violation of fishing rules. Taking advantage of his rights, the fish preservation inspector imposed a fine of 10,000 foreign currency rubles on the captain. A property action was also filed against him for a total of 315,000 American dollars. It is reported that the ship will be released after confirmation by the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations in Moscow that the fine money has been received. The poachers state that they caught only 20 tons of pollock in our zone and that they caught the rest in the open part of the Okhotsk Sea. The ship is still afloat at the place of detention under the vigilant watch of Soviet fish preservation organs.

Specialists do not have the slightest doubt about the legality of the actions taken by the fish preservation organs: The Korean ship was discovered in the zone of our country's fishing jurisdiction and administrative measures were properly taken against them for violation of fishing rules. Moreover, the poachers, thinks Professor K. Bekyashev, an independent expert in the area of international maritime law, got off easy. If, say, the ship had been taken to Nakhodka, by a decision of the city court, a fine in the amount of up to 100,000 foreign currency rubles would have been imposed on the captain and the ship and the catch would have been confiscated. But this did not happen because the northeastern border point, as it turns out, refused to help the fish preservation organs deliver the ship to the Soviet port. The fishing ships are so obsolete and worn out that they are afraid of any "close combat."

The assertions of the captain of the Korean ship that a large part of the catch was caught outside our country's jurisdiction do not hold water since pollock is a unique resource which migrates freely throughout the entire water area of the Okhotsk Sea. Because of this fact, the whole

pollock population belongs to our state, which was registered in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution.

Today a poacher pays a 2 ruble fine for one such fish, regardless of its size and weight. It is known that the average weight of an Okhotsk Sea pollock is two kilograms. In a store we pay 3 rubles for a kilogram of pollock. So it turns out that the poachers stand to gain, as usual...

Nor should we forget about the fact that at the present time in the Okhotsk Sea there are more than 60 large foreign ships engaged in illegal fishing for valuable breeds of fish near our country's economic zone.

Vietnamese Outraged by Removal of Ho Chi Minh Statue in Moscow

*92UF0390B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Nov 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "Ho Chi Minh...and the State Committee for the State of Emergency"]

[Text] In my archives I have two photographs, taken in different places at different times; but by the will of certain events they are now tied together by meaning and subject. One of them, almost 10 years old, shows the opening of the monument to V. I. Lenin in Hanoi. The person who is taking the cover from the memorial stone is current President M. Gorbachev. The second picture, taken last year in Moscow, perpetuated the moment of unveiling of the monument to Ho Chi Minh, the first President of Vietnam. Yes, the very monument which the Moscow authorities decided, by a recent ukase, to remove.

It is hard for us, Soviet citizens working here in Vietnam, to understand how Ho Chi Minh did wrong in the eyes of the Moscow lawmakers. He is a person who enjoys respect and authority throughout the world, and certainly had nothing to do with the events which our capital lived through in August of this year. Except that for 46 years now the day of 19 August has been considered a holiday in Vietnam, celebrating the August Revolution of victorious 1945, which was led by Ho Chi Minh. And maybe someone saw in this fatal coincidence of dates, 19 August, some secret meaning, some hint of a connection between

the heritage of Ho Chi Minh and the plans of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. It is as hard to understand the logic of the "war against stone images" as to understand the desire of the Moscow authorities to occupy themselves with anything except the city's most pressing problems. But it is even harder to explain this all to the Vietnamese, who do not conceal their "regret," which is really more like indignation, at what is happening.

Today we are very justifiably proud that we have become civilized, that we have moved away from idolatry, and in this we have done so much that we have amazed the rest of the world. But sometimes the feeling arises that we do not know the difference between ordinary vandalism and genuinely civilized behavior. Ho Chi Minh, aside from the fact that he was a communist, was also a great humanist and thinker. The 100th anniversary of his birth was celebrated by the world community in 1990. It is not accidental that UNESCO declare last year the year of Ho Chi Minh as a sign of gratitude for his services to humanity. But, as one of the high officials of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said with regret in a conversation with me, "The position of certain officials in the Soviet capital somehow does not match the general evaluation of Ho Chi Minh's activities by such a respected international organization." For the Vietnamese themselves the image of their president, a man of great personal humility, and everything connected with him is sacred.

We should remember that on the monument in Moscow are his well-known words: "There is nothing more precious than freedom and independence." As the Vietnamese press reports, the first question asked by the representative of the Vietnamese Embassy to the Moscow prefect which was "preparing for the removal" was: "Do you know what is written there, what principles you are raising your hand against? The prefect did not know. He was surprised, and promised to think about it."

Maybe he really will think about it. In any case, the Vietnamese have been insulted by the decision of the authorities in Moscow, whose inhabitants they usually recall with the warmest feelings of gratitude and respect.

Incidentally, there are always fresh flowers at the Lenin monument in Hanoi.

Israel Opens Cultural Center in Moscow*LD0712094591 Moscow TASS in English
0403 GMT 6 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow December 5 TASS—An Israeli cultural centre opened here on Thursday in one of ancient mansions in the old part of the city.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, Arye Levin, Israeli ambassador to the Soviet Union, voiced hope that the newly established centre will serve the lofty cause of the expansion of relations between the two countries.

'Personalization' of Soviet-Indian Relations Deplored*PM0212131991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Nov 91 Union Edition p 5*

[Correspondent N. Paklin report: "Complicated Times in Indian-Soviet Relations. Why the 1986 Delhi Declaration Is Not Working"]

[Text] Delhi—All the indications are that the anniversary of the signing of the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a world free from nuclear weapons and violence will pass without any fanfares this time round. In fact there is nothing to celebrate. With hand on heart, it has to be admitted that that the declaration which M.S. Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi signed in November 1986 in the Indian capital is "not working." Though both sides' propaganda presented this document as historic.

The Soviet Union certainly made great efforts to get the ball rolling with regard to the issue of nuclear disarmament. But progress in this direction was achieved not in the eastern but in the western salient, first and foremost by Moscow and Washington. But as far as India is concerned, the good intentions enshrined in the Delhi declaration about a world free from nuclear weapons and violence remain for it no more than a diplomatic formula. A paradoxical situation is developing: Though it signed a call to free the world from nuclear weapons, India is rejecting its neighbors' proposal to rid Southern Asia of them. You get the impression that India has recently stepped up its attacks on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the "last of the Mohicans"—those states which earlier, like India, rejected this important international treaty—are now acceding one after another. While India is expressing the intention to accede to it, this will only be after it becomes the possessor of nuclear weapons. (You can read about this in more detail in the report entitled "Who Has Got an Atom Bomb Behind Their Back" in IZVESTIYA No. 270.)

It is the very approach to nuclear disarmament that displays significant differences of opinion between our two countries. The Soviet delegation has just voted at the United Nations in favor of the draft resolution on transforming Southern Asia into a nuclear-free zone. Pakistan submitted this draft, coauthored by Bangladesh. India opposed it. The Soviet delegation's stance elicited a strongly negative reaction in Delhi. "India considers that this vote marks the beginning of the USSR's departure

from the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries," the influential newspaper THE TIMES OF INDIA writes. Indian newspapers assert that the USSR "voted against India." In actual fact this is of course not true. The Soviet delegation did not vote against India but for transforming Southern Asia into a nuclear-free zone.

Could our side have supposed when it was preparing for the Delhi Declaration's signing that the declaration would turn out to be ineffective? Knowing India's viewpoint on the nuclear question, it might of course have done so. But nevertheless it went on to sign it. Why did it do this? In the first place, I think, to invest M.S. Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986 with "particular significance." Later our propaganda moved heaven and earth to present this basically routine high-sounding document as a symbol of "new political thinking in tune with the conditions of the nuclear and space age" (here I quote an official description of the Delhi Declaration). Desperate attempts were made to lend the declaration an universal character. But nothing came of them.

And there is one other important aspect—the personalization of Soviet-Indian relations. Back then we set ourselves the aim of focusing them on the personal relationship of M.S. Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India at the time and chairman of the ruling Indian Nation Congress (I) party. The personalization of relations is not a new phenomenon for our two states. At first relations were "focused" on Khrushchev and Nehru, then came the turn of Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi, and then, after the signing of the Delhi Declaration, that of Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi.

In my opinion the personalization of interstate relations is a kind of manifestation of the personality cult. Using their power, leaders control these relations and pose in the garb of patrons and benefactors. A whole host of propagandists sing their praises, extolling their "personal contribution"...

What do we see five years on? Rajiv Gandhi died tragically. President Gorbachev's functions and role have changed. The question now is to avoid the mistakes of the past and not to focus on leaders in relations between the two countries. Then relations will be stable.

Shebarshin Book To Recount Days in Iran*924B0114A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Nov 91 p 3*

[“Memoirs” of Lieutenant-General Leonid Shebarshin, former chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate: “Memoirs of a Soviet Intelligence Chief”]

[Text] Leonid Shebarshin was the chief of Soviet political intelligence—the USSR KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD)—for almost three years. He took charge of it in 1989 under Kryuchkov, and resigned in 1991 under Bakatin. Immediately after leaving the FCD, Lieutenant General Shebarshin started to work on a book—mostly memoirs of his work at the Lubyanka and in the intelligence center in Yasenevo, near Moscow. Here, Shebarshin is writing about the countries he has lived and worked in, including Iran at the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq war.

Sometimes I feel that people in our profession need a sort of compact book, where they could find answers, or at least a general outline of possible answers, to those numerous questions people of our profession ask themselves. One would wish this book to also indicate some philosophical benchmarks, contemplate on life in its ordinary and extraordinary manifestations, and provide guidance for action for the occasions each of us may encounter.

* * *

What I saw in Iran had already been tormenting people in one or another corner of the globe for many centuries. Words and slogans change, but their meaning does not; turbans replace generals' caps or brass helmets, but the thoughts born in the heads covered by this varied headgear do not change. A considerable part of my life had been spent in Iran, shaken up by the revolution and the counterrevolution, where I, among many others, was a voluntary or involuntary participant in the events taking place. The fabric of those events got intertwined with our lives—they got permeated by a sharp aroma of anxiety and excitement, and they were darkened by the pain for those murdered and tortured to death—not some abstract people, but those whom we had known, who only yesterday had been living, talking, and smiling. In those bitter moments we were seething with indignation and impotent rage.

We lived the life of Tehran: its explosions, shots, chanting crowds, its rampaging gangs, its streets and squares; we breathed its air and mixed with its crowds.

I do not want it all to slip out of my memory, not to be able to again, whenever I may wish or just in passing, relive this sometimes unbearably hard but incredibly interesting part of life. With its political stratagem, with the indescribable atmosphere of a Russian's life in a foreign country, in a foreign revolution, and, most importantly, with the people surrounding us. Although that is the part that is the hardest to retain in the memory. And I will have to, with regret, let some of them quietly disappear, gradually losing their unique features, blending with the faceless multitude of friends and acquaintances, business partners and neighbors, bosses and subordinates, and accidental passersby.

We live too fast.

Do Not Pull a Lion by the "Tail"

I drive and walk around Tehran a lot, quite often alone. It is not safe, or at least not always sensible. Explosions are heard on the streets and squares, and shoot-outs break out here and there. Besides, the people from Khomeini's SAVAK [Chancery for Investigations and Information under the Iranian prime minister's office] are no angels, either. They much prefer to deal with minimally mobile and predictable objects. I cannot be immobile, but I am happy to oblige in regard to predictability. All my routes, all short and long car trips and walks almost always lead in the end to a book store or street stand, or the library of the St. Nicholas Orthodox Church on the former Roosevelt Street.

I know that my watchers also gradually get used to my habits—to linger for a long time in front of the book shelves, to strike a conversation with the owners, and definitely buy something, haggling where the custom permits. They definitely immensely dislike my habit of walking on foot—middle-eastern people fail to see pleasure in long walks. Gradually, I stop noticing my entourage. They have received good training, and therefore it is far from easy to detect them. But if you are not in a hurry and follow a familiar route, the task becomes easier. The important thing is not to look back or around you—just walk calmly, taking care—as any Tehran pedestrian—that you do not get hit by a crazy motorcyclist, watching with interest the street scenes, politely giving way to others coming from opposite direction, and stopping by street vendors of whom there are great number in Tehran. And then, at each stop or turn, or while crossing the street, you can surreptitiously look around and notice that car creeping suspiciously slowly, or an uncomfortable-looking figure always hanging out somewhere in the distance.

One thing not to do is irritate the "escorts." It is better not to try to disappear in the crowd, slip out of the car through the side door, or suddenly jump into a car parked somewhere behind a through alley and take off before their transport gets there. A few careless acts—and you are placed in a category of dangerous people, those who require especially close attention. No surveillant will ever admit, under any circumstances, that he had simply let the target slip away, lost it. The latter is always to blame. He was the crafty one. He was the one who for some reason (what reason?) needed to give surveillance the slip. The surveillance task immediately gets more complicated, and a routine cat-and-mouse game becomes heated. And when they get tired of a restless, crafty "mouse," they start working the hard way, using methods not envisaged by any international conventions...

...One beautiful day such an overly smart foreigner goes downtown; carefree, he parks his car by the sidewalk and goes about his business. Upon return, he discovers a most unpleasant thing: all four tires have been slashed. Do not blame hooligans—there are none in Tehran. An astute man will take the warning the right way and will carefully weigh his actions. A stupid one will continue to act stupidly, forgetting that he is not the master of the situation and that he is not on home soil. Next time, the mishap may not be limited to the car...

This is what a curious foreigner thinks about during his walk around Tehran. He has no intention of aggravating his relations with the masters of the country, and therefore he is circumspect. Every step of his is justified and predictable...

Navruz

Today is Navruz—the Iranian New Year. It is March. In war or in peace—during these few days all organized or official activities in Tehran cease. The Iranians spend these days with family and close friends. Newspapers are not published, offices are closed, and only a few shops are

open for business. On that cool morning we go to Zargande, a small village near Tehran.

Our usual watchful escorts are getting some rest today, too. At least along the unhurried—with stops—trip from downtown, where the embassy is, north to Zargande...

...The day is dragging on intolerably slow; I need to kill time until dusk. Everything had been thought through, prepared, planned for, and weighed. It is a simple business. Late in the evening, I need to meet and talk with an acquaintance. If SAVAK learns about this meeting, the consequences can be serious for both of us. But the worst will happen if SAVAK already knows about our meeting. It should not, but nobody ever knows for sure. You can never be sure, although it is imperative not to think about it and to exclude this possibility from practical considerations. Business is business. Therefore, we have to base our judgment on real information, soberly appraising the probability of sudden interference with our plans, and think through various options for our actions.

The second danger, and an absolutely inadmissible one, is to bring a "tail." In this respect, I am more confident. The third danger—my friend, too, may bring a "tail." But he is taking a greater risk than I, and he knows how to act. So I exclude this possibility, too.

One cannot ignore the whims of this master of fate—chance. It always hovers invisibly over our heads, looking for gaps in the clever constructions we build, and strikes mercilessly when least expected. But there is nothing anybody can do about that.

It is an endless day; we have not been taught the skill of waiting patiently.

Dusk in Tehran is of a slightly purplish shade. The street lights will not come on—the city is under black-out; cars will not turn on their headlights for another 15 or 20 minutes. The silhouettes of buildings, people, and trees grow softer, blend into spots; snow-covered mountain peaks on the horizon become pink in the light of a sun already invisible to us, the inhabitants of the plains.

It is time! We drive our ubiquitous Zhiguli through the gates of Zargandeh and dive into an endless maze of narrow, winding alleys. The road is long—through the entire city. We cannot afford to stumble on a patrol, a roadblock, or catch the attention of SAVAK people. The Zhiguli is ideal here because of its humble appearance and the ability to blend with the Peikans and Fiats. There are almost no pedestrians on the streets. The stores are closed. It is a holiday... We continue winding our way through the streets, keep changing the rhythm of the movement. Had anybody followed us at least part of the way, they would have no doubt that something did not smell right here. We are at the point when it is not enough to cast a quick glance to see if the surveillance is there. We have to be absolutely sure that it is not. The slightest suspicion—and we are heading back home. If the surveillance is there, we will not attempt to shake it.

Two or three more turns; I slip out of the car in an absolutely dark alley and am left completely alone. I am

wearing a green half-coat and jeans. This is the way the entire male population of Tehran is dressed these days, so an accidental passerby will not pay attention to me even if I get illuminated by headlights. In my pockets are a small amount of money, an ID, cigarettes, and matches. The shoes are special for walking noiselessly, well worn, with soft soles.

My eyes gradually get used to the darkness. I move in the direction from which we drove up. Not a single passerby, not a single car. A rare strip of light shows through carelessly drawn black-out window blinds; muffled voices carry from apartments. Everything has been calculated: I have a precise 15-minute walk, exactly one and a half kilometers. Darkness, silence, and heightened awareness will let me notice anybody who may decide to follow me. Patrols have no business at this time in dark alleys. Ahead of me is a small vacant lot; as soon as I cross it, I will be at my destination, give or take 30 seconds. From the lot—into an alley. In it, there is a light spot against the dark background—it is a white parcel, and the man holding it is supposed to walk slowly towards me.

...There is no mistake—the man with a white parcel is moving towards me. We meet, I ask a prearranged question, he provides a prearranged answer. One more alley; an unlit entrance way; the door closes softly. We have arrived.

It is a long, intense conversation, without excessive verbiage or digressions. Just in case, nothing is being recorded; neither is it advisable to talk loudly. The world moves aside, everything—the black-outs, the air raids, routine work, everyday concerns—all of it is now outside of the sphere where I and my interlocutor currently reside. Two radios are on. They are tuned to different programs. There is nobody to eavesdrop on it, but... God takes care of those who take care of themselves. Let them try to isolate two quiet voices in the chorus of radio voices.

Names, facts, numbers, the hidden interconnection of events. Politics in an Islamic republic is insidious, cruel, and bloody. Deception is not just a means in a struggle here—it is its foundation. My interlocutor speaks softly, in an even voice, but even in his calm words one can hear the roar of explosions, shots, a sinister rustle of multilayered intrigues, and moans of the deceived and the tortured. I believe him and feel for him... I still do. He had suffered a horrible fate. Under torture, he had denounced himself and slandered his confederates. One cannot blame him for this. The human body is weak, and there are tortures it cannot withstand.

...I am back on the street. In complete darkness, I hurry away, to put distance between me and this house. Two kilometers from here, in a deserted alley, the car should have been waiting for me for half an hour. There is nobody on the streets—neither people, nor cars. From somewhere far away, a floodlight set by the Revolutionary Guards at their post shines straight into my eyes. Watch your step! Tehran sidewalks are full of the yawning mouths of wells. Fall into one of them, and you will never get out. You will disappear, never to be heard from, which is much worse than death.

Success! I am moving as if I have grown wings. The tension has subsided; I do not feel tired. My head is clear; all that has transpired is easily recollected. An ambulance with a wailing siren rushes past me; then another, and then several roaring motorcycles. Somebody got killed somewhere. Tehran's everyday reality.

The car is where it is supposed to be. Everything is in order.

The Great Elder

The cult of death, admiring death, and relishing death—this is the atmosphere created by the Khomeinists. Blood and corpses in photos, on book covers, on television screens, and on posters; blood and corpses on Tehran sidewalks, in torture chambers, in Khuzestan bogs and Kurdish mountains; blood and corpses in Turkmen steppes, in Beluzhistan deserts, and in Mazenderan forests. And the black shadow of an ancient gray-bearded elder in a black turban hovering over all of this.

For me, Khomeini is not an abstract exotic figure. I see his strong points—an unbending will, an iron consistency, a practical calculating mind, and a boundless loyalty to the idea. What is frightening is that he is capable of sacrificing hundreds of thousands, millions of lives for the sake of this illusory idea. I have no doubt that he could sacrifice the whole of humanity. The old man sleeps well, albeit not too much; he often admonishes and exhorts Muslims in a fatherly way, monotonously denounces the enemies of Islam, and does not eat meat.

His hold on life is tenacious. In January 1980, in his native town of Qum, famous for its pottery and the sacred tomb of Our Maiden of Fatima, Khomeini had suffered a heart attack at a madrasah and was taken to Tehran, closer to modern medicine. Since then, he had outlived tens of his confederates, rivals, and associates—Mottahari, killed at a mosque doorstep; Biheshti, Rajai, and Bakhonar, killed by explosions; Ghoztzadeh, executed by a firing squad; Banisadr, escaped abroad in disgrace. The list of martyrs of the Islamic revolution is endless. But the old man lives on. Regularly, two or three times a year, rumors spread that he is on his deathbed or even dead. At one time, Khomeini even allowed himself to jest in public that the rumors of his death had been greatly exaggerated. (Since him reading Mark Twain is out of the question, he must have thought of this joke on his own!).

I am being ordered to verify these rumors. I get mad, lose my temper, and write: "Information of another death of Khomeini is not true." In reply—a disapproving silence.

Khomeini was born in 1902. I wanted so very much for him not to outlive me. Khomeini died two years ago.

A Cow Instead of a Minesweeper

The foreign war continues. Newspapers publish daily gloating summaries on the enemy's losses. The military in general have a tendency to exaggerate. The Khomeinists are no exception in this; they follow in the footsteps of their remote ancestor Haji-Baba from Esfahan, the hero of G. Maurier's roguish novel. Putting together a report on a

skirmish with Russian troops in the beginning of the last century, Haji-Baba reasons more or less this way: "Two, or five, Cossacks fell off their horses. Probably five. It is not known whether they have been killed or just wounded. Let us count them as killed. And why should we feel sorry for these infidel dogs at all? Let me write that 50 were killed!"

This is the way the Khomeinists produce their reports. If one were to believe their pronouncements, each Iraqi aircraft was shot down at least twice during the first months of the war. Armored tank divisions were "destroyed" the same way. "Our side" also suffers losses, but they are modest, most likely purely symbolic. All of Iran knows that the official propaganda lies, but it is better not to express doubts. Besides, the Iranians are rather indifferent towards figures—unless it involves counting money; for an average Persian figures are meaningless. On the whole, the Iranians assume a very artificial, fragile line between truth and lies. It is foreign diplomats who at first are horrified by the absolutely nonsensical result of their arithmetics.

The Iranian knows that the situation at the front is not all that great. Increasingly often, mobilized soldiers do not return home; echelons bring back cripples, torn apart by iron and burned by napalm. In particular, many come back without legs. The Iraqis put mine fields in the frontline zone, while Iranian commanders—yesterday's shopkeepers, drop-out students, and clerics inflamed by the idea of Islamic grandeur—drive their footmen through the mine fields.

The newspapers are full of overblown tales of heroic exploits of Islamic warriors. There is something of Good Soldier Schweik in these warriors. But are Iranian journalists really so pushy and naive? Persians are able to jest with finesse, all the time keeping this pious expression on their face; sometimes one seems to get a glimpse of Gasek's mischievous eye under that ordinary turban.

Saudi Arabia bought in America these incredibly expensive AWACS aircraft, equipped with modern radar detection technology. The deal is denounced in Iran, but with a certain envious undertone—such money, such wonderful technology. And so a propaganda opus comes out, under the title "Our Lord is our AWACS," with more or less this content. "Two brave soldiers are making their way through a mine field, expecting an explosion at any moment, but not afraid to die. Suddenly, a cow appears out of nowhere, overtakes the brave warriors like a whirlwind, and gets blown up by a mine that had been sitting on the warriors' direct path. Where did the cow come from in this deserted area? Clearly, our Lord himself sent it. We do not need expensive sophisticated equipment to detect danger. Our Lord is our AWACS."

Woe for Wit

In Tehran, a man encounters guards every hour, day in and day out; there are many of them, and they are everywhere.

We are leaving town on a smooth, wide highway, built for the shah by the Americans, in the direction of a small town of Karaj. The weather is excellent (actually, in these parts

it is almost never cloudy); the traffic is light. One can see from afar a home-made gate blocking the highway, and several figures. They waive at us: "Stop!" We stop. A Guards patrol is checking transports. A teenager, really rather a boy—12 or 13 years old, thin, with closely cropped hair, his face probably last washed three days ago—approaches us. Not rudely, but with an air of certain superiority he suggests that the travelers get out of the car. Oh, how tempting it is to tap him lightly on the forehead, laugh, give him a small souvenir—a pin or a pencil—and continue on our way. It would have been even easier not to stop and just ignore him. Some actually did that in the beginning, and paid dearly for it.

It turns out that it is possible to even now see Tehran the way it appeared to Aleksandr Sergeyevich Griboyedov 150 years ago, and exactly in the place where his trail on earth had been interrupted. A small monument to Griboyedov, erected in 1912 with the money collected by the Russian colony, stands in the embassy park. Our bronze compatriot sits in a chair set on a low pedestal, and reads, day and night for decades, something written on a bronze note sheet, with a barely detectable smile.

Griboyedov's mutilated body was taken from Tehran to Tiflis on a plain peasant bullock-cart. The monument had to do a little traveling, too. Originally it had been put next to the embassy's main building, among the bushes of evergreen laurel, flanked by two marble angels. It had stood in this spot until the end of the 1960's and Ambassador G.T. Zaytsev, who decided that the great Russian playwright and the torturous way his life ended were tactlessly reminding Iranian guests of this sad incident in the history of our relations. The little monument was lifted together with the pedestal and moved out of sight, closer to the residential building, so that it would not irritate the Iranians by being where it used to be.

The Foundation Ditch

There are fewer and fewer of us in Iran. The Islamic revolution inexorably and persistently continues to squeeze out representatives of the northern neighbor that started under the last shahs. Closed are the Russian-Iranian Bank and the Red Cross hospital in Tehran that used to provide medical care for the Tehran poor; closed are the consulate in Rasht and the office of the Main Administration for Foreign Insurance of the USSR Ministry of Finance; correspondents are not issued visas. The official Soviet colony is shrinking, and even faster the formerly flourishing Russian emigre community diminishes and disappears forever from Tehran.

In the beginning of the 1960's, construction of a new office building for the embassy was started. A contract was signed with a local company, which started digging a foundation ditch under the strict supervision of Soviet consular personnel and construction specialists. In the course of excavation—conducted on our territory surrounded by a tall fence—the remains of several people were found buried underground. It is a criminal matter, but it was somehow hushed up and things managed to get

on without an official investigation, although, by recollection of eyewitnesses, it was established that the burials had taken place at different times, and that the remains had been in the ground for several decades. Who were they; what had they been mixed up in; who got rid of them and why? All of this is shrouded, as one of Sholokhov's heroes used to say, in "unknown darkness." I somehow think that perhaps our compatriots found their final resting place on this small piece of our soil in Tehran. Or maybe it is entirely something else... But then, who was it that could have been secretly buried in the embassy park?

Bovin Sees Hope for Future Mideast Peace

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in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 8

[Interview with Aleksandr Bovin by Lena Bereznitskaya; place and date not given: "Lifestyle: The Fourth Youth of Aleksandr Bovin Goes to Israel"]

[Text]

[Bereznitskaya] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, congratulations on your appointment as ambassador to the beautiful country of Israel.

[Bovin] Thank you. But "beautiful"—that is questionable. I used that same epithet recently and met with an objection. People who have lived in Israel for a long time said that it is a remote province with a terribly ideologized society. I will go and try to straighten all that out.

[Bereznitskaya] What is your attitude as you set out for your "country of residence"?

[Bovin] I am a little bit afraid of how things will work out there. But I am more hopeful. And, you know, I am hoping for a fourth youth.

[Bereznitskaya] Why a fourth?

[Bovin] Well, like everyone else, my third one came when I was 50. And by the time I was 60 it began to dry up. But here I feel so shaken up, there is an ocean of new sensations. In general my fourth youth is beginning.

[Bereznitskaya] In connection with our latest internal changes, who do you feel you are today—the ambassador from whatever the Union may be or from Russia?

[Bovin] The former Union no longer exists and it never will exist again. Consequently, I represent some kind of formation comprised of the fragments of the USSR; I represent the head of this formation, who for now is called the "president of the USSR." Even now I feel that I am the servant not of two masters but more. And I must defend the interests of Russia and the interests of Kazakhstan and the interests of any participant in a possible confederation.

[Bereznitskaya] Russia has taken over the embassies that already exist. But there is not one in Israel. Are you now discussing such aspects?

[Bovin] I am not the one who is resolving these "aspects." I represent a power which actually will exist.

[Bereznitskaya] Will the embassy be in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv?

[Bovin] In Tel Aviv, of course. The world community does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the embassies are located in Tel Aviv. The consulate is now leasing the 15th floor of one of the high-rises on the seashore. A plot of land and a building will have to be found for the embassy.

[Bereznitskaya] How many people will be working in the embassy and who will they be?

[Bovin] To begin with there will be 14 diplomats and 14 technical workers. We have already chosen some of the people. We will choose the rest later. I have set three criteria: Intelligence, youth (around 40 years of age), and knowledge of Hebrew. Of course, compromises are possible. But I will fight for what I want.

[Bereznitskaya] Ata mevina ivrit (Do you know Hebrew)?

[Bovin] I am going to learn it; here is the textbook. I understand that I will not be able to speak like a native Israeli but it will be adequate for an ambassador.

[Bereznitskaya] And does your wife, Lena Petrovna, intend to learn Hebrew?

[Bovin] Probably not. She will have a lot of concerns of her own.

[Bereznitskaya] Will there be Jews working in the embassy?

[Bovin] I am not making a special point of that. I have already mentioned the criteria for selection. But all other conditions being equal, preference will be given to Jews.

[Bereznitskaya] And what about the people using the consulate as a front; they probably comprise more than half?

[Bovin] Your "information" is very outdated. Different times, different proportions. Let us think seriously. In every country that plays any kind of role in the world arena there are foreign intelligence workers who use the embassy as a "cover." This pertains to the CIA, the Central Intelligence Service, and, excuse me, the Mossad. It is important to practice moderation. Moderation in numbers and moderation in arrogance. One must be concerned about that.

[Bereznitskaya] Have you spent a lot of time acquiring an agreement? It probably took no more than a half hour, as with Pankin.

[Bovin] No, after all, they had a direct phone line from the president to the prime minister. It took me more time. And it was not a matter of personality but of bureaucratism. Papers make the rounds, first they arrive at one desk, then they are placed on another, then on the next. For example, after the president in the Kremlin signed the ukase for my appointment as ambassador, this paper reached the desk of the minister of foreign affairs 48 hours later, even though you can walk from the Kremlin to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in a half hour. The normal operation of a normal state machine. And "they" have the same thing.

[Bereznitskaya] When Shevardnadze came to be in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Relations did you not have the feeling that he might tinker with your appointment a little?

[Bovin] I did not have that feeling. Incidentally, the first person I spoke with after I learned that the ukase for my appointment had been signed was Shevardnadze. He is an experienced person whom I deeply respect. And I wanted to know from the horse's mouth what specifically it was that had been standing in the way of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel over the past two or three years, why it was always being put off. I went to see him in the association and Eduard Amvrosiyevich told me all about it.

[Bereznitskaya] And can you tell us?

[Bovin] I am not sure. In the most general form, it was blocked. But the details belong to history and to him. After this conversation I was convinced once again that our positions practically coincide. Therefore the departure of Pankin and the arrival of Shevardnadze should not have any effect on my situation.

[Bereznitskaya] What will be our policy in the Near East in the near future?

[Bovin] I am absolutely certain that unless we have some kind of totalitarian, conservative coup—and everything that does not contradict the laws of physics is possible—we will continue our adjustment and equalization of our Near Eastern policy, taking both Arab and Jewish interests into account. We will be oriented not toward ideological considerations as before but toward our state interests. Our interests consist in having peace in this region of the world, which is not far from us, making sure that "our" Jews who are living there (and there are already a half million of them) will not feel cut off or severed from their previous homeland, and strengthening economic, cultural, and technical ties. All this will be useful both for them and for us.

[Bereznitskaya] As for the regulation of the Near Eastern conflict itself, are you an optimist or a pessimist here?

[Bovin] Let me put it this way. I am a strategic optimist and a tactical pessimist. From now until the end of the 20th century I cannot see any real preconditions for the establishment of a durable and just peace. As long as we stick with the Americans we can avoid another war. That is the main thing we can do now. In parallel, we must search for peace. If the present confederation does not lead to concrete results, the next one will be set up. For the fact that the Jews and Arabs are sitting down and talking already indicates immense progress. To get them to sit down at the same table seemed to be utopia, but we got them to do it anyway. And we will have to proceed further along this path. Although I understand that the present generation of politicians will not be able to reach a compromise. But after a certain amount of time a new generation of people will appear and there will be a new policy.

[Bereznitskaya] Can you not write for IZVESTIYA any more?

[Bovin] I think we will come to some agreement: Say, once every two weeks or once a month I will give them a column. Of course, it is difficult for an ambassador to do this. But Garasimov from Lisbon shows that it is possible.

[Bereznitskaya] You have been in Israel twice; what do you like most about Israeli cuisine?

[Bovin] You know, I have a great suspicion that there is no such thing as Israeli cuisine. What we call Jewish cuisine in Russia and Eastern Europe is not regarded as Jewish at all in other regions of the world. Tell a Moroccan Jew about forshmak or radish with goose fat and he will say: What has this got to do with Jewish cuisine? There are restaurants with Jewish cuisine as we understand it. Only they do not have stuffed pike but stuffed sea perch. In my opinion, the basic "tonality" of Jewish cuisine is Arab and Mediterranean. Humus, olives, fruits, lamb, and various kinds of marine life which I like very much.

[Bereznitskaya] These kinds of sea life are mainly kosher.

[Bovin] I do not know very much about all that yet. One time when I was in a restaurant something extraordinary happened to me: I ate a cutlet and then asked the waiter to bring me a glass of cold milk. "Excuse me, I am not allowed to," I heard, "we have a kosher restaurant and you must wait 12 hours after you have eaten meat before you can drink milk."

And the most important thing: I want you to regard anything I say about Israeli cuisine as strictly from a dilettante. Everything could be just the opposite.

[Bereznitskaya] Are you not afraid that people on the street who used to live in Moscow will simply start tugging at you?

[Bovin] That has already happened. For example: "Oh, Comrade Bovin, may I touch you?" I was living in a hotel and was writing an article for IZVESTIYA on the veranda. Everyone around came to look at me and brought their children and grandchildren. We talked a lot. People in this last wave are having a hard life, very hard. Except for the young ones, of course.

[Bereznitskaya] Do you like all this attention?

[Bovin] In general, I do. Sometimes it is a little irritating. But I have already gotten used to it. By the way (or not by the way), about irritation. Sitting next to me on my last trip was an extremely educated, intelligent person who had left Russia about 20 years ago. He had an excellent command of Hebrew and a thorough knowledge of the history of Israel. I gained a great deal from communicating with him for two days. In his heart he was a confirmed, 100-percent Israeli and is not teaching his children Russian out of principle: "They are Israelis, and that is all there is to it."

But when he was with me and people came up to me and oohed and aahed, I felt that he was angry. I asked him why he was so nervous and told him all that was natural. No, he answered, they are in Israel, they are Israelis and should not behave themselves like that...

[Bereznitskaya] You will probably be able to contribute in purely technical ways to making it easier for people to regain their Soviet citizenship.

[Bereznitskaya] Of course, I will try to do that. The interests of the individual should be higher than the interests of the state.

[Bereznitskaya] If it comes to a choice between state interests and the interests of these people, in whose favor will you choose?

[Bovin] I will choose in favor of the people. I see my main function as resolving humanitarian problems. Namely: to bring together these 500,000 threads or at least begin this process. I think this will correspond to our state interests as well. This is—as it is now fashionable to say—the human dimension of politics.

I am fully aware that I am speaking too sweepingly, without considering the fine points or exceptions. But I am still too much of a journalist and have not yet mastered the diplomatic intricacies.

[Bereznitskaya] You will also observe how everything is closed on Saturdays; none of the institutions operate.

[Bovin] Well, there is nothing wrong with that. They know what they are doing in Israel. For example, on Saturday a Jew cannot even press the button on an elevator. But they have to get around somehow. So in the hotels they have Saturday elevators which automatically stop on each floor. And everyone is satisfied.

[Bereznitskaya] People have always said that there is Jewish blood in your veins, and there has been even more talk of this since your appointment.

[Bovin] I do not know whether it is a good or bad, but there is no Jewish blood in me. My parents and my grandparents came from the city of Shatska in Ryazan Province. And I do not think there has been a single Jew there since the Birth of Christ.

Why do people "say that"? Perhaps because I have always been a fundamental opponent of anti-Semitism and have never slung mud at Israel. Perhaps because my first wife was a Jewess. But most likely because they want to use this to compromise me in the eyes of a certain segment of the population.

[Bereznitskaya] When people speak about Jews the question of anti-Semitism automatically arises.

[Bovin] You are right. Contradictory processes are taking place in the country. On the one hand, real official anti-Semitism is gradually beginning to lose its positions, and I am convinced that this tendency will continue. But on the other hand there is the dirty byproduct of glasnost. Not only the opponents of anti-Semitism but also its proponents have been given the right to speak. Hence there are all kinds of leaflets and pamphlets reflecting the ways of the Black Hundred...

[Bereznitskaya] In your opinion, how great is the danger of anti-Semitism today?

[Bovin] It is difficult for me to judge this because I am not a Jew. I do not feel this in my "gut" and I have no psychological criteria for evaluating the situation. Still, it seems to me that things are getting better.

[Bereznitskaya] Do you have a large circle of friends over there who have come from here?

[Bovin] Not very large, but I have one.

[Bereznitskaya] When you visited Israel in 1979 many people probably asked advice from you as to whether to leave or not. After all, at that time there were few who traveled there and back.

[Bovin] I have always held the same position: You have to choose your own destiny, you have to decide for yourself whether to leave or not.

[Bereznitskaya] What was the reaction to your appointment from the Palestinians and Israel?

[Bovin] I do not know what the Palestinian reaction was. One can assume that it was fairly restrained. The reaction from the Israeli representatives was positive. But that does not surprise anyone.

[Bereznitskaya] When you were working in the Central Committee was there even one Jew there?

[Bovin] There were "half-breeds." I do not know how many; you would have to look at the department personnel records.

[Bereznitskaya] Did anti-Semitism somehow manifest itself at a high level?

[Bovin] I have not heard of that; it is difficult to imagine.

[Bereznitskaya] Well not in the meetings but on hunting trips.

[Bovin] I did not go on hunting trips with the leaders. I never heard anything like that in the places where I was. It seems to me that to display anti-Semitic attitudes and to speak of them in public was considered bad taste.

Directorate Chief Assesses Soviet Diplomacy in Middle East

92UF0333A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Nov 91 p 4

[Interview with Vasiliy Kolotusha, head of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Near Eastern and North African Countries Administration, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Yuriy Leonov: "The East—a Delicate Matter: The USSR Was Not Spoiling to Join the Organizers of the Peace Conference. It Was Invited There"]

[Text] Diplomacy

The Middle East Peace Process—is a very fragile thing. Some people compare this region with Nagornyy Karabakh: a couple of careless statements by politicians, one noisy article—and the growth of tension and escalation of the conflict. Throw a stone—an avalanche begins. This is certainly explained by the dislike of highly placed diplomats who are associated with the Middle East process and

by their frank conversations with journalists. Neither Baker nor Pankin, without talking about Bush and Gorbachev, have hurried to press conferences to report about successes achieved on peace conference preparations and the technology of the negotiating process has totally remained in the shadows.

The lack of information engenders rumors and myths which enter into the mass consciousness through the mass media. It is partly for this reason that the opinion has arisen among many journalists about the USSR's more than modest role in the Middle East process. Vasiliy Kolotusha, head of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Near Eastern and North African Countries Administration, does not agree with this opinion and therefore, while risking to say more than he wanted to, he nevertheless decided to talk with a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent.

[Leonov] Vasiliy Ivanovich, what factors determined our country's role in this region?

[Kolotusha] The Middle East is in the sphere of our geopolitical interests. Our involvement in all of the complicated situations in the Middle East is unavoidable. Many countries of the region are our traditional foreign policy partners. The recent restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel, closer contacts with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and maintenance of the ties with the Palestinians—all of this also helps us to maintain and strengthen our position here. There is also one other important factor. There must be a strong rear—a stable domestic political situation in the country—behind our diplomats....

[Leonov] Is this not linked with the American side's more active participation in preparations for the Middle East Conference?

[Kolotusha] This is primarily associated with the great capabilities of the Americans to influence Israel's position. The Americans have convinced Israel to participate in the negotiations and they have agreed to the principle "peace in exchange for territory." Therefore, Baker was traveling to the Middle East more often. Incidentally, he called his negotiations with Shamir the most complicated.

[Leonov] And what did the USSR do? Did it persuade the Palestinians?

[Kolotusha] Not only that. Contacts were continuously conducted with the Palestinians within the framework of conference preparations: sometimes our representatives traveled to Tunis (the PLO leadership is located there—Yu.L.) but more often the Palestinian representatives came to Moscow. The USSR's role in bringing Syria into the conference, as U.S. Secretary of State Baker noted, was no less important than the U.S.'s role. The decision on the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel—this is also part of our work.

[Leonov] They say that our role at the conference itself was quite modest. Or did it remain in the shadows?

[Kolotusha] There are many things that I simply cannot talk about. But, for example, this is what was apparent to everyone: on the eve of the conference's first session, Mikhail Gorbachev met with Shamir and appealed for him, as the first speaker of the conflict participants, to not make any sharp statements and to impart a constructive tone to the conference through his speech. Pankin talked with the Syrian minister of foreign affairs on that same score and I myself had contacts with the Palestinians. They obviously continue to underestimate the importance of Gorbachev's message to the Syrian president after Syria occupied a nearly inflexible position in Madrid.

[Leonov] While restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, did we pursue only the goals associated with organizing the conference or would these relations have been restored in any case?

[Kolotusha] Our relations with Israel have developed successfully in recent years and it was obvious that diplomatic relations would be restored sooner or later. But if we approach this issue from the other side, did we have the moral right to suggest to our Arab partners that they sit at the negotiating table with Israel when we ourselves were not conducting a direct dialogue with this country?

[Leonov] Were Soviet-Arab consultations conducted prior to adoption of the decision on restoring diplomatic relations with Israel?

[Kolotusha] Consultations were not conducted. But we attempted to predict the reaction.

[Leonov] Were the predictions confirmed?

[Kolotusha] The reaction of the Arab countries was more complicated than we had anticipated.

[Leonov] So, will contacts with Israel not damage our relations with the Arab countries?

[Kolotusha] I do not think so. Our policy in the Middle East is becoming more balanced.

[Leonov] Can we say that we have stopped being the antithesis to the Americans in the Middle East?

[Kolotusha] Yes. If previously we attempted to "push" each other out of the region, now the USSR and the United States are attempting to mutually consider each other's interests. There are spheres where we are cooperating and there are spheres where we remain competitors but, in my opinion, we have a single opinion on the main issue: for the USSR and the United States, the losses of the confrontation in the Middle East in any case exceed the possible unilateral gain.

[Leonov] So, the East, as they say, is a delicate matter. You have many high-class professionals in your administration. Will your Orientalists find work if the reorganization reductions affect them?

[Kolotusha] I do not want to think about that. In the event of the breakup of the Union MID, there will be an inevitably significant and drastic decline of professionalism even if the experts are reallocated among the republics.

The USSR was not spoiling to join the organizers of the peace conference. First of all, the Americans invited the USSR there after unsuccessful attempts to independently force the conflict's participants to sit at the negotiating table. In this sense, the USSR's role in the Middle East has once again been legitimized. And the organization of the conference in Madrid became the success of Soviet diplomacy. I want to believe that it will not be the last....

Economic, Political Changes in Syria Examined

92UF0308A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
3 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by A. Filonik: "Movement toward Democracy"]

[Text] In the international classification Syria is a country where centralized economic management predominates. But private enterprise does exist there and reproduces some elements of the market and market relations, creating a certain alternative to the state economic system.

The attack on private property began in the late 1950's, in the period of the union with Egypt, and greatly intensified in the mid-1960's when the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party came to power. This party proclaimed its ideology to be Ba'athism as a variety of non-proletarian socialism and carried out a series of nationalizations that marked the beginning of large-scale direct state intervention in the economy. Before this joint-stock capital had predominated in Syria, mainly in light industry. National enterprise was weak and the existing capital was linked to trade and concentrated mainly in the circulation sphere, holding back development of the production sphere, and accordingly preserving the country's production and technological backwardness. Against this background the patriotism of the leadership which expressed the interests of new social forces—the middle strata, peasantry, and mid-level military officers—found expression in a desire to transform the country, limit its economic dependence, overcome the monocultural character of the economy, and diversify and increase production.

Relaying on the studies of their own theoreticians and using the experience of the then-socialist countries the Ba'ath Party headed the entire transformation process, seeing the creation of a far-reaching and powerful state sector and industrialization as the panacea for all ills. In time they managed to build it, and this sector now encompasses the entire production and transportation infrastructure, the power industry, mining, and many sectors of manufacturing industry; in other words, it has taken over practically the whole economy. There is no denying that state participation in economic life helped make Syria an agrarian-industrial country, build large enterprises with modern technology, and establish new production facilities and sectors. As a result the volume of output produced and its assortment increased notably and national income and other indicators grew many-fold. But these major changes did not have enough impact on the life of the majority of ordinary Syrians, even though the Ba'athists did a great deal to improve the people's well-being. In any

case, the Syrian countryside does not give a desolate impression, and the cities certainly do not appear neglected.

There are many reasons that achievements which could have served the common good in large part lost their effectiveness. And here the parallel with the situation in our country thrusts itself forward. After all, the Ba'athists borrowed many elements of our socialist model of development and followed the path of collectivizing property. But while they created, at great expense, the basis for building industry and intensifying agriculture, they forgot about the people who were doing the work, depriving many of any personal interest in participation in state production. And this is in a country where a person's social status traditionally is determined by his occupation. Production at bottom remained inefficient; the pilot plants did not fit into economic relations because they were built more for prestige than from real need. Given the shortage of hard currency 50 percent of the imported equipment is standing idle because of shortages of raw materials and spare parts; production is being eroded by worker transience and undermined by incompetent management and mistaken planning from the unified center. Yes, Syria did not have complete collectivization, but what remained in private ownership is tied to the state sector and reproduces its flaws in itself.

Syria has no military-industrial complex, but spending to buy military hardware in order to achieve military parity with Israel, maintain defense potential, and support the deterrent forces in Lebanon absorbs up to half of the country's ongoing budget.

The lack of a mechanism for natural regulation of economic ties led to immoderate growth of bureaucracy and a strengthening of the parasitic bourgeoisie, which has latched onto the state sector and turned it into a feeding trough. Embezzlement, corruption, and bribery have blossomed.

Since 1970 a program of economic normalization has been underway under slogans of "corrective movement." In fact it arose as a reaction to the excesses of the leftist Ba'athist leadership which was at the helm of power in the second half of the 1960's. Declaring a policy of liberalizing the economy and attracting private and foreign capital, the new leadership still remained a supporter of state property and the state sector continues to predominate.

Half-measures to restructure the economic indeed had halfway results. Only the service sphere and contracting received an impetus to develop, while a far-flung shadow economy with contraband and speculation grew up. Western capital was generally deaf to the initiative because of the lack of investment guarantees, the lack of favorable spheres for the application of capital, and accusations that Syria is involved in international terrorism.

In essence the deadend situation continues to the present day, although Syria recently adopted the appropriate law to guarantee the rights of foreign investors and declared privileges for entrepreneurial business. This step was very timely, for inflation was rising, supply of goods was

worsening, and discontent was growing. But the Syrian leadership drew practical lessons from the events in the late 1970's and early 1980's when social protest merged with the fundamentalist movement of Islamic brothers and nearly led to civil war.

In the last year the situation in the country has tended to improve: stores have filled their shelves, there are more goods, and the trade balance has been reduced without shortages. It is hard to say now whether a slow normalization has begun or this is the result of a temporary surge. It is true that the revitalization of the economy coincided with an increase in the extraction and export of petroleum discovered by Western companies in new deposits.

There is no question that Damascus is looking for opportunities to increase cooperation with foreign capitalists. Arab business feels itself to be less constrained and is welcoming this cooperation, although it is far from large-scale. But Western capitalists are taking a tough posture, waiting for new evidence that the regime has softened and trying to influence Syrians, to force them to make certain concessions. After all, in the eyes of many in the West Syria is an authoritarian state with ideology-bound policies where in reality one party rules undivided. The fact that an elected parliament functions in the country, that there is local self-government, that a national progressive front has been formed which took in, in addition to Ba'athists, communists, socialists, and unionists, that there are an organized trade union movement and many public organizations—in the opinion of the West these are not determining considerations because all the power structures and social institutions are profoundly imbued with Ba'athism.

Under the influence of objective factors, including factors that are certainly related to the USSR declaration of perestroika and de-ideologization of politics, certain changes have taken shape in Syria. The Syrian leadership has enough wisdom and foresight not to miss the realities in the world community which are changing before their eyes and the abrupt thawing of the global political climate. For exactly this reason the parliamentary elections held this year were marked by greater democracy, an increase in the number of independent deputies, and the appearance of representatives of national minorities among the parliamentarians. A large group of political prisoners was recently freed. All this creates a significant political record that testifies to Damascus's good will, its aspiration not to miss its chance and to fit smoothly into the general movement toward democracy and cooperation.

New Factors Blocking Security System in Persian Gulf

*92UF0267A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Nov 91
Single Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent V. Belyakov: "The 'Six' Backs the West"]

[Text] Cairo—As is interestingly the case at times: yesterday an event shook the world, today there is hardly anyone who remembers it. A year ago, at the height of the Kuwait crisis, mankind forgot, apparently, about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now it is on everyone's lips once again. On

the other hand, there has been a marked diminution in material on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone, where a devastating war died away just eight months ago. But highly noteworthy processes are occurring there.

The war against Iraq was at its height when the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council engaged in earnest in a discussion of the problem of how to prevent a recurrence of the events like Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The question of the creation of a regional security system was squarely on the agenda.

In February, while in Riyadh, I met with Abdallah Bishara, general secretary of the Cooperation Council. He said then that the plans of "the Six" contained two main components of such a security system: the creation of strong armies, which were in time to switch to a single command, and the deployment in Kuwait of an international force consisting chiefly of forces from Islamic states. Bishara cited as additional components the normalization of relations with Iran (they were damaged at the time of the Iran-Iraq war) and promotion of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would make it possible to stabilize the situation in the Near East as a whole.

"The Six" are really tackling the last two tasks. Contacts with Iran have already led to an improvement in relations with it. It is expected that new steps will be taken on the eve of the summit, scheduled for December, of participants in the Islamic Conference Organization in the Senegalese capital of Dakar. Bishara intends to take part in the third stage of the "peace process," which has begun in Madrid, when regional problems, including such a serious one as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, will be collectively discussed. As far, however, as the two main pillars of the security system are concerned, there have been considerable changes in the positions of "the Six" here.

The strengthening of the armies, with the subsequent creation of a single command, mentioned by Bishara was to have developed primarily into a reorganization and expansion of the joint forces under the name of "Peninsular Shield." These forces, numbering 10,000 men, have been deployed in the area of the Saudi city of Hafar al-Batin in the northeast of the kingdom, not far from the border with Iraq. It was anticipated increasing them to 100,000. But essentially no steps have been taken in the present year toward the achievement of this goal. In the opinion of the Western press, the process is being impeded by disagreements among "the Six" as regards how to finance "Peninsular Shield" and who will command it.

But it is not just this, I believe. There has been a change following the liberation of Kuwait in "the Six's" views on the main question: under whose military umbrella to seek refuge—Islamic or Western?

A political alliance, which Egyptian journalists christened "Six plus Two," had begun to take shape even prior to the start of military operations against Iraq. "The Six"—the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, and the Two—Egypt and Syria, who sent army contingents to the Multinational

Force. Their foreign ministers have gotten together regularly and coordinated their positions. At the last such meeting, which was held after the liberation of Kuwait, at the start of March, in the Syrian capital, the so-called "Damascus Declaration" was initialed. The main point therein was "the Six's" agreement that Egyptian and Syrian forces should comprise the backbone of a regional security system in the Persian Gulf zone. It was contemplated convening a summit of these eight Arab states and conclusively confirming the "Damascus Declaration" threat.

But time went by, and the meeting kept getting postponed. Official requests for the deployment of their forces on a permanent basis were not received in Cairo and Damascus. At the end of May Egyptian President H. Mubarak, having lost patience, announced the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the Gulf. The Syrians followed his example. "None of 'the Six' wants any more to do with the expeditionary forces of Egypt and Syria," the British journal MIDDLE EAST affirms.

What has happened? New factors have evidently emerged.

The principal one is that, despite both the war and the uprising of the Shi'ites in Southern Iraq and the Kurds in the North, Baghdad has endured. More, although Iraq's military power was seriously undermined by the Multinational Force, it was not eliminated conclusively. The problem of security for that same Kuwait has assumed an entirely specific outline—protecting itself against possible Iraqi revenge. For this the defenders have to be powerful. The Egyptian and Syrian troops in the Multinational Force appeared manifestly more insipid than their Western colleagues.

But is it, perhaps, simply that the Western powers, interested in securing uninterrupted supplies of oil from the Persian Gulf, have put pressure on the Arab rulers? I do not believe so. For they are condemned to be partners. The countries of the Gulf will not find other purchasers for their oil, and without having sold it, they are not in a position not only to ensure economic prosperity but simply to feed their peoples even.

Thus was a choice made between the Arab and Western umbrellas. In the United States at the end of September Kuwait signed a 10-year military cooperation agreement. It provides for the storing of American weapons on Kuwaiti territory, joint military maneuvers with the United States and the participation of American advisers in the training of the Kuwaiti Army. The first joint American-Kuwaiti maneuvers were conducted at the end of October, and new, 10-day, maneuvers began on 11 November.

It is not a question in the agreement of the permanent military presence of the United States in Kuwait but it persists as yet. Kuwait intends to sign similar agreements with Britain and France. And Kuwait's National Council—the consultative body under the emir—has gone even further than the government: It has called for the creation on the country's territory of American and British military

bases. At the end of October an agreement on military cooperation with the United States was concluded by Bahrain also.

It has to be said that this metamorphosis was greeted in Cairo with sepulchral silence. But Damascus could not contain itself. General H. Shehabi, chief of Syria's General Staff, declared that his country was disturbed by the foreign military presence on Arab land and would seek its elimination.

Somewhere in between the positions of Kuwait and Syria was the biggest state of "the Six"—Saudi Arabia. The appearance of Western forces in the kingdom was formerly approved by far from everyone. I was told in the winter in Riyadh about cassette tapes with a recording of the sermons of Muslim clerics aimed against the Western military presence on Saudi soil changing hands. Both before and during the war King Fahd declared repeatedly that Western forces would leave the country as soon as they had accomplished their mission—the liberation of Kuwait. But the troop withdrawal has still not been completed.

At the end of October the United States began, it is true, the withdrawal from Saudi Arabia of the bulk of the arms and munitions, which it was contemplated storing on its territory, and their maintenance personnel. Commenting on this step, THE WASHINGTON POST observed that it had been brought about by "the Arabs' sensitivity to a permanent American military presence in the Gulf." It is anticipated completing the operation at the start of next year.

As far, however, as Egypt and Syria are concerned, they remain "the Six's" main political partners in the Arab world. It was decided at the latest meeting of foreign ministers of the "Six Plus Two" group, which took place on 11 November in Cairo, to begin implementation of the "Damascus Declaration" in the political and economic spheres. The ministers also agreed to make changes to the declaration and to postpone a decision on security issues until better times.

Anti-Saddam Exhibition Organized by Human Rights Body

PM0912155391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Dec 91 First Edition p 7

["Own information" report: "Who Will Laugh Last?"]

[Text] Husayn loves to smile in public. His smile is just another confirmation of his self-confidence. Saddam needed it when his army invaded Kuwait, when Iraqi missiles "took off" for Israel, and when dissidents were tortured in Baghdad jails. Masses of supporters, fanatically devoted to Saddam, are plunged into ecstasy when they see the smiling dictator...

So if you think Saddam should smile a little less or, even better, stop smiling altogether, come to the exhibition being held in Moscow by the Organization in Defense of Human Rights in Iraq, set up in March 1983 as a coalition of like-minded people.

After the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait and their leader's call for a "Jihad, or holy war, against foreign control of holy soil," the Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq appealed to the world community with a statement exposing this call as a plot to confuse Muslims and divert their attention from Saddam's failures. The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq firmly believes that it is important for all mankind not to cease condemning the crimes committed by Saddam. Everyone should know about his policy of terror, torture, and oppression.

The exhibition of the destruction wrought by one man—as Sahib al-Hakim, general secretary of the Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq, described it—will be held 11-13 December 1991 between 1000 and 1800 hours at the NOVOSTI Russian news agency cultural center at the following address: Moscow, 4 Zubovskiy Boulevard.

Brochures and badges will be distributed among visitors. In addition, you will be able to sign a petition condemning the Husayn regime. The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq will send this petition to the United Nations in New York.

RSA Foreign Minister Views Prospects for USSR
92UF0321A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Nov 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Roelof Botha, RSA minister of foreign affairs, by Yuriy Sigov]

[Text] [Sigov] Mr. Botha, this is your first visit to the Soviet Union in your 15 years as RSA minister of foreign affairs. You probably knew what you would see here, but something must have surprised you about the USSR. Was there anything in particular?

[Botha] My visit to the Soviet Union was extremely brief, but it was long enough to convince me that your country's greatest asset is its people. It was the people I met in St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Moscow that left an absolutely indelible impression. They were not the bloodthirsty communists and dogmatists I expected, but people quite similar to us Afrikaaners. This applies to the political leaders I met during my visit and to the ordinary people I met on the street, in hotels, and at the airport.

Before I came to the Soviet Union, I read Pasternak and Tolstoy and listened to Chaykovskiy, but it was one thing to visualize your country in my mind and quite another to see it with my own eyes. It was incredible. At a meeting with Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg, I said that I could die happy now that I had been in the Soviet Union, which had long been a dream of mine.

[Sigov] Nevertheless, you must be aware of our economic problems. Did you have time during your visit to see the Soviet stores where all of the counters are bare?

[Botha] I simply cannot understand why there is nothing for sale anywhere in your country. That is, I understand that this is the fault of the system which existed for more than 70 years in the USSR, but the conveyor belt carrying goods from the producer to the store and then to the customer works in any state, even with the most inefficient system.

The present state of the USSR economy is similar to conditions in the Republic of South Africa 20 or 25 years ago. The main problem is that the state is still "ravishing" your economy, despite all of the talk about privatization. The monopoly of the government and the producers results in monopoly prices. How is your state combating this? It is appointing its own financial inspectors to oversee production and distribution and thinks this will solve the problem.

The experience of South Africa proves that financial inspectors can be bribed and that government control cannot solve all economic problems. Only competition by free producers can provide the Soviet people with sufficient quantities of food and goods.

[Sigov] But everyone in our country is always saying that Soviet goods are inferior to their Western counterparts and that we cannot emerge from this crisis without foreign aid....

[Botha] I am simply amazed. Everyone I spoke to in your country complained that everything Soviet is automatically inferior. What about your space technology? Or your nuclear technology? What about your equipment for mining and metallurgy? Don't you know that all of this meets the highest world quality standards? The Soviet people are phenomenally talented, and the only thing you need is to put this talent at the service of all the people.

[Sigov] How were you treated in the Union and how do politicians and ordinary citizens in South Africa feel about the Soviet Union today?

[Botha] I was treated well. No one was intimidated by my "apartheid origins." As for the Soviet Union, I would say that people in my country respect you and sympathize with your difficulties. It seems to me that the Soviet Union is more like South Africa than any other country—in the way people relate to one another, in our problems (ethnic and economic), and in historical parallels.

Think back, for example, to the Anglo-Boer war at the beginning of this century. We had 50,000 troops and the English had 10 times as many. We were fighting for our own land and they were the invaders. The whole world, including Russia, helped us and sympathized with us and condemned the colonizers. Nevertheless, we lost that war. Why?

Because it is necessary to rely primarily on one's own strength, and not on outside help, in any kind of difficult situation. The Soviet Union now believes that it cannot emerge from its severe economic crisis without foreign credit and specialists. But what have you done to improve your own situation? What kind of changes has production undergone, and what kind of incentives have people been offered to work harder?

There have been no changes at all, but the USSR is wandering through the world with its hand out, begging for alms in the West. You have to realize that no one else will solve your problems. Everyone in the world has enough problems of his own. You will have to learn to help yourself, as South Africa did at the time of the international boycott. Only reliance on your own strength, particularly in view of the great strength you possess, can start the ball rolling; then you can begin using aid from abroad.

[Sigov] During your trip you visited the Baltic zone, Russia, and the Ukraine. How does South Africa plan to structure its relations with the Soviet Union in the future—as relations with a single state or with each of its former republics?

[Botha] I can answer this question by drawing another parallel between events in South Africa and the Soviet Union. There is every indication that you are through with communism, and we are in the process of dismantling the apartheid system. We are no longer separated by ideological dogmas, but are, rather, united by purely human feelings and mutual economic interests.

As far as South Africa's official relations with your country are concerned, we have to look at the facts. Today the USSR still exists as a single state, no matter what people

there might say. We are maintaining relations with the USSR and recognize it as a partner in international negotiations.

When I was in the Baltic zone, however, I discussed the establishment of diplomatic relations with these states. We do not intend to open South African embassies there at this time, and our affairs will be conducted by the section representing our interests in Moscow. In Kiev we reached an agreement on an RSA representation in the Ukraine. There are good prospects for cooperation with St. Petersburg, especially in business. Of course, we are quite interested in developing a comprehensive relationship with Russia.

[Sigov] What are the chances of full diplomatic relations between the Republic of South Africa and the USSR?

[Botha] We are willing to establish these relations at any time and in any form. I do not foresee any obstacles.

[Sigov] In the past year, beginning with the historic speech by RSA President Frederik de Klerk in parliament on 1 February, important changes have taken place in South Africa. Many of the disgraceful laws of apartheid have been repealed, mixed marriages are allowed, and blacks are being allowed into places (swimming pools, beaches, and movie theaters) once reserved for whites. But there is a paradox here: There is not one representative of the black majority in your delegation or on the staff of the section representing your interests in Moscow.

[Botha] During the replacement of the old and obsolete apartheid structures, we have worked on the premise that any person, regardless of the color of his skin, can apply for

any job corresponding to his level of education. Regrettably, one of the main errors of apartheid was the segregation of people by skin color and the consequent unequal educational opportunities. Today the social status of an individual depends on his professional training, and this depends on his level of education. It is this criterion, and not skin color, that will be the basis of all appointments to government positions and other jobs.

[Sigov] As a person visiting our country for the first time, how would you describe its immediate prospects? After all, in terms of political instability, the Soviet Union and the Republic of South Africa probably surpass all other countries in the world....

[Botha] For me, this visit to the USSR is representative of a whole era. You know, some of the people I met here had never been to our country but had nevertheless written absolutely scurrilous newspaper articles about South Africa and about me, as the minister of a "white racist government." They had called me all kinds of names. When I met them, I asked: "Tell me, what have I ever done to you? You have never even seen me and have not been to our country. Why are you so furious?" The surprising thing was that these close-minded people are few and far between in the Soviet Union. The rest of the people are absolutely normal; they are well-meaning and polite people with as much warmth as the South Africans.

Yes, the Soviet Union is in a difficult position, but I saw the desire to continue the reforms, however hard this might be. People still yearn for something better. All is not lost yet. As long as people have faith, things should progress.

P.S. We learned from reliable sources that Roelof Botha has scheduled another trip to the USSR for December of this year, during which he plans to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of South Africa.

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